

JPRS-WER-86-015

13 February 1986

West Europe Report

FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

13 February 1986

WEST EUROPE REPORT

CONTENTS

POLITICAL

BELGIUM

Initial Difficulties Confronting New Cabinet (Frans Verleyen; KNACK, 4 Dec 85)	1
Volksunie's Gabriels on Election Loss, Strategy (Jaak Gabriels Interview; KNACK, 13 Nov 85)	6
Government Program Leaves Many Areas Open (KNACK, 27 Nov 85)	12

DENMARK

Three Candidates Vying To Replace Retiring CP Chairman (Jorgen Placing; AKTUEL, 23 Dec 85)	17
SDP Faces Dilemma Over Socialist People's Party Move Against NATO (Editorial; BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, 29 Dec 85)	19
Leftists Forming Front Organization To Support Kabul Regime (Jeton; BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, 29 Dec 85)	21
Schluter, Jorgensen Girding for Possible Early Election in 1986 (Various sources, various dates)	22
Issues 'Possibly Toppling Government, by Bjarne Kjaer	22
Schluter Concedes Coalition Dissent, by Solveig Rodsgaard	26
Jorgensen Attacks Foreign Minister, by Peder Munch Hansen	33
Socialist Paper: 'Confidence Crisis', Editorial	34
Schluter Policies Hit, Editorial	35
Jorgensen: Election Likely, by Helle Ravn Larsen	36

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Parties Begin Positioning Themselves for 1987 Election (Robert Leicht; SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, 21 Sep 85)	38
ZEIT Analyzes Political Style, Strategy of SPD Candidate Rau (Gunter Hofmann; DIE ZEIT, 20 Dec 85)	41
Attitudes Toward Economic Growth, Employment Policy Analyzed (Michael von Klipstein, Burkhard Struempel; DAS PARLAMENT, 19 Oct 85)	47

FINLAND

Former Ambassador to U.S. on Youth Attitudes Toward USSR, U.S. (Tuomo Lappalainen; SUOMEN KUVALEHTI, 20 Dec 85)	68
Koivisto Interviewed on Coalition Alternatives, Foreign Policy (Pekka Hyvarinen, Mikko Pohtola; SUOMEN KUVALEHTI, 3 Jan 86)	74

ICELAND

Polls Show Increased Support for Left, Progressives (MORGUNBLADID, various dates)	81
Independence Party Suffers Decline	81
Fewer Support Government Coalition	82
Breakdown of Progressive Supporters	83
Newspaper Analyzes Polls Meaning	85

ITALY

FGCI 'University League' Congress Held in Bologna (L'UNITA, various dates)	87
250 Delegates Meet, by Maria Alice Presti	87
Delegates Propose Reforms, by Maria Alice Presti	89
Natta Gives Closing Speech	90
New Student Movement Applauded, by Maria Alice Presti	93
PCI Champions Rights of Foreigners (Maddalena Tulanti; L'UNITA, 11 Dec 85)	96
Briefs	
Decree Law on Foreigners Postponed	99

NETHERLANDS

Declining Communist Daily May Fold in 1986 (Arno Haijtema, Frank van Zijl; DE VOLKSKRANT, 9 Nov 85)	100
--	-----

NORWAY

Labor Party Leftist Steen Hits Willoch Foreign Policies (Reiulf Steen; ARBEIDERBLADET, 7 Dec 85)	104
1985 Proved Difficult Year for Coalition, Progressives (Bjorn Talen; AFTENPOSTEN, 31 Dec 85)	107

SWEDEN

Soviet Embassy Should Be Forced To Cut Staff Due to Spying (Editorial; SVENSKA DAGBLADET, 22 Dec 85)	111
Karin Soder Gives Views on Center Party Future (DAGENS NYHETER, 15, 17 Dec 85)	113
Economy, Taxes Weak Areas, by Sven Svensson	113
SDP 'Collective Society' Assailed, by Karin Soder	116
Paper Lauds New Clarity, Editorial	119
Other Papers Comment, Editorial	120
Soder Vows To Honor Pact With Christian League (Karin Soder Interview; DAGENS NYHETER, 22 Dec 85)	122
Poll Shows Gains for Liberals, Setback for Center, Moderates (DAGENS NYHETER, 22 Dec 85)	125
Liberals Largest Nonsocialist Party, by Ake Ekdahl	125
Nonsocialists' Disunity Seen Increasing, by Sven Svensson	128
Liberal Party Executive Questions Palme Plan To Visit USSR (Andres Kung; SVENSKA DAGBLADET, 23 Dec 85)	132
Annie Marie Sundbom Named To Post at United Nations (Sune Olofson; SVENSKA DAGBLADET, 24 Dec 85)	136

TURKEY

Reagan's Report on Cyprus Seen as Pre-Election Gambit (Tanju Akerson; CUMHURIYET, 28 Nov 85)	137
---	-----

MILITARY

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Swedish Defense Capability Seen Reduced, Worries Norwegians (Margit Silberstein; SVENSKA DAGBLADET, 5 Dec 85)	138
International Study of Soviet Northern Flank Threat Reviewed (Horst Bacia; FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, 7 Dec 85)	141

French Nuclear Shield Said To Offer No Guarantee for FRG (Karl Feldmeyer; FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, 21 Dec 85)	144
AUSTRIA	
Area Defense Combines Key Zone Defense, Harassment Tactics (Hannes Philipp; TRUPPENDIENST, Oct 85)	148
Fixed Fortifications Blocking Forces Linked to Area Defense (Hans Widhofner, Fridolin Gigacher; TRUPPENDIENST, Oct 85)	157
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY	
Military Medical Capabilities, Shortcomings Reviewed by Chief (Hansjoachim Linde; WEHRTECHNIK, Dec 85)	163
NORWAY	
Hawk Base Defense System Adapted To Protect Airports (WEHRTECHNIK, Nov 85)	171
SWEDEN	
Helicopter, Fighter Pilots Leaving Forces as Crisis Grows (SVENSKA DAGBLADET, 4 Dec 85)	173
Acute Personnel Shortage Disturbing, by Erik Liden	173
Helicopter Pilots' Complaint Unreceived, by Bjorn Hygstedt	174
Squadron's Pilots Quit, by Erik Liden	175
Air Force Commander Sven-Olof Olson Warns of Funds Shortage (Leif Carlsson; SVENSKA DAGBLADET, 14 Dec 85)	177
Bildt Leads Attack on Government Defense Policy (DAGENS NYHETER, 17 Dec 85)	179
Dissatisfied with Antisubmarine Defense, by Dick Ljungberg	179
Disagreement on Budget Figures, Editorial	181
Briefs	
Volvo Trucks to Air Force	183
ECONOMIC	
DENMARK/GREENLAND	
Home Rule Government in Effort To Revive Seal Hunting (Thorkild Dahl; BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, 26 Dec 85)	184

FINLAND

Risks, Challenges, Future of Eastern Trade (Various sources, various dates)	187
Challenges of Licenses, Information Technology, by Teppo Tiilikainen	187
S&T Cooperation With USSR	190
Western Trade Most Important, by Pertti Honkanen	194
Space Technology Cooperation: USSR, Finland, Sweden (TIEDONANTAJA, 14 Nov 85)	198
Agricultural Project To Continue in USSR (Ilkka Lampi; UUSI SUOMI, 16 Nov 85)	199

ITALY

Briefs	
Pizzinato Heads CGIL Poll	201

NETHERLANDS

Employers, Unions Give Views on Shorter Work Week (Pieter Broertjes, Jose Smits; DE VOLKSKRANT, 30 Nov 85)	202
All Forecasts Seen in Agreement Regarding Weaker Economy (Anders Nordstrom; DAGENS NYHETER, 22 Dec 85)	207

ENERGY

NORWAY

State, Oil Firms Shaken by Failure To Find Oil in Block (Flemming Dahl; AFTENPOSTEN, 30 Dec 85)	211
Unanticipated Economic Growth Seen Resulting in Power Deficit (Kjell Aaserud; AFTENPOSTEN, 30 Dec 85)	213

INITIAL DIFFICULTIES CONFRONTING NEW CABINET

Brussels KNACK in Dutch 4 Dec 85 pp 12-16

[Article by Frans Verleyen: "Being Included Is More Important Than Winning"]

[Text] How was Martens V different from Martens VI? Some people are even talking about Verhofstadt I, Leysen I, or Martens V bis. In search of that small difference in 10 points.

It all began 2 months ago with the introductory note with which Formateur Wilfried Martens opened the deliberations on the structure and nature of his future government. It was a vague, cautious text, one intended to be expanded, tightened, sharpened, edited by the 13 negotiators at Stuyvenberg. That occurred only to a certain degree. Just as in early 1982, Martens is waiting cautiously to be granted special powers before he becomes specific. He wants to moderate the cascade of government expenditure--that much is clear. But so far not a soul knows anything about how he intends to do it.

1. As usual at the start of a new cabinet, the public is very interested in the political personalia, the high-fliers, and the interesting details, although these things are usually soon forgotten.

Why has Minister Freddy Vreven really fallen into disfavor, to the great irritation of his mother, who is scolding Verhofstadt? Why did Frans Grootjans definitely not want to be a minister any more, although he is now ambitious again to be the president of the Flemish Council? Why did leading PRL figure Jean Gol prefer to have Georges Mundeleer in the government rather than Henri Simonet, who had just joined his party? What exactly was the behind-the-scenes role of EC Commissioner Willy de Clercq in resolving the rivalries and claims on portfolios within the PVV? What arguments did Wilfried Martens use to convince Guy Verhofstadt to trade the Finance Ministry he had asked for for Budget, Science, and Planning? Will there be anything to console the long list of people who thought they would have a role to play in the cabinet but never got that magic phone call: Jos Chabert, Guido Verhaegen, Ward Beysen, Francis Vermeiren, Herman Van Rompuy, Jos Dupré, Hugo Weckx, Marc Olivier, Paul Breyne, Chris Moors?

Record

In the PVV in particular the deliberations on the cabinet formation have left tensions behind. They will probably continue to reverberate right up to the coming congress, where Annemie Neyts is to be confirmed as chairwoman. And will Minister Herman De Croo recover from what has turned out to be his vain ambition of finally becoming party chairman? At one point he refused to join the government but yielded when he was given responsibility for foreign trade in addition to transport. Of course all that is due to the fact that Guy Verhofstadt was unwilling to face a cold shower in the government unless he could protect his back adequately with a party chairman he had sufficient influence over. It is just about certain that Willy De Clercq played a role as negotiator in this. Even so, Mrs. Neyts' position will have to be defended against some of her rivals until the PVV's December congress has definitively confirmed her.

For several days there was a related problem with the unsuccessful attempt to bring CVP Chairman Frank Swaelen into the government and to entrust the CVP leadership to a woman: Wivina Demeester or Miet Smet. That set off a chain reaction of counter-candidates (including both Herman Van Rompuy and Jean-Luc Dehaene), which in the end compelled Swaelen to stay where he was. In the end things turned out very simply for the CVP: all the CVP members of the previous government were kept on in the new one, and the newcomers largely strengthened the so-called "Dehaene-Martens axis." State Secretaries Wivina Demeester and Miet Smet have belonged to that for a long time. They, however, will have to look for something worthwhile to do: the responsibilities they have been given (Public Health plus Handicapped Policy and Environmental Concerns plus "Social Emancipation") threaten to be empty names. Furthermore, the policy matters affecting individuals which they are supposed in principle to deal with are the responsibility of the Flemish government. It might have been more useful to have given both women a more meaningful role, such as that of chef du cabinet to a real minister. After all, having three female CVP state secretaries threatens to turn out to be just window-dressing and thus to prove disillusioning. There is no danger of that with Paula D'Hondt-Van Opdenbosch, back in her usual place at Posts, Telegraph, and Telephones, though this time it is directly under Wilfried Martens himself. A strange arrangement but an important one: the CVP is now in charge of the RTT [Telegraph and Telephone Authority] contract "of the century" and the complicated conflict connected with that and involving both Bell Telephone and the Société Générale.

The Christian Democrats did not get everything their own way, however. The CVP had never had anybody in the Brussels Executive, and did not manage it this time either, even though there was a complete turn-over in the three-man delegation from Brussels. The PSC did not manage to get Education. The chairmanship of the Walloon government for 4 years will be good enough.

Many kinds of pressure and counter-pressure have resulted in Belgium's now being governed by a record number of people: 46 ministers, state secretaries, and members of the Executive, responsible for some 60 departments in all. Wilfried Martens failed in his goal of forming a small government with a limited number of super ministries. He has admitted that himself. Unless very precise "protocols" have been drawn up precisely defining the competencies of all those people, we can anticipate a great many conflicts of authority within Martens VI. The fact that roughly half the members of Martens V have kept the same job may help preserve the peace within the governing team.

2. As soon as we have all this political to-do behind us, the general political significance of the government declaration should become clearer to the MP's of the majority and to the public. Everybody will have to come to terms with the special powers requested by Wilfried Martens for the third time, for the period until 31 March 1987. These special powers are quietly bringing about a thoroughgoing change in our political system. The prime minister went pretty far in mentioning this transfer of constitutional competence in the same breath with the "cooperation" he so strives for of the House of Representatives and the Senate in his economic recovery policy. It was melancholy for the 60 newcomers in the House who have to start their career in this way. Because they will have to surrender their sovereignty in the knowledge that some new ministers, such as André Damseaux at Education, are flagrantly incompetent and really do not deserve to have things made easy with an enabling act. But it may be that Daniël Coens can make up for that by taking his PRL colleague from Liège in tow.

One advantage the cabinet has is the fact that Martens has succeeded in regrouping the state secretaries under ministers of the same political persuasion. Continual conflicts such as occurred in the past, as between Paula D'Hondt and Herman De Croo or between Ridder Xavier de Donnée and Leo Tindemans, should be lacking in the future.

You can also see some communal harmony in the division of authority among the ministers: despite what their regional opposition says, just about all the leading figures in the government claim that it is more Flemish or more Walloon or more social or more liberal than the previous one. Everybody seems to have gotten what he wanted, except for the PVV, which asked for new negotiations on the way things are going in national education. And the CVP backbenchers have gotten no reply to their request to change the position of Charles-Ferdinand Nothomb. He stays at Interior and continues to be in charge of the Public Office. Furthermore, he is responsible for the decentralization of towns and provinces, a project he had already been working on quietly, and as a fervent provincialist he may further brake the process of federalization. His duties, which remain unchanged, are not only important because of the Happart issue. After the 1988 council elections Charles-Ferdinand Nothomb will be able to name the mayors and in doing so see to it that the facilities of the six suburban districts are protected.

His fellow party member, the gifted Philippe Maystadt, is minister of economic affairs and as such is responsible for five major policy areas: national industries, industrial compensation, energy program contracts, prices and competition, and international economic treaties. Particularly now that Raymond Levy has announced that despite Jean Gandois things are going badly again at Cockerill-Sambre, and Kempen Coal Mines faces a historic challenge, Maystadt will be a key figure in the cabinet.

3. Working alongside him will be that other eye-catching figure, Guy Verhofstadt. Martens did manage to haul him on board after all to ensure that the permanent struggle between the young Liberal and the great advocate of government social provisions, Jean-Luc Dehaene, can be fought out in the discretion of the cabinet. As minister of the budget Verhofstadt faces a just about hopeless task. First of all he has to whitewash the missing 40 billion in the 1985 budget. Then he has to show how the government can achieve a deficit of only 7 percent by 1989, i.e. almost 4 percent less than now, but still 3 percent more than the European average will be at that time.

The Christian Democrats are extraordinarily delighted with the inclusion of Verhofstadt. They are firmly convinced that he will quickly be compelled to make concessions on the most important commandment in the Martens VI catechism: thou shalt not raise any taxes whatsoever in any manner. Because the granting of special powers will have to receive practical elaboration next spring in the 1986 budget (which is still not ready), Verhofstadt's talents will soon be put to the test. The ACV [Confederation of Christian Trade Unions] ministers are already chuckling in advance and like to point out that the Liberal vice-premier is also minister of planning, an area of policy that he must be ideologically opposed to. Everybody will be watching him and will punish the slightest concession.

Guy Verhofstadt, however, does have a little room to work in. He can take advantage of the current fall in interest rates and can help the treasury to new revenues that need not name their name by permitting a reduction in deductible items on the tax form ("fiscal expenditures") and by devolving some expenditures to lower levels of government that can levy taxes themselves, such as towns and provinces.

4. Business and the Union of Belgian Companies [VBO] are very sceptical about the probable industrial and economic significance of Martens VI, although the stock exchange seems to be reacting hopefully on the basis of international perceptions. But industry has not as yet accepted the vagueness of the government program, and VBO Chairman André Leysen has even launched a strong attack with his statement that Martens V did not bring the nation to the end of the tunnel at all. In Leysen's eyes there still has been no recovery policy worthy of the name. Government has just stayed fat and greedy. The fall in pay and the sacrifices have only strengthened the political powers and their social and union home bases. In order to achieve the officially stated goals of this cabinet if there is no change in policy, Leysen says, it will be necessary to make 10 times as many sacrifices. And he was not even talking about the implications

of the impending coal crisis in Limburg, which CVP'er Firmin Aerts will have to deal with as state secretary for energy.

The Central Business Council too is worried about a deflation effect and economic growth of just 0.8 percent next year as a result.

5. As for the unions, they already know that they have just about no chance in the next social consultation, and that the government itself will determine what happens to pay and related social figures. The cabinet also does not have any clear plans on reducing working hours, still the main goal of the unions in Belgium and Europe. The government's promise to reduce youth unemployment by 50,000 in the next 4 years is described as "half-hearted." The demographic reduction in the number of young people in the labor market will after all lead to a reduction in youth unemployment. This trend can be increased additionally by the proposed extension in the term of compulsory military service, with the favorable effect that will have on the statistics. Last year 16,000 recruits were released from military service, roughly half of the total. There will be less of that: it will probably go to 12 months in Belgium and 10 in Germany.

These are just pinpricks compared to the large-scale operation thought necessary to bring the social security system "with all its branches" into balance between income and expenditure. Because Belgium has the most expensive social security in the world, according to the OECD, some people are now thinking how useful a budget norm suggested by Marc Eyskens would be. Just as we do for the competitive position of our companies vis-à-vis the seven large industrial partners, we could in the same way and under legal guarantee limit the cost price of all our important expenditures to that of comparable countries.

6. Martens VI does not intend to permit any increase in the tax burden, at least not one directly visible. This difficult technical problem may also have political consequences. It seems that the government wants to toughen the fight against social fraud (anybody who refused a State Labor Service job would immediately be deprived of his stamp money) but make the tax inspectorate and the financial magistracy behave more liberally and supervise them better. This softening of the fight against tax fraud will probably be fought bitterly by the unions.

7. Flemish cultural policy comes into the hands of the very young Liberal communal minister, Patrick Dewael (30), whose name has already given rise to amusing puns. He is the one who will or will not liberalize and commercialize television. As soon as the Cable Decree is released from the alarm procedure where it got hung up in July, it will be possible to have a second network financed by the publishers of newspapers and weeklies and carrying advertising. The final formula, however, is still not known. Chairman Gaston Geens also wants to get RTL [Radio-Television Luxembourg] involved in this (and André Leysen has something to do with that indirectly), but there is still opposition to that in the CVP.

8. One of the most striking elements in the present political climate is the total fading away of the communal dimension: the majority spokesmen describe it as "sterile." The regional and communal governments now clearly serve as trash cans for cast-off political personalities and are made up centrally at the national level in one and the same political package deal. How we are to continue on now with that "refining and extending" of the state reform is very unclear. Furthermore, the provincial governments are so closely bound politically to the Martens VI cabinet, despite all federalist theory, that the bare majority in the Walloon Council (52 to 51) poses a permanent threat to the central government. Despite this fragility the French-speakers have concluded a Roman-blue contract for 8 years. On account of Melchior Wathelet, Gaston Geens' new PSC colleague, that should be viewed as particularly energetic.

9. The reactions to all this therefore, even in the pro-government press, are very lukewarm if not disappointed. The weariness of the government declaration has led to disappointment and to the thought that Wilfried Martens does not believe entirely in what he is doing. The bitterness of people like Hugo

Schiltz is as great as the disbelief in industry. Notable too is the displeasure of the Liberal newspaper HET LAATSTE NIEUWS: "The PVV is entering this government weakened and divided."

10. Various leading ministers have admitted by way of general conclusion in the last few days that the weak points of Martens VI leap to the eye: the vagueness, the lack of trust among the partners, and the further decay in the communal dossier. One of them even said that Wilfried Martens had prepared his team for a "mission impossible." The impossibility of achieving the budgetary goal will make the PVV in particular nervous, even though it "won in the negotiations on the program and only lost in the division of portfolios."

On the psychological side, the fact that antagonists Jean Gol and Charles-Ferdinand Nothomb remain in exactly the same jobs where they were creates an unpleasant situation. The Heizel drama and its aftermath never existed.

12593

CSO: 3614/44

VOLKSUNIE'S GABRIELS ON ELECTION LOSS, STRATEGY

Brussels KNACK in Dutch 13 Nov 85 pp 15-18

[Interview with Jaak Gabriels, president of the VU parliamentary party, by Hubert van Humbeeck and Jos Grobben: "Jaak Gabriels: 'We Sat Too long Around Idols'"; date and place not given; passages enclosed in slantlines, printed in italics]

[Text] An interview with the new president of the VU
[People's Union] parliamentary party in the House.

Question: In recent years, a whole series of issues has arisen which seemed made to measure for the VU: Happart, Wallonian steel, 59b, ... And yet, your party did lose the elections. Didn't your messages get across to the voters?

Jaak Gabriels: At the 1981 elections we compensated in a single blow for the Egmont loss. Until 1983, we scored at an unheard of level in public opinion polls, but then suddenly a setback occurred. Apparently the community issue became less important and we landed in a polarization wave, together with the liberals. During the weeks immediately preceding 13 October, 20 to 30 percent of the voters were still /undecided/ and then because of circus advertisements they went to one of the poles.

Question: But those issues were the best (part of sentence is missing). They were never even used in the campaign.

Gabriels: That is right. I think that we should not put the blame for the defeat on the outside world alone, but we must dare point the finger at ourselves. Those issues were very sound, but there was not enough strength for battle in the VU to pass them along to the citizens. /That/ is where things went wrong.

In my opinion there were two reasons; in the first place we came up too often with always the same figure heads, and there was not enough rejuvenation of the political personnel. And secondly, we often came across as confusing. Member of parliament X said /this/, and Y said /that/. That is anything but conducive to clarity.

Question: It is remarkable that rejuvenation is so hard to accomplish in the VU. While all kinds of new faces showed up in the other parties, your party had barely one Johan Sauwens.

Gabriels: We were indeed too late in coming up with new people. This may perhaps have something to do with the structure and the history of the People's Union. We simply sat for too long around God-the-Fathers and idols. I myself came from an ACV [Confederation of Christian Trade Unions] background; my father was a representative at the zinc plant in Rotem, but when I went to Louvain to study I became attracted by the diversity of the People's Union. There were people there such as Hugo Schiltz, Maurits Coppieters, and Maurits Van Haegendoren. That was very pluralistic and thus attractive. We have lost a large part of that attractiveness now. We have to work on that again. Together with those who created the party, those who will have to act in the future will take care of the changing of the guard.

Question: How is that to take place?

Gabriels: The president himself has already indicated this: via the rejuvenation of parliamentary party presidents, the renewal of party leadership and via the various districts.

Question: The president said that. Isn't it strange that Vic Anciaux, who after all did have to swallow that defeat, has to work out that rejuvenation as the person in charge of a special committee?

Gabriels: We clearly didn't want to engage in any head hunting. What good would it have done the party if drastic measures had been taken? That way a vacuum would have been created, and wounds would have been inflicted. A new president would have needed a full term in office to heal them again. This is why both the party leaders and the party council decided unanimously to do something together. I find that the healthiest solution.

Question: Earlier on, you mentioned problems of communication between your party and the voters. Isn't that an old wound which was also poignantly obvious at the time of Egmont?

Gabriels: As far as I am concerned, first of all the activities of the parliamentary parties should be better attuned to one another. Numerous and detailed discussions can take place within the parties, but we must be unanimous and use understandable language toward the outside. In recent years, I myself have participated in numerous panel discussions, where they hit me over the head with statements from colleagues in the House and in the Senate. I can assure you that you feel very stupid then.

Peddling

Question: It is remarkable that the People's Union declined nationally, while you achieved an excellent score in Limburg. Is there a difference then between your province and the rest of the country?

Gabriels: Incidentally I would like to point out that at the time of Egmont we also stood our ground. As for Limburg, I must make a distinction between the Tongeren-Maaseik district and Hasselt. In the former (Gabriels' district-editor) we came up with an open, younger team. In three of the eight cantons we are now the largest party and in several other ones the second. That is primarily due to the activities of our elected officials at the municipal level. An honest and consistent policy in that area has saved us from negative election trends.

Question: In Bree, where you are mayor, aren't you in fact governing with a kind of broad platform? Is that the miracle formula?

Gabriels: From the beginning we have said that democracy is something that must be realized by the people themselves, locally. We have consistently implemented that to this day. Thus we ourselves go to the various housing centers in Bree every year to clarify the policy of the past year and to elicit reactions and criticism. And then we really do assimilate that in the next year's policy.

We also resolutely opposed the pillarization. During the 1976 elections, we attracted a number of people from Catholic social life, for example the president of "Wood and Construction" of the ACV. We never called that a /break-through/ or anything like that, but it did go so far that we had more ACV elected officials than the official CVP [Social Christian Party (Flemish)] list. In 1982 the CVP tried to counter us by putting a number of heavyweights on their list; doctors, specialists, you name it. The people didn't buy that; we won another three seats anyhow and thus proved that if you conduct an honest policy you get rewarded too.

Question: Aren't you thus promoting a dualism? In the national elections you appear under the VU flag, and in municipal council elections under another name but with the same people.

Gabriels: It is true that for municipal council elections we don't appear under the name People's Union in most places. Also because we feel that at the municipal level you should not let yourself be encapsulated by national parties. Well, the same people... a number of names will indeed come up twice, but at the same time there is a whole series of candidates who want to run exclusively in municipal council elections, who have no national ambitions. There are a great many people there who do not have a membership card from our party. I have never ever peddled those cards. More even: I absolutely want to prevent those two matters from becoming mixed up, because otherwise you sow confusion. Of course, I will not prevent anyone from buying a VU card, but again: they have never been peddled, nobody has ever been put under pressure. Besides: it is not the VU which conducts policy in Bree, but what is called there the /Rejuvenation Working Group/.

Farmers' Intelligence

Question: Why isn't that model followed elsewhere?

Gabriels: I suspect that people in our party have too often fallen into the pillarization trap. I have defended our methods everywhere, and whenever they were implemented, they were successful. For example in Tongeren -- there the VU was still carrying the odium of the war, but we did manage to break through that. But it is also working elsewhere in the country, in Brabant, Antwerp, East Flanders. My predecessor Evrard Raskin once said and wrote that the VU always scores badly at municipal council elections, but we have proven the opposite.

Question: Can you draw lessons from that at the national level?

Gabriels: The creativity we display at the local level, the real working of democracy, must be translated at the national level. Only in this manner will the VU be able to break through the pillarization. We must associate ourselves more with issues which are alive among the people. Perhaps we have wanted to impose something on the people for too long. We must once again become the attractive party the VU was in the beginning.

Question: What then, in your opinion, are the issues which are alive among the people?

Gabriels: The people also realize, with a good dose of farmers' intelligence, that all kinds of things are going wrong in this country. But that is now as it were being translated for them with complicated words, in incomprehensible structures. And we are participating in that; we have allowed ourselves to be seduced by the traditionalism we used to oppose so much. We also use that difficult jargon. Those issues are an excellent example; they were simply good, but we did not succeed in explaining precisely what we wanted to the citizens. We were talking about federalism, confederalism... No. What do we want? Short and clear: self-government.

Question: Your own president has done virtually nothing else in his appearances over the last 4 years: arguments that could barely be followed and expensive words.

Gabriels: I am not criticizing my president, but I only meant that we are sick in the same bed. We went to the people with concepts which apparently did not convey any message to them. How do you expect people to vote for you if they don't even understand what you are saying?

Trailer

Question: What concretely do you want to do now as parliamentary party president?

Gabriels: I studied history and thus try to draw the necessary lessons from history. I have been a representative for 8 years now, not an eternity, but long enough to learn /something/. Within the parliamentary party, they too often let one or two people speak; I want to change that. There have to be new faces. The image of a party is not formed by a single person. Its credibility is not tied to that one face. You become credible as a party only when

many people think the same thing. That is appealing, especially to young people. And we have lost too many generations already.

Question: The so-called AGALEV [Live Differently] generation?

Gabriels: Among others, and that pains me very much. Look, I myself was active for years in Limburg in the fight against the construction of the A-24. Johan Sauwens was the president of the youth of the A-24 action front. As mayor, I had an illegal recreation spot levelled. That is not a question of wanting to be heavy handed, but of being consistent. And what is happening now? AGALEV is not getting off the ground in our country.

Since 1968, the VU has been the first party to concern itself with ecology, but we lost that role. What can be said about our representatives is that their actions in this regard were at least /diffuse/. That way it was possible for AGALEV to come into being. If we had been more consistent, then a green party would have been superfluous. What we want to do now is to devise a kind of ecological charter in consultation with the green movement. That charter would be binding for all our representatives. We are not going to do that simply to follow in the wake of AGALEV, but because ecology as an issue can only become more important in the future. And we are not going to stop at ecology by itself either, but put a socio-economic vision in it.

Question: It is only the VU which is making eyes at the AGALEV voters, your opposition partner, the SP [Socialist Party (Flemish)] is also looking in that direction.

Gabriels: We have been skilfully pushed into a single corner with the SP by the CVP. And thus now we are together in the opposition. Now, that doesn't mean that we cannot distinguish ourselves relative to the SP. We have rejected their socialist alternative in the past, even though that was not made very clear either. We now have to make the citizens understand that we are not the trailer the CVP would like to make us out to be.

Question: Do you, for example, after the polarization has been carried through, see another possible alternative at the socio-economic level?

Gabriels: Of course: the Flemish national one. That has to be in the forefront for us. The people's nationalism is our priority. But you cannot stop with that. You have to go further. What kind of Flanders do you want? All of that must be filled in, that whole socio-economic area.

Left-Right

Question: There will probably be new special powers. What are you going to do about that as parliamentary party leader?

Gabriels: We are going to state clearly that special powers belong more in an authoritarian regime than in a democracy. When you know that at the municipal level we cannot even allow the municipal council to make decisions on its own, that there have to be hearings... It is absolutely unacceptable that a

government, which is still in the process of being formed, should consider special powers as a first acquirement as it were.

Question: Those special powers are said to be necessary because parliament works too slowly.

Gabriels: When someone is ill, he can get better only when the causes of his illness have been removed. I agree that our dual chamber system is no longer tenable, but then that should simply be changed.

Question: And what, in your opinion, is the remedy?

Gabriels: Aside from constitutional amendments, bills could be introduced to change the electoral law and to organize separate elections for the Flemish Council and the national parliament. That Flemish Council should then become a second chamber, which the Senate now is. But to eliminate the Senate you need a constitutional amendment and that is impossible within the existing political constellation. But we do have to make sure that that problem is tackled as soon as possible.

Question: Immediately following the elections your name showed up as successor to Anciaux. The switch was said to be only a question of weeks or months. Where did those rumors come from?

Gabriels: I also found out about that from the newspapers. Well now, you can never avoid speculation. I have immediately insisted with the party leaders that those rumors should be laid to rest. That was done immediately.

Question: At the time you were described in the newspapers as a "candidate from the right." Is that true?

Gabriels: It is no secret that there have been tensions in that area within the VU, but I have never let myself be tempted into making any comment on it. I don't want to have a label stuck on. Am I leftwing or rightwing? I come from an ACV milieu, but Dutch newspapers, which have sometimes mentioned me in connection with problems which go beyond the border in Limburg, call me a progressive. What's in a name? Leftwing, rightwing, I am not going to walk into that trap. That is a sterile discussion.

Question: Would you be a candidate next year if Anciaux leaves?

Gabriels: People have repeatedly tried to push me to the fore already, but it would be very pretentious to say now: "Yes, I am a candidate." What is important now is for our party to win again, and for our ideas to be better disseminated. /That/ is important and not so much who will lead that party. Well now, if I were asked, I do think that I would not flee from my responsibility.

GOVERNMENT PROGRAM LEAVES MANY AREAS OPEN

Brussels KNACK in Dutch 27 Nov 85 pp 25-28

[Article by F.V.: "The Bar Now Lies in the Clouds"]

[Text] The reaction to the government program of the Martens VI administration was generally: "clever, very clever." But at the party congresses a spiritual hangover was already spreading around. This time the little game of words and silences could turn out to be too clever. The Martens VI administration will become a permanent Stuyvenberg.

After 40 days a so-called complete text was published. But the understanding was far from complete. At their party congresses or councils, some negotiators frankly admitted that. A deeper arguing out of a number of unsolved questions of principle would have required another number of weeks, and everyone was so tired already. And as Martens has to be able to go to the Luxemburg summit meeting in early December as a fullfledged government leader, and while a square circle does not exist anyhow, the 13 negotiators of Stuyvenberg simply gave up putting salt on all the slugs.

Consequently, the new administration is moving into the future with a number of blanks which will have to be filled in along the way. It is known that Wilfried Martens is not averse to this situation. He likes to sail by compass and is a master in settling quarrels along the way and a connoisseur of short bibles which are not binding. According to him, the basic rule of democracy is that the national government must be permanently ensured. Now that he is in charge of that together with an ideologically really unsuitable partner he prefers to live from hand to mouth and from one day to the next. That is why the 50 page long Stuyvenberg agreement is full of vaguenesses and unspoken issues. Apparently, the Martens VI administration will learn as it goes along. The new Council of Ministers will see the problems come and go, without a ready-made recipe. As the Walloon red baron Paul-Henri Gendebien said at the PSC [Social Christian Party (Walloon)] council meeting: the government declaration resembles an abstract painting, done by pistol painters. As a matter of fact, the program contains few hard truths and even fewer figures. The ship will sail by compass.

The list of what has been settled, both in principle and in numbers, is dreadfully long. Even the attention getter of the government agreement, the fiscal stop, is bathing in an artistic fuzziness. The "government" cannot impose a

single new burden on the citizens, it says. But the 1984 savings plan, which will continue to have an impact until next year, is supposed to produce another 25 billion francs in fiscal returns. Furthermore, the possibility remains open to divert a number of national expenditures to lower administrations such as municipalities and provinces. And finally, implementation of the cost price principle in the public services could produce an ocean of new billions, which have to be paid by the citizens. The national administration is so refined these days that levying hidden taxes, whose name does not need to be mentioned, is possible everywhere.

Toys

In addition, the CVP [Social Christian Party (Flemish)] does not seem to really have the political will to freeze direct taxation (46 percent of the national income). The ovation at the CVP congress against the "fiscal comforter" and a little later Guy Verhofstadt's fiscal "toy pistol," foreshadows future tension. A child could know that. At first sight, the immediate decrease of government spending by 150 billion francs per year, with an eye to achieving a treasury deficit limited to 8 percent of the GNP by the end of 1987, seems an absurd project after already 4 years of what is considered dramatic income cuts and in a political system which has committed itself not to look for new income. At Stuyvenberg someone neglected to say: this agreement is not possible. But the government may be betting on an invisible box of tricks and on optical illusion. Consequently, observers will have a great deal of work in the coming months or years in deciphering or discovering what the conjurers in the rue de la Loi are really up to.

The government leaders on the trapeze will have special powers, so-called "limited in time and in terms of the policy areas they relate to" (Verhofstadt). But yet they will relate to the major budget plans for 1986 and 1987. Read: hence, to everything of any importance. An equally large unknown we are faced with is announced in the cuts for social security and the "defattening" of its structures. Prime Minister Martens tells us that to safeguard our industrial competitive power will cost 20 billion francs next year. Nobody knows, however, where he will get them. One percent of the cost price of the public service will be saved every year, without however touching employment in the public sector. The rest remains guesswork. In education, the number of teachers will be calculated according to the number of school children. It was not announced how those calculations would have to be carried out.

They will try to privatize the government enterprises by drawing capital from the private sector or by "converting" pieces of public commercial property "into money." In the circles involved, many people are afraid that this could refer to the RTT [Telegraph and Telephone Administration] or other public utility companies, but precise data are lacking. A lengthening of the military service will very probably come about, provided that a review of the military laws concerning exemptions and the statute of conscientious objectors also takes place. Not a single participant in the congress asked what direction the government was looking in here. The same applies to the policy on foreigners about which the new liberal Henri Simonet worries so much and about which the government only says that it will strive for greater integration, while all kinds of control measures will be sharpened also.

As for the federalization of education, the issue on which the Martens V administration officially fell, the CVP congress stated that a "breakthrough" had occurred here. Even though the constitution is not adjustable in this sense, and PSC President Gerard Deprez said about the matter that "nothing had been given in" on this subject. At another point it says that the Martens VI administration will wrap the two national crises branches of industry (steel and coal) into a sensible 10 year plan, but at the same time it put an eight nuclear power station and a preference for centrifuge power stations on the play-bill. Consequently, in the Limburg KS [Coal Mines of Campine] nobody probably knows what course events will take. As for the other Limburg sorrow, Jose Happart, he is not even mentioned at all. Perhaps one could read something about that between the lines in the sentence which notes that the administration does not want situations to occur "which could hamper its economic and budgetary recovery policy. Furthermore, people are waiting with growing impatience for the day when the Council of State finally comes up with that judgement about the official knowledge of Dutch in municipalities with special language facilities located in Flanders. The suspicion that this high legal body gears its actions to the political desiderate of the executive power, is growing by the day.

Charter

The community situation in the capital remains, in general as a matter of fact, as unclear as before. At the CVP congress a breakthrough was also signaled in this respect, but it remains anybody's guess how it should be implemented. Jean Gol himself admitted that there was no time left to reach more specific agreements on Brussels, but insisted that the civil rights of the Flemish inhabitants of Brussels will remain tied to those of the French speakers in the capital's border areas. The Brussels agglomeration will be eliminated and the government will introduce a bill to that effect. We will have to wait and see what it will include. Meanwhile, the inhabitants will receive, so to speak, 2.5 billion francs in addition to their current regional budget of 6.8 billion. Specifically, they will also be able to rake in their share of the inheritance tax (estate duties), but subject to conditions. Those in turn are so complicated and described so inaccurately that the government is still in a fog about it. Everything looks somewhat like the checks and balances used during the discussion of the "charter" (does this mean a law?) for the protection both of the taxpayer and the social security recipient. The former came at the request of Guy Verhofstadt, the latter at the request of Jean-Luc Dehaene.

Martens wants to take over part of the debts incurred last year by the Flemish and Walloon regions in social housing. How and how much is not known. Neither are we aware of the manner in which further decentralization toward the municipalities and provinces, a wish close to the heart of Charles-Ferdinand Nothomb, will be implemented. The conflict which has been dragging along for months between the PSC, the CVP and the PRL [Liberal Reform Party (Walloon)], about the allocation of very large government contracts, such as for the RTT, has apparently not been given a practical solution. This also applies to the putting into harness of a "Belgian FBI," the super-police Jean Gol dreamed of aloud. Instead, the setting up of a kind of national judicial police, which in fact already exists, was announced. And it may perhaps have demonstrated

a skill beneficial to civil democracy when formateur Martens spoke about a necessary "new freedom treaty" in our country, which has been rocked by terrorism and banditism. However, the consequences of this concept remain unclear. In another area we find an equally confusing lack of direction when the new administration assures the man in the street that unemployment among young people will decrease by 50,000 units. Pessimists will only conclude from this that it will involve a statistical operation, perhaps coupled to the probable extension of the military service, which in turn will be weighed against the waiting period for young unemployed individuals who want to receive unemployment benefits.

Fortunately, there are a few small matters which the observer can fasten onto. It appears to be certain now that the power company Distrigaz will be privatized. KMO's [not further identified] and members of parliament will be given a separate place in the social and economic negotiations. Family allowances are apparently not being touched. BRT [Belgian Radio and Television (Dutch Service)] and RTB [Belgian Radio and Television (French Service)] will not get any television advertising. That will go to new commercial broadcasters, in addition to the RTL [Luxemburg Radio and Television]. With regard to abortion, parliament will be allowed to make a decision based on individual freedom of conscience. The old and the new poor will be given allowances which increase more rapidly than the index figure. The reduction in BTW [Value-added Tax] for construction will continue until May 1986. A fiscally favorable system will be established for retirement savings. Hospitals will have to work with set financial envelopes. Judicial abuses concerning second offences will come under legal return fire. And by 1989 we will try to spend 0.7 percent of the GNP on development cooperation, something we have been trying to do for 10 years in vain.

Second Breath

The vagueness and skill, even though this may be the same thing, with which the government program was put on paper will soon prompt its "actualization." To rewrite the government bible every time anew had already become a custom under the Martens V administration. The previous administration used to do that every year around the middle of March, when political circles are supposed to get warmed up for the development of a new budget and then was always said to be in search of a "second breath." Guy Verhofstadt in particular -- who in everyone's opinion has developed at Stuyvenberg into a young politician of the first order -- will have to keep permanently busy to keep the "blue thread" visible in the government fabric. It became clear at the CVP congress that the willingness to carry out further retrenchments is rather small, especially in education. There are still centers of opposition against one thing and another among the young in all the coalition parties, and 2 odd years from now we will be facing the municipal council elections.

The danger of disloyalty to the political ideals also exists within the Flemish and French governments. President Gaston Geens and his future Walloon colleague Melchior Wathelet defended their plans before and succeeded in getting them approved by the same congress participants who gave the Martens VI administration the green light. And yet, the basis of their policy remains equally

invisible behind the fog of words. Nobody knows to what extent the system of endowments, with which the budgets of the regional governments are heavily spiced, will be turned into a system of fixed allocated tax income (refunds). Furthermore, Gaston Geens confesses with animation his belief in an increasingly independent Flemish government which does not want to be a "subsidiary" of the national administration. And yet he is concretely dependent on the Council of Ministers to achieve greater autonomy. The fact that the composition of the Flemish government will be the product of the same overall political operation which the Roman catholic-liberal coalition consists of at the national level, leaves little intact of Flemish as well as Walloon-Brussels independence. It is hard to see how the Executives can be anything but a reflection of the national power relationships in the rue de la Loi.

Gendebien

Besides, in Wallonia there is also the threat that the steadfastness of the Roman catholic-liberal marriage may be in danger. The PS [Socialist Party (Walloon)] was driven out of the regional government by the narrowest margin. Last Sunday, however, it turned out that "red baron" Paul-Henri Gendebien, who recently joined the PSC and came from the completely shriveled Walloon Rally, is unhappy. At the PSC party council meeting, the very new member of parliament from Namur expressed quite a bit of criticism about the vague and short-sighted government agreement. Furthermore, he felt that it was a mistake to ban Guy Spitaels' Socialist Party so completely. Quick mathematicians immediately realized the problem. Gendebien, who had been fished up by the PSC, holds the balance of power in the Walloon regional council. His vote there could ensure a short-circuit at any time and necessitate negotiations with the PS or another opposition party. Tomorrow or the day after, situations will undoubtedly arise whereby the Roman catholic-liberal house of cards will totter and shake like the bar under the feet of a high jumper. And it does not even have to be Coens' bar then.

8463

CS0: 3614/41

THREE CANDIDATES VYING TO REPLACE RETIRING CP CHAIRMAN

Copenhagen AKTUELT in Danish 23 Dec 85 p 13

[Article by Jorgen Placing]

[Text] Communist Party of Denmark (DKP) chairman Jorgen Jensen wants to be replaced. Three candidates are vying for the chairmanship of the party, which according to opinion polls is further than ever from representation in parliament.

The three candidates are SiD (Semi-Skilled Workers' Union) president Ole Sohn of Horsens, Danish Metalworkers' Union Local 13 president Jan Andersen, and European Parliament member Jens Peter Bonde.

Another name is also circulating--that of another European Parliament member, Else Hammerich. It is reported that she is not a party member, but that she could be brought into the party by certain persons who want a woman in the top party position.

The question of a change in party leadership has not yet been discussed at the DKP Central Committee or at the Executive Committee. It is clear, however, that Jorgen Jensen wants to be replaced. There is also no doubt that one requirement for the next DKP chairman will be an ability to deal with the new electronic media and to stand out in the media, in general.

The party will hold a congress late next year. Sources within the party say it is probable that the change will occur in connection with this congress.

Ole Sohn is the youngest of the candidates. He is 31 years old and a member of the DKP Central Committee and the Executive Committee. In a short period of time, he has managed to stand out as a dynamic union president. Jan Andersen is also on the party's Central Committee and the Executive Committee. He became known in connection with the strikes following the intervention by the government and was seen as a leading figure in the activities of the so-called ring of representatives. Jens Peter Bonde is on the Central Committee, but not on the Executive Committee.

The party's inner circle believes that the greatest problem in the DKP today is that the party has been unable to make use of the modern media to a satisfactory degree. There must be a renewal in the areas of information and the media if the party is to survive at all.

9336

CSO: 3613/54

SDP FACES DILEMMA OVER SOCIALIST PEOPLE'S PARTY MOVE AGAINST NATO

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 29 Dec 85 p 14

[Editorial: "Two-Faced"]

[Text] It comes as no surprise that the Socialist People's Party (SF) will propose that Denmark withdraw from the NATO nuclear planning group. That is the forum at which decisions of a military nature are made concerning the nuclear defense that NATO has at its disposal. That is the result of SF's announced proposal, which the party supports heart and soul, that Denmark reject the use of nuclear weapons not only in times of peace, but also during a crisis or war.

Thus, SF has no problem allowing a domestic political position to be translated into an international measure. The situation is different, however, for that section of parliament that recognizes Denmark's NATO membership as a guarantee for peace and as a duty. The present NATO strategy provides for the use of nuclear weapons if NATO territory is attacked. For years there has been talk about the need for a new strategy, including a strategy that would strengthen our conventional defenses at the expense of nuclear weapons. But a new strategy could not be implemented without regard to the strategy of our opponent. This means that a shift of emphasis within NATO presupposes a corresponding shift within the Warsaw Pact. In other words, mutual disarmament and clear agreements on nuclear weapons are prerequisites for the shaping of a new NATO strategy.

SF wants to create a proposal that will appeal to the so-called alternative security policy majority in parliament. This will put the Social Democrats in a difficult situation. Throughout the security policy debate that has been conducted since the change in government in 1982, the Social Democrats have maintained that Denmark has no alternative to NATO. But if NATO, in practice, has no alternative to the present strategy--at least the main features of this strategy--then the Social Democrats must conclude that Denmark must continue to participate in the work of the nuclear planning group. It is impossible to be a member of a defense alliance and not discuss its means and ends in the military sector. Consequently, the Social Democrats cannot support the SF proposal without eroding the credibility of its NATO policy. On the other hand, the party cannot reject the SF proposal without eroding the credibility

of its domestic policy, which was shaped by Lasse Budtz. Thus, the Social Democrats seem to be in a situation in which they must choose sides. It is more probable, however, that the party will seek a way out through tactical maneuvering, so that it can continue its two-faced policy, which is split between demonstrations at home and international obligations abroad.

9336

CSO: 3613/54

LEFTISTS FORMING FRONT ORGANIZATION TO SUPPORT KABUL REGIME

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 29 Dec 85 p 11

[Article by Jeton]

[Text] A presumably leftist-oriented front organization for the communist Kabul regime has been established in Denmark under the name Denmark-Afghanistan Friendship Association. The new association, which was formed at a general assembly on 30 October of this year, "stole" its name from another organization of the same name, whose members are former resistance fighters from Afghanistan who have connections with the resistance movement fighting the Soviet forces of occupation.

Would Use Danish Sympathy

The latter association was founded on 23 August this year. Its chairman, Asmat Mojaddedi, said that the new association probably intended to use Danish sympathy toward war-torn Afghanistan for purposes that would not benefit the Afghan resistance movement. The newly formed association is calling for "solidarity with democratic Afghanistan." Its purpose is to "disseminate objective information on life in Afghan society" and to "seek contact with social institutions in Afghanistan that are known to be in need of material aid." The association's address is given as Civic Hall on Blagards Square.

"We have registered our name in the registry of associations and others cannot use our name," Asmat Mojaddedi said. "It would be a shame if funds sent to us by those who sympathize with the Afghan people end up in the hands of people who support something other than freedom for the Afghan people, because of confusion over the name."

"Members of the newly formed association were also absent from the demonstration Friday in front of the Soviet Embassy. This also says something about the so-called friendship association."

9336

CSO: 3613/54

SCHLUTER, JORGENSEN GIRDING FOR POSSIBLE EARLY ELECTION IN 1986

Issues Possibly Toppling Government

Copenhagen AKTUELT in Danish 1 Jan 86 pp 32-33

[Commentary by Bjarne Kjaer: "EC, Economic Democracy Could Topple Government in 1986"]

[Text] EC policy, the distribution of profits and new economic interventions could force the government to call for an early Folketing election in 1986 and lead to a change in government if the Social Democrats and the Socialist People's Party [SF] both make the gains indicated by the latest opinion polls and the results of the municipal elections in November.

There is little doubt that the four government parties and their Radical Liberal support party will fight with all their might to stay in power as long as possible as we approach the end of the election period in January 1988. But the question is whether agreement among the four government parties and between the government and the Radicals can be sustained. There have recently been several cracks in the cooperation and the closer we come to the end of the election period the more the individual parties need to outline an independent profile.

So far only Prime Minister Poul Schluter's Conservative Party has reaped the benefits of government cooperation to the intense regret of the three small government parties, the Liberals, the Center-Democrats [CS] and the Christian People's Party. Niels Helveg Petersen's Radical Liberal support party and the Progressive Party have also paid dearly for Schluter's gains. So much so that the Progressive Party is threatened with total extinction and is on its way out of Danish politics.

SDP and SF Ready

If the government falls, the Social Democrats are ready with support from SF to take over government power. The municipal elections and the latest opinion polls have whipped up the fighting spirit of the two parties. And with the new program, "Denmark for All the People," SDP has presented not only a political program but also a program statement for a new socialist government. No one thinks SF will join a new socialist government, although SDP

chairman Anker Jorgensen and SF leader Gert Petersen refuse to rule out this possibility. When it comes right down to it the opposition is probably not so great among Social Democrats as it is on SF's part, with deep resistance throughout the ranks of the party to involvement in a government coalition which would bring with it the political responsibility SF has happily avoided to a great extent since its start in 1958. It is undeniably easier to stay out of the government and keep one's hands "clean."

However all indications are that the two parties can reach the point where SF can become a credible cooperative partner and act as a parliamentary guarantee for a new SDP government. The prerequisite is that following the Folketing election that may come before most people expect it to SDP and SF have a combined majority in Folketing. If that does not occur a new SDP government would find itself in the same situation as we had before Anker Jorgensen relinquished government responsibility in September 1982 to the present nonsocialist government. In other words the Social Democrats would wear themselves out in a constant struggle to gain majority support for their policies. And SDP would be fleeced by both the left (SF) and the right (the Radical Liberals or any other nonsocialist party that considers it advantageous to support an SDP government).

EC Showdown

As early as January, EC policy could bring the government into serious difficulties. Folketing must take a stand on a number of proposed changes in the EC cooperation. The government has not made a firm decision as to whether Denmark will say yes or no to the results of the EC summit meeting but is trying to push responsibility onto the Social Democrats. There are people in the government who are willing to make the EC issue a cabinet question. In other words a question of the continued existence of the present government. It is especially in this light that we should view the request of Liberal Party chairman, Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, to the Social Democrats concerning a "political truce" on EC policy. There was a prompt SDP response. Anker Jorgensen told Ellemann-Jensen to mind his own business and keep his moral repugnance over SDP to himself.

EC Election?

It has long been thought at Christiansborg that within the government it has been the Liberals and CD in particular who were anxious to have a political showdown over EC policy and an EC election, if necessary. The two parties could not bear it if Denmark places itself outside the European Community by voting no on changes in the EC cooperation. The Social Democrats have clearly rejected the idea of giving the EC Parliament increased powers and are very dubious about the "internal EC market." The Social Democrats see some positive elements here but want clear guarantees that will safeguard Danish environmental regulations, for example.

Security policy could also give the government more problems this year. There are signs of several new enquiries from SF and the Left-Socialist Party

[VS] on this subject but as long as the government upholds the 1984 and 1985 May Day directives and loyally lives up to them it is unlikely that there will be another political showdown here.

New Economic Interventions

But the "security policy" majority in Folketing, SDP, the Radicals, SF and VS, will continue to follow closely the conduct of individual ministers in international affairs in 1986. Economic policy can be the straw that breaks the back of the nonsocialist government. Developments in 1985 were catastrophic for the government. While it succeeded in cutting the state deficit by means of drastic cuts, a tough wage intervention, etc., and in lowering interest rates and inflation, the balance of payments ran amok. The deficit for 1985 set a new Danish record with a total deficit of 23 billion kroner. That is 53 percent higher than the government's original estimate. After the government's "Christmas intervention" in December, it now says that the deficit for this year will be around 16 billion kroner. If that estimate is as accurate as those for previous years the prospects look bleak for the Danish economy and for the government. It could be forced to take new economic steps very early in the new year. Most people are already aware that the government's goal of eliminating the balance of payments deficit by the end of 1988 cannot be met.

Even though Prime Minister Poul Schluter has guaranteed that there will be no new economic interventions before the summer vacation period, all economic experts believe that the government will quickly be forced to step in if the unfortunate trend in 1985 continues into the new year with continued unacceptably high deficits in foreign trade.

Interventions Difficult

New economic interventions could be very difficult for the government. This is partly due to internal disagreement concerning the type of intervention among the four government parties but it also has something to do with relations with the Radical Liberals. The Radicals tightened up their demands to the government following the party's catastrophic defeat in the municipal elections of November 1985. CD, the Christian People's Party and the Liberals also have a clear need to etch an independent profile. An intervention would blur these profiles if the special issues of the small parties are closely involved. None of them would chance a Folketing election today with the prospect of losing a good many seats. CD could risk being eliminated from Folketing altogether. On the other hand the municipal elections and the latest opinion polls have greatly encouraged the Social Democrats and SF. The two parties have made sizable gains and if this trend continues we would have a different government if a Folketing election took place today. And at the same time the united union movement is exerting a lot of pressure to get a new government.

Tax Reform

One of the biggest political issues was settled in 1985--tax reform, which will go into effect on 1 January 1987. The various proposals are now being discussed by the Folketing Tax Committee and should be ready during the spring of 1986. That could be a "chance" for the government. If it is forced to announce a quick Folketing election in which, judging from all the available signs, it would be defeated, tax reform might get lost in the shuffle. It is true that the four government parties, SDP and the Radicals solemnly promised to enact the reform, but if the government falls it would not be surprising if there is new uncertainty about tax reform. There is opposition in several government parties, including CD, and there is disagreement on the matter among Social Democrats.

TV 2 and the Great Belt Project

Other big political questions that must be decided early in 1986 are the creation of a second Danish TV channel and the Great Belt project. The government is negotiating with the Social Democrats and the Radicals on TV 2. There is general agreement on the matter but continued disagreement about financing. The government parties want advertising while SDP has rejected advertisements as a matter of principle. The surprising endorsement of TV advertising recently by the chairman of the Danish Federation of Trade Unions [LO], Knud Christensen, underlines the fact that there is a desire for and an acceptance of advertising deep in the ranks of SDP. If nothing else because we may get advertising anyway from foreign TV channels.

Bridge

The government and the Social Democrats are negotiating on the Great Belt link. Here the Radicals are clearly opposed. So are SF and VS, for that matter. After years of internal conflict the four government parties have agreed on a combined solution for trains and cars, either in the form of a tunnel or a combined highway and railroad bridge. The so-called big "chrome-plated" solution. The Social Democrats have so far insisted on a tunnel solution built in stages that would first of all provide mass transit with rapid transportation beneath the Great Belt. A change may have taken place in SDP on this too and this may result in an agreement early in the year. There are strong opponents in the SDP group, but LO and the unions are now exerting pressure. However the Radicals have made it clear to the government that a Great Belt agreement with the Social Democrats could jeopardize the Radical support for the government's economic policy.

Economic Democracy Election?

The question of distributing profits could also be a sensitive one for the government in 1986. Both the Social Democrats and the Radicals will exert a lot of pressure for the introduction of mandatory distribution of excess earnings as soon as possible. At the same time Prime Minister Poul Schluter (Conservative) has made it clear that the government will not allow a

Folketing majority to force through a mandatory Economic Democracy [OD] solution against the wishes of the government.

LO and SDP recently presented an entirely new and amended OD proposal without the controversial central fund. It is scheduled to be presented to Folketing at the end of the month.

New Ministers

The Radicals have rejected the proposal in advance and will present their own proposal for the mandatory distribution of profits instead. The debate on OD in the months ahead could be a serious matter for the government, which will insist on "voluntary" OD solutions at individual job sites instead.

In addition to the government's political problems, there are problems concerning the composition of the government. It has long been expected that the prime minister would fire some of the ministers who have been in the government since September 1982 and perhaps also change the balance of power among the parties that make up the government. Economic Affairs Minister Anders Andersen (Liberal) is over 73 and Industrial Affairs Minister Ib Stetter (Conservative) will be 69 in March, so perhaps both men will be retired. Nor was it by chance that SKIVE FOLKEBLAD called in late November for the summary dismissal of Interior Affairs Minister Britta Schall Holberg (Liberal), Labor Minister Grethe Fenger Moller (Conservative), Traffic Minister Arne Melchior (CD), Agricultural Minister Niels Anker Kofoed (Liberal) and Greenland Affairs Minister Tom Hoyem (CD) in addition to Ib Stetter. The demand was later followed up by Radical vice chairman Keld Anker Nielsen. Shortly before Christmas Poul Schluter put to rest all the rumors about government changes--at least for a while. Few people doubt that changes will occur sometime this year. The government will need new faces if it wants to shore up its eroding support among the voters. And a quick little reshuffling of ministers might make things a little easier for the government for a while.

Schluter Concedes Coalition Dissent

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE AFTEN in Danish 20-26 Dec 85 p 8

[Article by Solveig Rodsgaard: "Prime Minister Takes Stock at Midterm"; first paragraph is BERLINGSKE AFTEN introduction]

[Text] Prime Minister Poul Schluter openly concedes that the government has midterm problems and he analyzes the situation of the parties--especially the Center-Democrats--in the next Folketing election. The prime minister also asks the labor market factions to handle the next contract renewals themselves on the basis of a continuation of the low-inflation policy.

Prime Minister Poul Schluter admits that the government has midterm problems. While according to the prime minister the Conservatives practice the art of self-discipline daily, the other government parties permit more digressions and attempts to etch clearer individual profiles for themselves.

Of the Social Democratic leadership the prime minister says that Svend Auken is a professional opponent who appeals to the worst instincts in people. But Poul Schluter is still convinced that the people will reject the red majority as soon as a Folketing election is imminent. And if the unthinkable occurs and an SDP-SF majority does gain power, the prime minister predicts that it will have a short life. Therefore the head of the four-party government sees it as a historic task to forge the four nonsocialist parties together even in the opposition role, thus avoiding a repetition of past nonsocialist divisions and maintaining a nonsocialist government alternative.

With regard to the composition of the four-party government, Poul Schluter says that if the Center-Democrats are voted out of Folketing in a future election the party would not be represented in a continued nonsocialist government coalition. But the prime minister is confident that all the government parties will continue to be represented in Folketing and he is equally confident that the Radical Liberals will also get a pat on the back from the voters for their part in promoting the economic recovery, even though this involved unpleasant decisions for the party.

Contract Negotiations

However neither a Folketing election nor a government reshuffling is just around the corner. But negotiations will be started in 1986 concerning the next round of contract renewals. And the prime minister lets it be known that the labor market factions themselves were to blame for the political intervention in the spring of 1985 because negotiations were so centralized that the procedure almost precluded results. But the next round of contract renewals is up to the labor market factions themselves, according to the prime minister:

"I consider it extremely unlikely that the government and Folketing will intervene again. I definitely think that the parties to the contracts can see a great common interest in taking care of the next round, also because it would be very unhealthy if Folketing has to legislate contracts twice in a row. I also think it is important that we have shown that a tight income policy is a good thing. There is a prospect of rising real wages in 1986 and price increases have never been lower in the last 20 years. Employment has increased; from 1983 to 1986 we have created 135,000 new jobs and unemployment has also declined among young people. All these things together will create such a good climate that the factions on the labor market will be able to handle the contracts themselves, in my opinion. I do not want to say anything about the wage ceiling in the next contract period, but we want to make sure that we continue the low-inflation line that has been so beneficial for us."

Government's Position

Of the government's good situation at present, the prime minister said:
"Thank you, the government is doing all right."

"We are certainly not on the defensive. What haven't we accomplished in recent weeks? We got the economic adjustment made at the right time and in the right way. We reached an agreement on tax reform and on the last day before Folketing took its Christmas recess we had the first debate on the major reform proposals, which in my opinion is a major victory for non-socialist Denmark. The tax reform is permeated on major points by the attitudes of the nonsocialist parties. And I am also very satisfied that the Social Democrats--with a few exceptions--consider it to be an excellent tax reform."

But Poul Schluter concedes that a red majority was registered in the municipal elections:

"However I think the municipal elections were characterized by two things. In the first place the elections were more local than they have been in the past. And in the second place this was a midterm election. I also think the Social Democrats had an unusually poor election, but the party has devoted itself to concealing the truth. It is also a fact that many nonsocialist voters stayed at home instead of voting in this midterm election. But it will be quite different the day that we have a Folketing election.

"We have now had the four-party government for a good 3 years and many voters may have felt prior to the municipal elections that things would continue to go well for the government in the future as a matter of course. They are apt to forget the black memories from the time before the government was formed. It is also clear that when a government has been in office for 3 years and under our circumstances, without a majority of our own, there will be a group of voters who feel we are not doing a good enough job. The Conservatives do not think we are conservative enough. The Liberals do not think we are liberal enough, CD people do not think CD stresses its own viewpoints enough, the Radicals do not think things are radical enough. And everyone is right, of course. The task consists of establishing a majority of five parties and each party cannot have everything it and its voters would like. But the voters have probably been given a scare by this midterm election and it is probably beneficial for nonsocialist Denmark to realize that one cannot take it for granted that nonsocialist Denmark will win the next election."

Coalition Wear and Tear

The prime minister admits that the government parties have suffered some wear and tear as a result of the cooperation. This is also true of the Conservative Party:

"The cooperation also wears us down because we have to be so disciplined. That is quite natural due to the fact that we are the principal party in the four-leaf clover. We have a large group of 43 members and we practice the art of self-discipline daily because we are the ones who have to set an example."

Do the Conservatives permit digressions on the part of the other parties?

"Perhaps a little more than we do where we ourselves are concerned. But that doesn't worry me, because it is probably something of a midterm problem. The four-party coalition has held together through thick and thin. And the parties that feel they are not doing so well in the opinion polls are probably saying at internal meetings that they must present a clearer profile, wave the flag a bit more and take somewhat firmer stands. But I would still say that solidarity in the coalition is at least as good as it is in the whole Social Democratic Folketing group. It is also important to bear in mind that the coalition consists of four separate parties. We must each have our own profile while continuing to stick together on the overriding purpose, namely presenting a government alternative to the Social Democrats, who used to have a monopoly on government power."

Will he keep an even lower profile leading up to the next election than he did prior to the election in January 1984 when he did not praise his own party but urged the voters to vote for the other coalition parties? Will we see a prime minister who is even more self-effacing than he was in 1984?

"I didn't exactly go underground. I was energetic and aggressive in the campaign. But I stressed the idea that the most important thing was that the voters made sure they strengthened the four-party coalition. And fortunately that is what they did. And I would think my main task in the next campaign would be to convince the voters that across from a Social Democratic Party that is ready to fall into the arms of SF stands the coalition with all its many facets and variations, ready to keep going as nonsocialist Denmark's answer to socialism."

Will the political struggle be waged by the prime minister of a four-party government rather than by the chairman of the Conservative Party?

"I think that is obvious. And I didn't do my party any harm by doing so last time."

Are some Conservatives dissatisfied because he does not emphasize the party's profile more?

"I am the one who will determine that."

Does that mean he is the one who sets the party line?

"Yes. And at this time it is impossible to see what the background will be for the next Folketing election campaign. Especially if it doesn't take place for another 2 years. And it is impossible to imagine what will dominate the campaign. But one thing is certain: I consider it my historic task--if we can use such grandiose terms--to make sure that we do not return to the futility that characterized Danish politics in the many years when the nonsocialist parties were fighting one another. It is great that we each have our own profile and the fact that we do is fairly obvious, but we must try to win the next election."

Nonsocialist Voter Shifts

The prime minister said with regard to a different election outcome:

"Of course the voters might decide to let us lose the next election. But that should not mean that the four-party perspective will be put in the archives--over and done with. And I think it is important--whether the next election is held 1 or 2 years from now--that the coalition has been together and has stuck together for such a long period in Danish politics as it has. This means that the four-party coalition cannot simply be wiped out by tactical partisan manipulations if we have another government. The only possibility for a different government is one made up of the Social Democrats and SF or a Social Democratic minority government supported by SF. If we are unlucky enough to see that, I think the most likely thing is that it will be a repetition of Krag's red cabinet, a short-term affair that lasts until the voters come to their senses, so I think it is very very important for the four parties to stick together so they can make a comeback.

"It is obvious that if the coalition group ends up in the opposition some day, the parties will outline more independent profiles. But there are two things that count in political work. One is made up of the active politicians and the party officials around them. The other is undeniably the voters. And I know the nonsocialist voters well enough to know that most of them put more weight on the four-party coalition than they do on their own parties. We have seen that over the last 20 years nonsocialist voters have not shown the same lifelong fidelity to an individual party that was common in the old days. The voters think in more individual terms and they are more likely to shift around within the group of nonsocialist parties. But I think it is important for most of them that the nonsocialist parties are a unified team."

Future of CD

Of the problems of the small parties and the fact that in the latest Gallup poll published in BERLINGSKE TIDENDE the Center-Democrats did not have enough voter support to be represented in Folketing, the prime minister said that he considered it very certain that "CD will have a good result in the next election and win more seats than it did in the last election.

"I base this on the fact that CD has gone through a difficult period for many reasons. But I think a lot of voters will say next time that CD, which is one of the leaves in the four-leaf-clover coalition, ought to continue to be represented. And CD has some positions and some basic viewpoints in a number of areas that I am sure will be appreciated by the voters."

But if the nonsocialist government remains in office after the next election and CD does not get into Folketing, would the government consider having ministers from a party that is not represented in Folketing?

"No, I don't think the party in question would care for that. It would mean that those particular members of the government would actually be unaffiliated

in a parliamentary sense because they would not have a Folketing group to work with. But I would like to emphasize in this context that it is important that all four parties do well in the next election and I think that will be the case."

There is a lot of talk right now about a government shakeup at an early date. We asked when that might happen.

"When the time is ripe."

Who will decide when the time is ripe?

"I will--in cooperation with the three other parties. We made changes in the government in the summer of 1984 and I will not guarantee that it won't happen again. But I think it has been a strength and also an attraction that Folketing and especially the people have now had a permanent team of ministers for such a long time, long enough to get to know them. One should not follow the example of some of my predecessors and switch ministers at the drop of a hat."

Radical Liberal Position

In addition to the wear and tear connected with cooperation within the government there is also the question of working with the Radical Liberals. Of the Radicals' need to profile themselves prior to the next election, the prime minister said:

"The Radical Liberals are in a difficult parliamentary position and they always have been. That is the party's special characteristic. This is a middle-spectrum party that has always stressed participation in everyday parliamentary work and having as much influence as possible. It accomplished this in the past through relatively close cooperation with the Social Democrats and now it is doing so with us. The Radicals know that when one is in a middle position one can be attacked from two sides and that is probably also the case here. We have never seen more bitter and intense attacks on the Radical Liberals as during the budget debate last week in which both the Social Democrats and SF demeaned themselves with totally unjustified accusations.

"I consider it my task to keep this possibility open so that if the Radical Liberals hold the swing votes after the next Folketing election, the party will prefer a nonsocialist government to a Social Democratic or an SDP-SF government. And I believe the Radical Liberals will win a respectable number of seats. They deserve them. When I think of how the party stood up under decisions that were hard for a middle party to make as well as under the daily work load I must say that although I deeply disagree with the Radicals in many ideological areas, it would be completely unjustified if the voters fail to give the party due recognition next time."

Would he come right out and urge coalition voters to vote for the Radical Liberals?

"No, I will urge Social Democrats and Radicals to do so. I think that the more the Social Democrats ingratiate themselves with SF in the future and go out of their way to form a majority with SF, the more we will see some SDP voters preferring to support the Radical Liberals. Out of every 100 Social Democratic voters, 7 or 8 have voted for the Radicals once or twice in their lives, so the idea is not entirely foreign to them. And the Radicals should receive a bonus from the negative course the Social Democrats are pursuing and the hard work the Radicals themselves have put in."

Auken's Attack

The economic cuts of around 8 billion kroner which the government and the Radical Liberals made last week have been sharply criticized by the opposition, and SDP political spokesman and vice chairman Svend Auken said last week in WEEKENDAVISEN that the government was displaying "blithering optimism." To this charge the prime minister responded:

"What an expression! When one recalls that Auken was labor minister in a period when unemployment rose and rose and the Danish society became weaker and weaker and fell into stagnation, it is pretty hard to have him talk about 'blithering optimism.' At the moment he is a professional opponent and his only chance is to appeal to the worst instincts in people, negativism, pessimism and dissatisfaction. I have to defer to this, of course, but it is all idle talk that has nothing to do with reality."

Economic Intervention

The prime minister denied that there might be another economic intervention before the summer vacation period:

"We have just made an adjustment and it was objectively justified. It came just at the right time. We have placed a lot of emphasis on not discouraging optimism and the economic upturn. Our main goal was to increase employment and we have succeeded there. We have cleared many hurdles but we have one left and that is the balance of payments. It is clearly unsatisfactory and I have said so many times. Now we have implemented a moderation in demand amounting to around 8 billion kroner and of course some economists will say that this is not enough and others will say it is too much. Economists are just like other professionals, they like to disagree, especially when it comes to making predictions about the future. I think the 8 billion kroner in cuts will do the trick. That is what is needed to make sure that the Danish economy does not become overheated but maintains its healthy condition. It is worth noting that never in Danish history has an economic adjustment been made that the opposition had such a hard time labeling as socially unfair, etc. Actually reactions in society have been quite positive. People have accepted the adjustment and have understood the need for it."

TV News Story

Why did he react so strongly when the TV news program aired a story about economic intervention before the municipal elections?

"Because it was untrue. What I reacted so strongly to was that the TV news show made an attempt to present a news item in such a way that people would think the government had made a decision--as the TV news program said--to cut municipal funds by 8-9 billion kroner and increase taxes by 4-5 billion, for a total of 14 billion kroner. In the first place the figures were too high and in the second place the government had not made up its mind. The government was waiting to see the trade figures from October and our position was that we would not take a stand on a potential adjustment of the economy until toward the end of the year. As late as the end of October and the beginning of November the economic ministers and I were still undecided and uncertain as to whether it might be appropriate to go on without making an adjustment. But in the end we felt the time had come."

Jorgensen Attacks Foreign Minister

Copenhagen AKTUELT in Danish 27 Dec 85 p 3

[Article by Peder Munch Hansen: "Jorgensen Tells Ellemann-Jensen to Stop Preaching"]

[Text] Copenhagen--Former Prime Minister Anker Jorgensen called it a New Year's speech when Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen said that the Social Democratic foreign policy is strengthening the Socialist People's Party.

"This is the usual style when the foreign minister wants to make a political move. He shakes his finger and is incredibly moral about the Social Democrats, among others. But the foreign minister can save his breath. We have our foreign policy and we will continue to pursue it when we form a new government," said Anker Jorgensen.

New Foreign Policy Discussion

Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen opened up a new foreign policy discussion by saying in FREDERIKSBORG AMTS AVIS that in the weeks ahead Denmark will be making the most important decisions since we joined EC in 1972. He said Danish interests were involved to such an extent that it is imperative for the government to join forces with the Social Democrats. In this context he reproached the Social Democrats for embarking on a new course and doubted that the party could adhere to it if it held government power.

Course Strengthens SF

"The party is pursuing a domestic policy. I don't intend to offer the Social Democrats good advice, but it is hard for me to understand why they are

pursuing a course that so obviously strengthens and legitimizes SF," said Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, who called for a truce between the government and the Social Democrats.

To this Anker Jorgensen said that there is a kind of truce concerning essential issues like NATO and security policy, although there are different views on some details, such as nuclear weapons and a further development of EC.

Things that Need Changing

"We have just seen the new agreement that is planned in EC. We intend to decide for ourselves what our position will be on such agreements. We think there are positive elements in the latest agreement, but that is in no small part due to the fact that we told the government that there were things that needed changing. Some things have been changed. They would not have been if we had not made our wishes known," said Anker Jorgensen.

"Our foreign policy is well-known. We support NATO and EC but we oppose nuclear weapons. We will continue to do so in a new government, even if Uffe Ellemann-Jensen says we cannot live up to our policy if we are a government party. It is quite possible that the present government parties cannot support our nuclear policy, but in that case we will have to seek support elsewhere," Anker Jorgensen said.

Early in the new year Folketing must take a stand on the whole EC package that is the result of the latest EC compromise in Luxembourg. Just before Christmas there were rumors that the Liberals and especially Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen were ready to accept the entire package as it stood, while people like Prime Minister Poul Schluter were more willing to listen to the opposition in Folketing and perhaps renegotiate matters with the nine other EC countries. People at Christiansborg even said that the Liberals were about to resign from the government over the EC question. Uffe Ellemann-Jensen's new attack on the Social Democrats could therefore be an attempt to save face.

One of the big EC questions is the section on environmental policy and the Social Democrats have insisted that EC policy not be expanded in such a way that Danish environmental regulations are undermined.

Socialist Paper: 'Confidence Crisis'

Copenhagen AKTUELT in Danish 28 Dec 85 p 10

[Editorial: "Crisis of Confidence"]

[Text] In the past year the nonsocialist government under the leadership of Poul Schluter experienced a string of political defeats that could lead to a Folketing election and a change in government in the new year. The municipal council elections were probably the biggest shock the government had. The four government parties, the Radical Liberals and the Progressives

lost almost 10 percent of their voter support while the Social Democrats and particularly the Socialist People's Party made striking gains.

At the same time the government has obviously run into a serious crisis of confidence. It is increasingly difficult for the prime minister to win a sympathetic response for the artificially inflated optimism that has characterized the government in the past. Throughout the year the prime minister has assured us over and over again that the catastrophic balance of payments trend would turn around sometime this year. The government predicted a deficit of 15 billion kroner and dismissed repeated warnings that the trend was going in the wrong direction. It will change in the last few months of the year, the prime minister said over and over. Month by month the government was forced to "adjust" its estimate and yesterday the final figures were released by the Danish Bureau of Statistics. At 23 billion kroner it was the biggest balance of payments deficit in Danish history. An "error" of 53 percent in the estimate. Typically, that figure is 1 billion kroner higher than the latest government estimate.

Credibility was also seriously weakened when Prime Minister Poul Schluter attacked the TV news program and virtually pledged a few days before the municipal elections that the government had no plans for an economic intervention. The municipal elections were barely over before the intervention took place.

Schluter Policies Hit

Copenhagen AKTUELT in Danish 1 Jan 86 p 10

[Editorial: "Poor Taste"]

[Text] It is in poor taste when Prime Minister Poul Schluter (Conservative) says in his New Year's address that the government is "about to rescue the welfare state." It is quite true that more people are working, interest rates have fallen and the state deficit has been cut drastically. But the price has been paid by the very weakest groups in Danish society and by ordinary Danish wage earners who have been affected by the government's wage directives and at the same time have seen groups that are better off getting income hikes that are shockingly high.

But the prime minister is quite right when he says that the balance of payments is "a major unsolved problem." It certainly is. In 1985 the balance of payments set a new record with a total of 23 billion kroner. Here too the prime minister continues to be optimistic: "We can also rest assured that in 1986 we will at last achieve a positive change in the balance of payments."

No one has any faith now in this nebulous optimism. These are the same words we heard both in 1984 and in every single month of 1985. Just wait. The figures will show a change within the next few months. They did not. The average family has to pay the price in the form of increased taxes on oil, electricity, gasoline, etc., while the groups that profited from the "upturn"

and were largely responsible for the unfortunate development because of their massive overconsumption escaped almost scot-free. It is much harder on a family already living on a tight budget when its annual heating bill goes up by 1000 kroner or more than it is on the family of a managing director who has received a 30 percent salary increase.

Jorgensen: Election Likely

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 1 Jan 86 p 9

[Article by Helle Ravn Larsen; first paragraph is BERLINGSKE TIDENDE introduction]

[Text] Former Prime Minister Anker Jorgensen (Social Democrat) thinks 1986 will be an election year. He fears that the present four-party government is prepared to make "ill-considered and desperate" interventions that will hurt the weakest members of society, especially pension recipients and the unemployed.

The chairman of the Social Democratic Party, former Prime Minister Anker Jorgensen, urged the government in his New Year's speech to avoid confrontations and uncertainty with regard to Denmark's foreign policy. Anker Jorgensen also said he expects an election in 1986 and he did not hide his conviction that this will result in a Social Democratic victory, especially in view of the fact that the municipal elections represented a victory for the party.

"We are hoping for broad agreement in Folketing on both EC and security policy. We urge the government to avoid confrontations on foreign policy and to work actively instead for the policy that was laid out by a majority of Folketing members," said Anker Jorgensen.

At the same time he pointed out that there are many indications that there will be an election in 1986.

"If the Social Democratic Party is strengthened in a future election we are ready to cooperate with other far-sighted forces to assume responsibility for getting Denmark back on its feet, economically and socially--and we will replace the policy of confrontation on the job, in society and in relation to the organizations with cooperation and social restoration."

Greater Understanding for Social Democratic Viewpoints

Anker Jorgensen stressed the fact that the balance of payments deficit set a record in 1985.

"This is one of the results of the fact that economic policy has been based on incorrect evaluations and false optimism. Therefore there is reason to believe that 1986 will bring new ill-considered and desperate interventions

that will have a negative impact on wage earners and especially on pension recipients, early retirees and unemployed people."

Of his own party's situation he said that Social Democratic viewpoints won greater understanding and support in 1985 and that the municipal elections emphasized that the conservative wave has peaked--a trend that was reflected in a number of other European countries that held elections in 1985.

6578

CSO: 3613/52

PARTIES BEGIN POSITIONING THEMSELVES FOR 1987 ELECTION

Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 21 Sep 85 p 4..

[Article by Robert Leicht: "Already in the Midst of the Campaign"]

[Text] Here's another belated result of the change in Bonn: political time-consciousness has somehow gotten mixed-up. When people speak of the 1987 Bundestag election, most of them from old habit think this is - because of fall elections - still two years off. In reality, however, the premature 1983 new elections have had the result that next time the federal citizens will be (as the lovely image has it) called to the urns in the last days of January, that is, almost three-fourths of a year earlier than the collective consciousness of dates is expecting it. So, although the SPD may be trying with dogged footdragging to keep its candidate out of the campaign preliminaries as long as possible, in reality we're already pretty far into the next election campaign.

Taking Up Positions

One need only look at how Franz Josef Strauss is treating his coalition partners to realize that the bell has already sounded for this round. This session of the legislature is hardly the point any longer for the CSU chairman with his attacks, but rather primarily the consequences for the next one. All in all, no further substantive problems will be resolved in Bonn from now on; rather a few will be created. This is called taking up positions....

The only thing that unites the two popular parties in all this is the fact that it is almost impossible to achieve absolute majorities in the Bonn governmental system. Thus practically everything is dependent on a potential coalition partner. If you don't have one, or if you act - like the SPD - as if you were counting only on yourself, you're conceding the whole game in advance, and betting only on an improved position - and incidentally on 1991 (unless it turns out that we vote again as early as December 1990). If, on the other hand - as with the Union - your partner has long been obvious, and indeed can do nothing else, then precisely from this circumstance springs the freedom, at least for Strauss, to treat the FDP as rudely as was possible during the social-liberal coalition right after the breakdown of the alliance.

It's been asked often enough, why Strauss persecutes the liberals so aggressively, thereby bringing home their bacon for them. The ostentatious way in which Helmut Kohl used the FDP, as early as the change-over months of 1982-1983, to free himself from Strauss as much as possible, was a deep provocation to the CSU chief. It can't be a matter of indifference to the Bavarian minister-president that Kohl (without any ingenious activity on his own part - just the reverse!) is turning his own increasing weakness - that is, his inability to form the government again without a growing FDP - into a source of strength as against Strauss. For the historian, a classic example of how history moves on without regard to persons, or to their merits or mistakes.

But his rage against Genscher (and thus against Kohl) cannot be fully explained with these interpretations (which of course aren't unknown to Strauss). A serious problem is posed for him and the CSU. State legislative elections are scheduled in Bavaria for the fall of 1986. Since Strauss has been minister-president in Munich, his party has lost bit by bit in percentage terms - a process that threatens to continue. Indeed, the Bavarian SPD is already hawking early opinion polls that pretty much cut Strauss down to Johannes Rau size, i.e., that give him 52 percent.

CSU Fears for the Core

The CSU leadership now apparently believes this drop is attributable not so much to a loss of fringe voters to the center as to a "coming unglued" of the party's core voters: agriculture, church and paragraph 218, Bavarian leftovers of German nationalism - these, as is believed, are the clienteles that have hitherto been underserved by Bonn-oriented politicking. And, posed with the choice between core voters and switch voters, the CSU thinks it presently has more to lose at the core than it has to gain at the fringe.

Seen in this light, there exists no tactical contradiction at all between the CSU's self-preservation and any indirect subsidization of the FDP that may be linked with it. The awkward thing about it is that, for the CDU in the rest of the country, the problems can't be solved in this way. Its core voters are not sociologically defined in such an airtight way, either in terms of occupation, or in terms of religious denomination or geography. The CDU has to serve both core voters and switch voters equally. How far these differences have been smoothed out for some time now can be recognized from the migration of voters to the SPD. And voters "borrowed" by the FDP (drawn by its up-front attractiveness to the middle-class and to interest groups) are - despite the totals - doubly hard for the CDU to swallow, since this particular kind of liberal profile simultaneously repels many a potential Union voter. And drives him to the SPD....

The peculiar thing is that, although Bonn's policies are no brilliant show-window exhibits either for the Union as a whole or for the CSU, the SPD itself is wondering whether a direct confrontation with Kohl really is profitable on the whole. No one could fail to notice how energetically the leading Lower Saxony candidate Gerhard Schroeder argued for keeping Johannes Rau and federal-level politics out of his campaign this coming spring. This argues

very clearly that the SPD itself is quite aware of the following: just now, the party comes off noticeably worse against the liberal-conservative camp in the overall arena of national politics than it does in the "minor theaters of war," so to speak, of the individual states. That's why even Johannes Rau rejected any national-level tincture in his North Rhein-Westphalia campaign, since he could beat Worms more easily than he could Kohl.

SPD Caution

Still another reason makes cautious movement advisable for the SPD. It can expect a tidy step-by-step victory at the national level only to the extent that it succeeds in distancing itself from the signs of collapse among the Green (quite apart from the fact that the German voter as a general type simply doesn't want a red-green government in Bonn, with all its foreign-policy and security-policy uncertainties). But this means that the SPD has to uncouple federal and state policies as far as possible. At decisive points in the municipal and state governments, and throughout the Hessen government, the Greens are well represented. There, it is impossible to fight the Greens or to advance without them openly and directly, the more so since even Gerhard Schroeder in Hannover will perhaps have to decide whether he wants to sit with the Greens on the government benches or on the opposition benches.

Whatever meaning there may be in the daily din from Bonn, in reality a cautious tacking in search of the right starting position for the upcoming campaign is taking place. The day-to-day situation is much too ambiguous for everyone, for anyone to know already what he should do. Anyone who chooses to polarize things to any extent at this point is probably taking a very risky path, a fact that Heinz Geissler must have recognized. The coalition cannot get very far by pluming itself on financial and economic policy, as long as unemployment remains as long-term social problem.

Laments over unemployment don't help the SPD much, so long as its own economic-policy perspectives make no appeal corroborated by leadership. The foreign-policy and security-policy themes can't be partriotically built up and turned against the SPD, because patriotism in its ambivalence doesn't necessarily rime with alliance. And perhaps in the end Genscher will profit from Kohl's weakness in the art of government for the FDP just as much as will the chancellor's challenger.

13070/13068
CSO: 3620/68

ZEIT ANALYZES POLITICAL STYLE, STRATEGY OF SPD CANDIDATE RAU

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 20 Dec 86 p 2

[Article by Gunter Hofmann: "Here He Stands and Cannot Do Otherwise-- Johannes Rau Wants To Lead His Party to Victory But Remain Himself"]

[Text] Ahlen, Dec 85--Now the minister-president is also a candidate--for all of the long election year of 1986. Johannes Rau hesitated before he made up his mind. The preacher's son from Wuppertal, land of the crystal gazers, head of government in Duesseldorf, and one of the most popular politicians, would like to relieve Helmut Kohl as chancellor in Bonn. The SPD leadership nominated him unanimously. Did the Social Democrats, did he make the right decision? Is he the right man at the right time?

Johannes Rau is not an unknown quantity. People know his merry laughter; they recognize his subdued voice, which more and more is resembling that of Willy Brandt. He is part of the solid inventory of the world politicians; Brother Johannes, born in 1931. But then this same Johannes Rau suddenly surprises everyone by refusing to fit into any of the Bonn categories, which he hates anyway.

As late as day before yesterday he was Rau the successful who had always marched on the road of triumph. As recently as yesterday he was a Hamlet plagued by self-doubt, who had to be consoled and built up again because in a period of a few weeks he had made so many mistakes or blunders that one was almost bound to conclude that, somehow or other, he still wanted to bar his own way to Bonn.

Today, after Ahlen, Rau is making a confident impression, however. He looks as if he had found himself again. After all he is also the kind of cheerful and confident person who does not easily let himself be intimidated--by the gushing optimism of Kohl amid the upswing of the economy and emotions or by the internal conditions of the SPD, which has got a foothold as the party in opposition but is not yet on solid ground by a long shot as far as issues are concerned. All this does not seem to frighten Rau that much. There is only one thing he is really afraid of: Bonn.

Perhaps that has also to do with his having had to make a broad hint even before he had been nominated candidate for chancellor, saying that for him

too there were limits to what he could be expected to put up with and that one must not deal with him that way. Four recalcitrant but politically not inexperienced grandsons of Willy Brandt's--Gerhard Schroeder, Bjoern Engholm, Oskar Lafontaine, and Karl-Heinz Hiersemann--thereupon retracted their criticism of his controversial decision in favor of the Ibbenbueren coal power plant, the "Buschhaus of the SPD." Having put his foot in it once before on social issues, the candidate thus nearly spoiled his entire start.

Someone like Helmut Kohl must find this hesitancy as to whether one should want to come to Bonn in the first place rather comical. He always wanted to get there. Kohl had thought in terms of categories of power when he was still a young party official in Oggersheim and later when he was minister-president in Mainz. He always wanted to become chancellor. The answer to the question of why this in fact was so would perhaps be found later.

In Johannes Rau's case, this is different. He had never been particularly keen on becoming a candidate, but after the overwhelming Landtag election victory on 12 May, in which the SPD gained an absolute majority, there simply was no way around it any longer. The closer the time came, the more seriously Rau wondered whether he really should go in for this Bonn experiment.

As far as distance from Bonn is concerned, Johannes Rau would not be the first to notice something of it, and also to want to make that clear. Kohl's populism too was pervaded by judgements and resentment against the world of headquarters, of coldblooded operators, against the political world consisting of bureaucracy and the state, which he simply calls "not human." Kohl instinctively felt quite uncomfortable about it. Franz-Joseph Strauss or Lothar Spaeth, incidentally, are also among the professional politicians who have had populist reservations about Bonn.

Discomfort About Bonn

Johannes Rau's populism, for a start, is of a different kind--not a vehicle for getting hold of a power whose omnipresence one deplores at the same time, but a real discomfort coming from the heart. Kohl was driven to Bonn by instinct and consciousness of power. Johannes Rau, guided much more by his head than Kohl is, gives vent to his feelings when Bonn is the subject.

To him--as if this was not also occasionally true of Duesseldorf--the whole of Bonn looks like a unique strong-hold of "cartoon balloon politics." Rattling polemics, cabinet cronyism, campaign planners, the place of supposedly grand politics--those are the labels Rau uses for Bonn. Let the people in Bonn talk about "party coalitions," he remarked with a sign in Ahlen; he would rather look for a "new citizens' coalition."

In a strange way this sounds genuine--simply Rau's original way of speech. Not even an address which like the one in Ahlen had gone through the wringer so often and had been composed by the Bonn book can conceal this basic trait.

Not to buckle, to remain oneself, not to have to follow the rituals--Johannes Rau is not the first politician to wish for that. But the task is almost

insoluble. By the time election campaign managers (perforce) deal with it, even a negative attitude toward Bonn and the world of grand abstract politics becomes the object of the cultivation of an image or of a pose serving higher purposes.

However much, in the case of Helmut Kohl, one may miss a feel for institutions, forms, and public standards, and however often one has reason to deplore the forcible entry of the all-too-human into the Chancery--it really would be a worthwhile task to confront the political class in Bonn. The most serious attempt of this kind so far has been made by the Greens, and it got no further than overtures. So now Rau wants to give it a try.

It all may be in line with the zeitgeist. Yet it may be necessary. Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan too, each in his own way, successfully went into battle against the Washington juggernaut. It is also certainly true that Bonn politics could learn a great deal from the despised province or the base. It is a fact that with an uppityness which Rau cannot understand at all, politicians from the embrasure of headquarters look at the "people out in the country" as if there were from another planet. Finally it also stands to reason that someone who did not even risk the basic consensus as head of an all-Social Democratic government in the difficult industrialized Land of North Rhine-Westphalia is shying away from the more pigheaded way in which disputes are often waged in Bonn.

But can what is meant by politics in Duesseldorf--what Kurt Biedenkopf calls bureaucratization but which in fact represents a particular form of Ruhr democracy, from the communes to Rau's cabinet--be transferred to Bonn? It remains too great a risk to challenge Bonn, and what the name of Bonn stands for, this way.

After all, Helmut Kohl too has long been indulging it. He has turned to account the surfeit of or resentment against too much politics which dominated the seventies. The motto: You out there need not worry about politics; we will take care of that in Bonn. That is the same tune as Rau plays when he says, "Politics is the most important thing in the world--for the press." Put nicely but a little too simply.

It turns out that Johannes will be a candidate in a year in which, what with the increasing election campaign din in Bonn and growing feelings of helplessness outside Bonn, reservations concerning politics will proliferate further quite universally. As it is, parliament and parties, big organizations and institutions having to do with politics, have lost a lot of respect. Whether he has wanted to or not, Helmut Kohl, if anything, has furthered this state of affairs. It is not difficult to generate ill feeling against palaver democracy in Germany.

So a piece of political culture and fragile tradition is indeed at risk. It is not only Green fundamentalists who doubt that politics can be moved or changed via the customary methods. Particularly the SPD with its history of enlightenment has to be concerned a great deal if this piece of political reason goes under in the new mixture of surfeit with politics, anger about

impotence in Bonn, bewilderment, cult of authenticity, mythology, and dismissal of representative democracy.

So one can look forward with suspense to the tightrope act which Rau will have to perform--a credible politician who wants to remain himself and not let himself be bent out of shape, but not at the same time corroborate even further the flight from politics or the division of labor between Bonn and society.

Although the Ahlen address often was couched in rather general terms, it was possible to recognize the course which the SPD intends to steer with Rau. The basic note had been sounded by Willy Brandt in a SPIEGEL interview early this year when he momentarily spoke of the "national responsibility" being felt and borne by the SPD. While there was no mention of a grand coalition, it was the beginning of a grand, very bighearted, and ambiguous embrace.

As far as Rau is concerned, this will remain the tune for 1986; it accords with his temperament and style, the principle of caution to which he is beholden, but also with internal conditions in the SPD. Rau does not excite euphoria; he spreads a pleasant atmosphere (if things always go the way they did in Ahlen). The comrades then silently nod their heads--not all of them, not always, but most of the time anyway.

Thus Rau is not playing a big trump card by proposing a grand alternative which would challenge Kohl with the kind of precision which is alien to the chancellor anyway. He is presenting himself as a head of government who can show that he can pursue a policy of small steps forward and limited changes in difficult economic conditions.

An opposition which takes a moderate stand and seeks a minimal consensus repelling as few and "reconciliating" as many as possible--it is not the first time that the SPD is taking this kind of a position. Herbert Wehner, who, moved, embraced the candidate in Ahlen, has taken that kind of stand before. Unabashed, the SPD is talking not only of "politics for the majority," as Rau puts it, but also about the center--a word it had been unable to utter for years.

What "center" is supposed to mean in the case of Johannes Rau may be observed by looking toward Duesseldorf, and anticipated by taking the Ahlen fix seriously. The term has to be replenished with politics, Erhard Eppler advised, for center surely could not be understood only as the golden mean or "yes and no." Rau does take a more concrete view. The SPD is supposed to open up; it is not supposed to be an opposition thriving on conflict or a minority party but a guardian over the fact that social balance and justice must not be forgotten.

The performance could be described as close to Willy Brandt in style and tone, and in issues closer to Helmut Schmidt, who was not present in Ahlen. Rau is a discreet politician who in his cabinet in Duesseldorf literally has things discussed until no one is left with anything whatever to say. He feels comfortable in small circles engaged in thoughtful conversation, corrects

positions, and listens. However, like Kohl, when he is in doubt he is also fond of resorting to a little joke at times.

In the case of Rau, center means moving on the wavelength of the North Rhine-Westphalia SPD, which is not the propelling but the cautiously persistent bloc of the party. In light of this too, it is not hard to predict that it is going to be difficult to recognize the political significance of the handwriting of a politician who is after all a successful ruler of a Land and not a man without a political mind.

If one wants to describe the political orientation of Rau's SPD, it has a lot to do with modern industrial policy, with the development of universities (a veritable revolution in the workers' area staged by Minister Rau), and with the desire not to ignore questions about the consequences of technology and the search for greater justice.

The road from there to the enlightened conservatism of a Lothar Spaeth is definitely shorter than the one between the SPD and the Greens, no matter how one looks at it. It is after all no coincidence that Rau and Spaeth, perhaps for different reasons but with the same fervor, speak of a "spoiled" society. In the case of Spaeth, who is constantly searching for a modern technopolis, one can hear tones of a developed society. In the case of Rau, what is called conciliation is dissolved occasionally into a political "somewhere" located on the other side of political routine. Or--the night following his surprise victory over Friedhelm Farthmann (in 1977) in the election to the SPD Land chairmanship, he drops in at the house of his rival to console him.

If nothing else, Ahlen has offered a political pointer as to what is meant by the motto "conciliation rather than split." The Ahlen CDU program of 1947 (British Zone)--something the CDU has long since forgotten--noted that the capitalist economic system did "not meet the state and social life interests of the German people." The only thing possible was a "fundamentally new order," and the content of this new social and economic order "no longer can be a capitalist striving for profit and power but must be the welfare of our people."

Student of Heinemann

It is beyond dispute that today this third way is not even being sought by the SPD. The republic has gone another way, and the SPD with it. What has been left over from these years, however, is the lesson that codetermination, social justice, or the control of economic power are points of orientation which cannot be eliminated without a major conflict. Johannes Rau did not find it particularly difficult to connect his plea for strong labor unions with his plea for social compromises on the occasion of the dispute about the Labor Promotion Law and an unrestricted right to strike (article 116).

In other words, Rau does not simply substitute ethical ideas for thinking in terms of power--the kind of thinking the chancellor is wont to engage in. It is true, though, that he really comes to terms with himself whenever he bases political positions on ethical reasons. The scale ranges from the

policy of detente to human rights to his attitude toward Israel to criticism of the policy of facilitating arms exports. Here he is wholly a student of Gustav Heinemann, father figure and father surrogate.

One would have liked to know, however, why Johannes Rau so seldom makes the things that clearly are on his political mind the subject of discussion in Bonn. On the presidium of his party too, he acts rather as a moderator than as one who fights with enthusiasm for positions and orientations. That too has contributed to his reputation of being "nonpolitical." But why shouldn't he change?

In other words, it is no thundering new beginning apt to make the comrades cheer or to amaze the republic. Johannes Rau has not shown any weak point. He offers little in the way of areas for attack. He has made up for mistakes and apparently recovered some self-confidence, believing now that the decision to take aim at Bonn from Duesseldorf was not such a bad one after all.

After a paralyzing half year in which the opposition did not know who is setting the tone and what it should say even after it nominates its candidate at long last, the SPD has managed to come up with a solid platform for 1986. If the economic upswing has the kind of effect that is being forecast at the moment, the opposition will find it even harder to come up with the majority this side of the CDU/CSU which Brandt once talked about. But the candidate really looks like he is suited to the conditions and temper of the times. If not Rau, who else?

Rau the candidate, who wants to remain the man from Duesseldorf, has switched arenas. He will encounter Helmut Kohl the chancellor, born in 1930, whose personal style at first glance resembles that of Rau and whose abilities overlap Rau's to quite an extent. According to the opinion polls, Kohl is ahead when it comes to relations with the United States, growth and fiscal matters, and also when questions are raised about external security and national interests.

But Rau's head start increases when questions are raised concerning the human shaping of technological progress, insuring peace, fighting unemployment, a secure future for youth, equality of women, social payments, and social peace.

Kohl and Rau the populists sometimes definitely appear to resemble one another. But then invariably something that separates them crops up. One of the comrades, entering 1986 after Ahlen more confidently but not innocently, replies to the question concerning Kohl and Rau quite loosely and relaxed with the words "Long live the small difference!"

8790/12948

CSO: 3620/159

ATTITUDES TOWARD ECONOMIC GROWTH, EMPLOYMENT POLICY ANALYZED

Bonn DAS PARLAMENT (AUS POLITIK UND ZEITGESCHICHTE Supplement) in German
19 Oct 85 pp 19-38

[Article by Michael von Klipstein and Burkhard Struempel: "Change in Values and Economic Picture Perceived by Germans. I. People's Attitudes Toward Technology and Growth"]

[Excerpts] There is probably no other country which, in recent history, has acquired its self-confidence from economic success to such an extent as is the case with the Federal Republic of Germany. During post-war times, when millions went hungry and shivered through the cold of winter, when bomb ruins had to be replaced by housing structures, economic growth was nothing less than a national effort. Farmers, miners, masons and construction workers were the heroes of the first hour.

Today, farmers produce for butter mountains, miners for coal waste dumps; we even have an oversupply of residences and new construction ruins. Yet even after almost four decades of historically unprecedented production increase, politicians and industrial leaders still cultivate the concept that a growing economy is imperative to ensure a functioning economy. Stepping up economic growth and technical progress, combined with calls for wage restraints addressed to the employed and those who represent their interests, are still the main stays of current labor policies.

There is simple logic behind this model: by way of productivity increases and product innovation, technical progress is to enhance international competitiveness and thus furnish one of the conditions for the idea that the liberating effect of manpower connected with productivity increase is being overcompensated by the output increase of the economic growth. Wage increases which remain below the productivity progress and profits which exceed this correspondingly, are to be the necessary source of financing for enterprise investments in technical progress.

But can the economic and labor policy still count on smooth acceptance of growth and technical progress on the part of the populace? (Footnote 1) (The demoscopic results given in the following refer exclusively to representative polls for which time series data are available in part, i.e. the same question was repeatedly asked during the course of the years. The German part of the international

study "Jobs in the 80s" (sponsored by the "Volkswagenwerk Foundation" and directed by Prof Dr Elisabeth Noelle-Newmann and the two authors) constitutes the keypoint of the data basis for this article. The project examined--in part with international comparisons--the people's attitudes toward work and economy. (Controversial interpretations of the poll results are discussed in: E. Noelle-Neumann/B. Struempel, Does Work Cause Illness?--Does Work Cause Happiness?, Munich 1984. Project results from the Berlin task force [Research Unit Social Economics of Labor at the FU Berlin], which do refer to qualitative interviews, are extensively documented in: M.V. Klipstein/B. Struempel [Publ], Changed Values--Frozen Structures, Bonn 1985.) The data for the project were collected in 1982. More recent survey results regarding the polled subjects are frequently not yet available, but where this is the case these data were taken into account. Methodic objections can be formulated against particular survey indicators taken into consideration, if viewed on an isolated basis. However, in the following we are describing only trends and correlations for which a semantically similar indicatorbundle is available that possesses "convergence validity" in the sense of one or both of the following criteria:

--In the time series study, indicators, which linguistically are obviously similar, exhibit in their development over the years trends of equal direction, which indicate a common attitudinal dimension (see Tables 1 and 2 for example "Technology Scepticism").

--In the cross-sectional study for a certain year, the linguistically similar indicators show close relationships statistically.)

Since the end of the sixties, the technical development in the FRG presents the image of scissors opening between intensified government sponsorship and decreasing public sanction.

Between 1969 and 1980 the government's financial expenditures tripled for--primarily technologically oriented--research and development, and from 1969 to 1977--during a period in which the total number of workplaces in the FRG dropped--the number of those employed in public service with research and development assignments rose by almost 70 percent. (Footnote 2) (R. Merklein, The Germans are Getting Poorer, in: DER SPIEGEL, 31 (1982).

Table 1. Technology: Blessing or Curse?

Question: "Do you believe that technology on the whole is more of a blessing or a curse for mankind?"

Options	Aug 1966	Nov 1973	Sep 1976*)	Nov/ Dec 1980	Sep/ Oct 1981	Aug/ Sep 1984
	in percentage					
Technology on the whole is						
more of a blessing.....	72	55	44	34	30	32
more of a curse.....	3	10	9	13	13	11
yes and no**).	17	28	43	49	53	54
no opinion.....	8	7	4	4	4	3
	100	100	100	100	100	100

*) Results in a representative half group

**) 1966 and 1973 the option read "neither nor"

Source: Allensbacher Archiv, IfD-Surveys (Umfragen) 2019; 2099; 3034; 3091; 4000; 4048

In spite--or because of--these government efforts the public today has a far more sceptical view of technical development than was the case even in the mid-sixties.

At that time, the general, demoscopically verifiable consensus was that technology on the whole was more of a blessing for mankind and that it made life easier and more comfortable. Today, in the mid-eighties, this technological optimism has given way to a conflicting view of technology. Only a minority considers technology more of a blessing, and those who hold the opinion that life is becoming more aggravated all the time because of technology are just as numerous as those who anticipate an ever more easy and pleasant life because of technology. More young adults identify with the statement: "Technical progress destroys our life," than with the opinion: "Technical progress makes our life worth living." (Footnote 3) (Jugendwerk of Deutsche Shell, The Attitude of the Young Generation Toward the Working World and Economic System, Hamburg 1979.)

Among the younger ones the percentage of those for whom technology means an ever easier life has dropped far more than among the older ones (see Table 2)

At first glance, economic growth seems to have received better grades from the population than technical progress (70 percent, in round number, of the population had a generally positive opinion of economic growth in the beginning of the eighties). An association test on consequences of economic growth for various social areas reveals, however, that primarily negative growth results, such as "environmental pollution," "overpowering technology" and "stress and exhaustion" are being perceived. Among the few frequently named positive consequences of growth "new jobs" take a lead (see Table 3).

Judging by their social sentiments, the spontaneous associations in opposition to economic growth, the majority of the people must therefore be classified as being dissonant: Growth is good, but primarily has negative consequences. One bad basic conflict underlying this dissonance is the dilemma between growth and new jobs on the one hand and environmental protection on the other. If the people who are polled have to make a decision with regard to these conflicts, two characteristics of this growth dissonance become evident:

--In the target conflict "Environmental Protection versus Jobs," the majority opts for jobs. (Footnote 4) (Institute for Demoscopy (IFD) Allensbach/Research Center Social Economics of Labor (FSA) 1982)

--In the target conflict "Growth in Consumption versus Environmental Protection," a majority is in favor of giving priority to environmental protection. Fifty-one percent of the population is in agreement with the argument: "I feel we are so well off that our industry does not have to continue to grow. At this point we should primarily make an effort that we live in a healthy and natural environment." Only 35 percent are in agreement with the argument: "I don't agree. There are a lot of people who are far from being well off, therefore our industry must continue to grow, otherwise we can't help." (Footnote 5) (IfD Allensbach 1981)

Table 2. Technological Progress--easier for people or more difficult?

Question: "Do you believe that technological progress makes life more and more easy for people or more and more difficult?"

(1)

Categories	Es sind der Meinung, der Fortschritt der Technik mache das Leben immer —									
	(2) einfacher					(3) schwieriger				
	1966	1977	1981	1983	1984	1966	1977	1981	1983	1984
	in %									
(4) Bevölkerung insgesamt	50	40	32	35	38	29	41	44	39	41
(5) Männer	51	43	37	41	42	31	41	41	35	40
(6) Frauen	50	37	28	31	35	28	40	46	42	42
(7) Altersgruppen										
16—29 Jahre	67	48	38	38	42	14	33	35	36	36
30—44 Jahre	50	43	34	36	41	30	38	42	38	38
(8) 45—59 Jahre	44	38	31	36	40	38	42	45	37	43
60 Jahre und älter	36	29	25	31	30	35	49	54	45	47
(9) Schulbildung										
(10) Volksschule	48	38	32	37	37	31	42	44	39	42
(11) Höhere Schule	58	45	33	34	40	25	37	43	38	39
(12) Konfession										
(13) Protestanten	54	41	31	37	37	29	39	45	37	41
(14) Katholiken	48	38	34	34	41	30	43	43	41	39
(15) Andere, ohne	38	46	35	37	36	32	34	39	38	43
(16) Berufskreise										
(17) Angelernte Arbeiter	46	35	32	35	37	30	42	42	41	40
(18) Facharbeiter	54	40	33	37	40	27	41	43	39	42
(19) Einfache Angestellte, Beamte	58	41	32	35	35	26	41	44	39	43
(20) Leitende Angestellte, Beamte	51	46	30	35	48	32	37	46	38	37
(21) Selbständige, freie Berufe	45	39	34	43	40	35	39	46	30	36
(22) Landwirte	40	42	32	25	36	36	37	40	46	41

Quelle: Allensbacher Archiv, IFD-Umfragen 2015, 3045, 4001, 4030, 4045

Key:

- | | |
|--|---------------------------------------|
| 1. Of the opinion that technological progress makes life more and more - | 10. Elementary School [primary] |
| 2. Easy | 11. High School [secondary] |
| 3. Difficult | 12. Denomination |
| 4. Population overall | 13. Protestants |
| 5. Men | 14. Catholics |
| 6. Women | 15. Others, without |
| 7. Age groups | 16. Occupational groups |
| 8. 16-19 years | 17. Semi-skilled workers |
| 30-44 years | 18. Skilled workers |
| 45-59 years | 19. Regular employees, civil servants |
| 60 years and older | 20. Managers, civil servants |
| 9. Education | 21. Independent, liberal professions |
| | 22. Farmers |

Source: Allensbacher Archiv, IFD-Surveys 2015, 3045, 4001, 4030, 4045

Table 3. Attitude Toward Economic Growth

"The economy should continue to grow..."

I am more likely to be for that.....70%
 I am more likely to be against that.....16%
 I don't care.....12%
 No answer..... 2%

Source: FSA/IfD Allenback 1982.

Question: "Growth brings to mind..."

	Agreement in %
Technical progress	89
New jobs	82
Nuclear energy	76
Recreation, Vacation	69
A better life	56
Safety in everyday life	50
Freedom	39
Clean Environment	28
Pollution	77
Overpowering technology	75
Stress, Exhaustion	73
High oil prices	73
Waste of raw materials	60
Inflation, Price increases	57
Imperialism, multimillionaires	50
Inhumanity	49
Unemployment	39
Coercion	38
Uncertain future	34

Source: IfD Allensbach 1981.

Many citizens--this is how the findings could be interpreted--in their roles as subjects of the economy, but also as national citizens are caught in a producer-consumer dilemma, in a conflict between their roles as gainfully employed individuals having to worry about their jobs and as consumers with their needs fully taken care of and the critical views of an affluent society.

On the matters of growth and technology, the majority of the population is perplexed and torn between environmental sentiments and technocratical arguments. Without technical progress, competitive strength is already dropping today, without growth, unemployment is already rising today and tomorrow maybe the economy will collapse--with growth and technical progress, however, the environment will collapse the day after tomorrow, and even today life becomes more trying, hectic and inhumane all the time.

In this economic picture as seen by many people, in which the many individual economic goods no longer join together for the good of the whole economy, two "tragic priorities" can be recognized, dictated by the issue:

1. The priority of productivity--if we don't maintain our competitiveness, we shall lose jobs and are no longer able to pay for our energy and raw materials--and
2. the priority of accumulation--if growth does not continue in the long run, our economy will not function.

Both priorities are tragic for the reason that, from the citizens' perspective, they cannot be realized in step with social and ecological requirements. In order for the economy to work (short- and medium-range), man and his natural environment becomes but a mere economic function.

II. The Demythologizing of Production

Production without charisma as the bone of contention--this is something new in the province of social conflict. The traditional class conflict, which in politics was fought between leftists and rightists, always was about the distribution of the cake, not its size or its production. even employees considered growth and technical progress more of an opportunity than a threat. The proud slogan "All the wheels will stand still, if it is your strong arm's will" did not advertise a goal, but was merely a flexing of muscles; it was meant to demonstrate strength in the distribution fight.

Well, are the presented attitudes of the citizens toward technology and growth merely lightweight media covers, colorful balloons which inconsequentially sway in the changing winds of public opinion making, or do they take root in the personal life and work concepts of the people?

We want to explore this question both from a longitudinal section perspective (development of survey indicators for the total population or working people, respectively, in the course of time) and from a cross-sectional perspective (different manifestations of the indicators at a certain time for population subgroups).

During the course of time it appears that parallel to increased technology skepticism there took place a change in the principles of life and education (see Fig 1). Principles of interhuman communication, self-determination and enjoyment of life have gained in significance; values of adaptation, subordination and performance orientation have lost some of their importance, on the other hand. Closely related to this, as it would seem, demands upon one's occupational work (Fig 2) also changed. Here too increased significance of interhuman communication is observed; furthermore, requests for creative and interesting work as well as for shorter working hours made a stronger show. On the other hand, advancement and high income becomes less important.

Overall, we observe a quantum jump in demands, which reality--including all humanization efforts--is confronting helplessly up to now. In fact, this is a demand revolution, but different from the one which is continually evoked by

critics of the social state. It is not a matter of money, but of interesting work, fulfillment at the workplace; codetermination more likely in the form of self-determination; good relations among colleagues and superiors; health, which is threatened by high job demands, and meaning--work benefiting the community.

To date, jobs really have not done justice to the new demands. Although working conditions in the perception of non-supervisory working personnel on the whole have not worsened since the mid-sixties, they also have not improved, (Footnote 6) (E. Noelle-Neumann/B. Struempel (Not. 1) p 56 ff.) while with rising income, increased education and shorter annual working hours, leisure time opened up new options for activity. As a result it can be assumed that gainful employment in a relative comparison to leisure time took more and more of a backseat. In this manner, the following trends become apparent:

--During the past decades job satisfaction among the German working population has decreased;

--orientation toward leisure time has increased;

--the exercised freedom to make decisions at work has diminished, and special exertion on the job is considered to be a health-hazard by a majority of workers;

--loyalty toward the employer is lower in the FRG than in other industrialized countries;


--roughly every fourth full-time employed person would like a reduction--cost-neutral to the employer--of working hours. (Footnote 7) (P. Pawlowsky, Work Orientation between New Demands and Old Structures, in M.V. Klipstein/B. Struempel (footnote 1)).

Thus criticism and skepticism toward one's job have increased. In addition, the tendency to remove oneself from the job is stronger with Germans than with other nations included in the international comparison. Especially the younger ones are very vocal on this issue, as illustrated by Table 4.

A detailed analysis of 20 qualitative interviews examined to what extent different orientations toward growth and technical progress are linked to different work attitudes and life concepts, for one, and to distinguishable attitudes, for another, toward the causes of and measures taken with respect to unemployment. In both cases, a considerable degree of consistency was found. (Footnote 8) (J. Scholz, How Diverse Is the Popular Economic Thinking?, in: M.V. Klipstein/B. Struempel (footnote 1)). With the help of dialogue questions on growth problems a "Post-Materialism/Materialism"-index was then formed, in order to be able to also trace the mentioned interrelations on the basis of a representative population poll. The index furnished the results shown in Table 5.

Hardly any differences can be detected, between the post-materialists and the materialists, in the job classification status and employment status as well as income. On the average, post-materialists have a slightly higher level of

Figure 1. People's Values have Changed...
The Development of Life and Education Principles



Key on next page

Key:


1. Increased importance of
 - Communication
 - Self-Determination
 - Enjoyment of Life
2. Decreased importance of
 - Adaptation
 - Subordination
 - Performance
3. Very important in %
4. Respect those who think differently, be tolerant (IfD)
5. Judgment of character, select the right friends (IfD)
6. Independence, free will (EMNID)
7. Enjoy life (IfD)
8. Be part of a certain structured order, adapt (IfD)
9. Accomplish something in life, make something of yourself (IfD)
10. Obedience and Subordination (EMNID)

schooling, but not of professional training. Overall, the education differences can explain for a minor part only the different viewpoints of both groups. More obvious, however, are the age differences between the younger post-materialists and the older materialists. The life concepts of both groups, to which the central personal value systems give a clue, also show distinct differences. While the materialists place more emphasis on duty, diligence, professional success and good earnings, self-realization as well as an interesting and ecology-minded life comes more to the foreground with post-materialists. If one views the longitudinal section and cross-sectional observations in context, then post-materialists place more emphasis on those values in life which have gained in importance in the total population since the end of the sixties; the materialists, on the other hand, are most likely to stress principles whose significance has paled during this period.

Distinct differences also appear in their attitude toward the job between the two groups. Post-materialists express less unreserved satisfaction with their work than materialists. They are more inclined to cite self-realization as the basic motif of their work, while the materialists more frequently mention income and advancement. For the post-materialists; they are less prepared to make sacrifices for it and to a greater degree would personally like to have shorter working hours, even with correspondingly adapted income.

When describing their own job with the help of 31 characteristic features, only few differences appear between the two groups. It stands out that the post-materialists, especially in the instance of "classical" job characteristics such as high and just income, job security, little physical effort as well as hectic and stress, do not do any worse than the materialists. In the case of typical post-materialistic demands for interesting and codetermined work, however, the post-materialists register larger deficits than the materialists. Possibilities for rapid advancement are also found less frequently by post-materialists in their jobs than by materialists. The fact that the life goal of "Professional Success" is less important to the post-materialists leads to the assumption, however, that this group also places less value upon career opportunities than the materialists and that this already influenced their job search.

Figure 2. ...and with them the demands upon one's job
The Development of Demands Upon One's Job



Key on next page

Key:

1. Increased importance of
 - Communication
 - Creativity
 - Interesting work
 - Shorter working hours
2. Decreased importance of
 - Rapid advancement
 - High income
3. Very important in %
4. Interesting, diversified activity (IfD)
5. A lot of contact with other people (IfD)
6. An occupation where it is important to have own ideas (IfD)
7. Interesting, diversified, responsible work (INFAS)
8. Shorter working hours with adapted income (IfD/FSA)
9. High income (IfD)
10. Good possibilities for advancement (IfD)
11. Good earnings possibilities (IfD)
12. Longer working hours with income adaptation (IfD/FSA)

A comparison of attitudes toward technical progress showed a far more critical point of view from the post-materialists. As is the case with the materialists, in their personal work experience with technical changes their comments were predominantly positive, however. Only where post-materialistic demands for interesting and responsible work are concerned, technical changes get a less favorable report, although roughly every second post-materialist still admits that his work has become more interesting with added responsibility, at least in part, as a result of technical changes.

Distinct differences can also be detected between the two ideological groups in their viewpoints on the employment problem. In answer to the question, what they think are the causes for unemployment, the post-materialists more frequently cite technical progress and the companies' search for profits, materialists, on the other hand, more often the presence of foreign workers. For proposals to fight unemployment, post-materialists more frequently vote for a general shortening of working hours, for less rationalization and a promotion of alternative projects. Materialists more strongly advocate the more rapid approval of power plants and industrial establishments, increased promotion of technical progress and return of foreign workers.

In taking stock: The analysis of representative survey data also shows: The public attitudes toward growth and technology are not "up in the air." They are clearly linked to viewpoints of unemployment, to personal concepts of work and life as well as to age. The connections are much minor by far to one's education and concrete work experience including technical changes at the workplace as well as to one's income and occupational group status. When viewing the longitudinal and cross-sectional study in context, it is the personal work and life concepts of people that stand out the most. These motivational factors are the only variables which indicate an interrelation with views on the technologic-economic dynamic. The change in values reflected here therefore deserves closer examination.

Table 4. Work Ethics In An International Comparison

Question: "Here are two people talking about their work. Which of the two comes closer to saying what your thinking is also, the person above or below?"
(A picture page is presented)

The alternatives were: "I give my all to my job and often do more than is asked of me. My job is so important to me that I sacrifice a lot for it."

"In my job, I do what is expected of me, so nobody can reproach me. But I don't see that I should make any special effort over and above that. My job is not that important to me."

		(1)			(2)						(3)					
<u>Alternatives</u>		Bundesrepublik Deutschland			USA			Israel			Schweden			Großbritannien		
		in %														
(4)	Ich setze mich in ...	(1967)														
	meinem Beruf															
	ganz ein	(54)	42		68		79		56		66					
	Ich tue das, was von mir verlangt wird	(33)	41		24		18		36		30					
	n =...	741			845			964			1 128			825		
(5)	Altersgruppen:	16-29	30-54	55 u. älter	16-29	30-54	55 u. älter	16-29	30-54	55 u. älter	16-29	30-54	55 u. älter	16-29	30-54	55 u. älter
		(6) in %														
(7)	Ich setze mich...															
	ganz ein	31	43	58	61	70	73	75	81	71	45	58	55	57	69	74
	Ich tue das, was... verlangt wird	51	39	28	30	22	18	24	16	22	45	33	38	39	28	19
	n =...	279	304	158	244	476	125	215	659	90	164	792	172	238	399	188
(8)	Berufsgruppen:	Ange-stellte	Arbeiter	Ange-stellte	Arbeiter	Ange-stellte	Arbeiter	Ange-stellte	Arbeiter	Ange-stellte	Arbeiter	Ange-stellte	Arbeiter	Ange-stellte	Arbeiter	
		(9) (10) in %														
(11)	Ich setze mich...															
	ganz ein	48	32		72	61	—	—		64	43		80	54		
	Ich tue das, was... verlangt wird	34	54		20	29	—	—		24	51		17	41		
	n =...	456	285		485	347					616	465		370	455	

(12) Quelle: Auswertung der internationalen Umfrage „Jobs in the 80s“ 1982

Key:

- | | |
|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| 1. FRG | 7. I give my all... |
| 2. Sweden | I do what is expected... |
| 3. Great Britain | 8. Occupational Groups |
| 4. I give my all to my job... | 9. Salaried Employees |
| I do what is expected of me... | 10. Laborers |
| 5. Age groups | 11. I give my all... |
| 6. and older | I do what is expected of me... |

12. Source: Evaluation of international survey "Jobs in the 80s" 1982

Table 5. Post-Materialists (Growth Critics)--Materialists (Growth Advocates)*)

Description	Post- Materialists n = 275/24 %	Middle Group n=428/37% in %	Materialists n = 463/39 %
Ages			
16-24 years	24	17	12
25-35 years	31	25	19
35-44 years	18	18	21
45-54 years	13	18	22
55-69 years	13	23	26
Occupational Groups**			
Skilled workers	24	25	28
Other workers	12	13	13
Supervisory employee	7	7	10
Regular employee	32	29	26
Higher official	6	7	5
Minor official	5	6	5
Independent	6	6	9
Liberal profession	3	2	1
Schooling and Professional Training			
"Hauptschule" (secondary school)	44	55	55
"Realschule" (secondary school)	24	18	20
High School diploma (pre-college)	17	14	10
Completed apprenticeship	42	49	51
Completed vocational school	11	7	11
Completed college education	7	7	7
No occupational training	14	16	9
Very Important Personal Goals in Life			
Interesting life	58	49	45
Self-realization	51	44	41
Live ecology-minded	59	41	34
Make good money	32	51	60
Do my duty	42	49	65
Be successful in my job	23	38	54
Attitude Toward One's Work**			
Completely satisfied with work	29	37	48
In favor of shorter personal work hours with adapted income	35	27	21

I give my all to my job and often do more than is expected of me. My job is so important to me that I make a lot of sacrifices for it	28	37	54
I work mainly, so that I can afford more things and to get ahead	50	70	72
I work mainly to realize myself as a person	30	20	10

Experiences at Work**

"This is absolutely true for my work":

A job where I have a say-so in important decisions	17	20	32
A job where I am never bored	42	46	59

"This is not at all the case with my work":

A job situation, where one can get ahead quickly and make a career	77	71	62
--	----	----	----

Perceived Causes of Unemployment

Too many jobs are being replaced by machines	86	76	65
The companies are only out to make profits	42	29	23
The many guestworkers take our jobs away	54	59	65

Endorsed Measures Against Unemployment

The foreign workers and their families should be sent back to their own country	41	57	65
More rapidly approve the erection of power plants and the establishment of industries	20	36	60
Do more for technical progress	20	38	58
Take more countermeasures to prevent jobs from being replaced, rationalized away by machines	71	57	46
Working hours should be shortened for all working people	55	47	44
Institutions, which have been established by citizens, should receive financial aid from the government, e.g. environmental protection, social and cultural work	67	54	54

Attitude Toward Technical Changes

Do more for technical progress	20	38	58
Society should place a greater value on the development of technology ("I am apt to be for that")	28	42	58
One person: "The modern working world has become more monotonous and the individual is more and more estranged from his work." (Agreement)	60	43	34
The other person: "Work is more enjoyable than before. Workplaces are nicer and better equipped, work itself has become more interesting." (Agreement)	26	30	48
	Post-	Middle	
Working Individuals Only	Materialists	Group	Materialists
		in %	

Work Experience with Technology**

Technical changes at own workplace within the past 5-10 years

great	27	28	33
small	37	33	42
none	36	39	25

As a result of technical changes my work is now:

Physically less demanding

absolutely	9	20	19
in part	50	42	37
not at all	37	31	38

Intellectually and mentally more

burdening			
absolutely	9	10	8
in part	24	28	25
not at all	57	56	61

More monotonous

absolutely	3	5	3
in part	22	18	24
not at all	63	71	68

Holds greater responsibility

absolutely	17	12	21
in part	28	48	42
not at all	45	34	32

More Interesting

absolutely	5	15	20
in part	45	43	46
not at all	41	31	30

*) Both groups were formed with an index that comprised four dialogue questions (pro and con arguments) on growth problems. Those individuals were classified as "Post-Materialists" who did not give a single positive, but at least one negative comment with regard to economic growth. Accordingly, the opposing group was formed by "Materialists" (no negative, but at least one positive comment on growth). The remainder of those polled was combined as "Middle Group." A more detailed illustration of the index developed by J. Scholz, including related queries, can be found in: M.v. Klipstein/B. Struempel (Publ), *Changed Values--Frozen Structures. How Citizens experiences Work and Economy*, Bonn 1985, pp 318/319.

**) These percentage figures refer to working individuals (post-materialists: n = 165; middle group: n = 246; materialists: n = 266).

Source: Evaluation of international survey "Jobs in the 80s," 1982 (results for the FRG).

IV. Employment Policies and Income Solidarity

Which consequences result from the described tendencies toward post-materialistic life and work concepts as well as economic pictures for the presence of employment policy solidarity potentials? Is there an income solidarity on the part of the employed in favor of the unemployed? If so--should this income solidarity be understood to mean a blanket authorization for the decision makers of employment policies or do the survey data indicate certain criteria to which would have to be linked a successful utilization of existing potentials for income solidarity through policies? Are these criteria being met by various employment strategies?

On the one hand, unemployment today has become the most important social issue for citizens overall (Footnote 10) (E. Noelle-Neumann/E. Piel (Publ), *Allensbacher Yearbook of Demoscopy 1978-1983*, Munich--New York--London--Paris 1983, pp 260, 263, 334, 465); on the other hand, distinct material saturation tendencies are evident for the average wage earner (Footnote 11) (M. von Klipstein/B. Struempel, *Der Ueberdruss am Ueberfluss [Weary of Affluence]*. The Germans After the Economic Miracle, Munich 1984). Both provide the background that potentials exist for income solidarity of the employed to combat unemployment. A large majority in all occupational groups at least spoke in favor of waiving increases in the available real income--increases to which, given continued productivity increases, the dependently employed can generally lay claim under the standard of a distribution-neutral, productivity-oriented wage policy (see Table 6).

The willingness to make further concessions in the status quo real income has also increased from 1975 to 1983, although available real incomes have been stagnating since the beginning of the eighties. This increase though, is only being observed in the case of salaried employees and not of workers (see Table 6). Considering that even today only every fourth employed individual is prepared to make real-wage concessions, it is likely that further general income reductions to combat unemployment would not receive a majority vote. (Footnote 12) (E. Noelle-Neumann/E. Pier (Footnote 10) p. 375.) Tax increases in order to

create new jobs are also being rejected by a majority. (Footnote 13) (P. Grottian, Concept and Materials with Regard to Wage Negotiations in Public Service, Study Paper of the Freie Universitaet Berlin, Berlin 1981.) A utilization acceptable to the public of existing potentials for income solidarity through employment policies is--according to our theory--bound to the solution of three problems.

a) The Valence Problem

It is true that employment policy can be based on the high merit (valence) of the political requirement to combat unemployment, but it must also take into account other values of the public--personal as well as political, positive ones as well as negative ones--which are being affected by measures of employment policy (e.g., health and environmental protection, technology skepticism, leisure time interest).

b) The Instrumentality Problem

The issue here is the employment policy effectiveness of income solidarity measures from the viewpoint of the citizens for one, and the perceived effects, for another, of these measures for other values.

c) The Distribution Problem

Income solidarity employment policies affect popular distribution standards in two respects: Who and to what extent shall make concessions (contributory justice), and who is entitled to be the recipient of these concessions (receiving-end justice)?

With the help of the demoscopic data evidence two overall economic employment strategies, which must claim income solidarity for themselves, shall be examined in the following as to how they solve the valence, the instrumentality and the distribution problem from a point of view of the public. On the one hand there is collective working hour reduction, on the other a strategy package, which we call "Industrial Paradigm":

--Stimulation of technical progress, company investments as well as intensified work effort in order to strengthen growth and international competitive capabilities;

--Reduction of unemployment benefits in order to motivate the unemployed to intensify their search for work--along with increased regional and qualificative mobility.

1. The Valence Problem

In addition to increased concern about jobs, it is personal and social values--which have changed in part--that are primarily affected by the two employment strategies:

Table 6. Willingness to Make Income Concessions for Economic Upswing and Jobs

Question: "Economic experts say that the upswing will not take place and unemployment cannot be reduced, unless all working individuals will be content to receive only moderate wage increases during the next year. On this page you see various opinions on the subject. Which of these reflect your thinking?"

	(1)			(2)			(3)			(4)			(5)			(6)			(7)		
	Angelernte Arbeiter			Facharbeiter			Einfache Angestellte und Beamte			Leitende Angestellte und Beamte			Selbständige und freie Berufe			Landwirte			Berufstätige insgesamt		
	1975	1981	1983	1975	1981	1983	1975	1981	1983	1975	1981	1983	1975	1981	1983	1975	1981	1983	1975	1981	1983
	in %																				
(8) Ich wäre damit einverstanden, wenn (1976, 1982, 1983) die Löhne und Gehälter notfalls gar nicht erhöht werden	11	11	14	10	10	15	12	20	31	15	31	37	29	43	54	32	39	34	14	21	28
(9) Ich wäre dafür, daß die Löhne und Gehälter um soviel erhöht werden, daß die Preissteigerungen und die erhöhten Sozialversicherungsbeiträge ausgeglichen werden (Inflationsausgleich)	66	53	61	69	62	67	74	58	58	78	59	50	63	43	44	56	49	62	69	57	58
(10) Ich meine, die Löhne und Gehälter sollten (1982, 1983) so erhöht werden, daß nicht nur die Preissteigerungen ausgeglichen werden, sondern daß auch darüber hinaus noch etwas übrig bleibt*)	19	28	20	18	26	17	11	18	7	4	8	13	5	6	2	4	5	0	13	18	11
(11) keiner davon	4	8	5	3	2	1	3	4	4	3	2	0	3	8	0	8	7	4	4	4	3
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

(12) *) Antwortvorgabe 1975: Ich meine, die Löhne sollten 1976 so erhöht werden, wie in den letzten Jahren, nicht weniger.

(13) Quelle: JfD Allensbach, Sekundärauswertung FSA, Bundesgebiet mit West-Berlin, Berufstätige.

Key on next page

Key:

1. Semi-skilled workers
2. Skilled workers
3. Regular employees and officials
4. Supervisory employees and officials
5. Independent and liberal professions
6. Farmers
7. Working individuals overall
8. It would be all right with me, if (1976; 1982; 1983) wages and salaries would not be increased at all, if necessary...
9. I am in favor of increasing wages and salaries sufficiently, so that price increases and increased social security payments would be compensated for (inflation adjustment)...
10. I think wages and salaries (in 1982; 1983) should be sufficiently increased to make not only up for price increases, but to have something left over and above that *)...
11. None of these...
12. *) Answer option in 1975: I think wages should be increased in 1976 as they have been in the past years, no less.
13. Source: IfD Allensbach, Secondary Evaluation FSA, FRG with West Berlin, working individuals.

a) Technical Progress

Technical progress has lost some of its charisma in the seventies. Only a minority still rates it as unequivocally positive, the majority of people considers it "part blessing, part curse" (see Section I).

b) Environmental Protection

Since the beginning of the eighties, environmental protection is among the most important political demands of the public. (Footnote 14) (E. Noelle-Neumann/E. Piel (footnote 10) p 263) Environmental protection and new energy technologies are also among the items in the federal budget, for which the public is willing, on the average, to put up with the largest cutbacks from their available income (Footnote 15) (WZB-Notices, July 1983)

c) Leisure Time Interest

Since the end of the sixties, public interest in more leisure time at respective given hourly wages has grown. At that time, those who expressed a desire for more work outnumbered those who wished for shorter working hours, today the reverse is the case. (Footnote 16) (M.v. Klipstien/B. Struempel (footnote 11) p 166)

d) Health

"Live healthy" is a documented priority as an important life value for the German citizen ahead of "occupational success," "diligence" and "earning good money." (Footnote 17) (IfD Allensbach/FSA 1982) A majority is also in favor of creating more jobs in Preventive Medicine within the framework of public service. (Footnote 18) (P. Grottian (footnote 13) p 12)

2. The Instrumentality Problem

Both general working hour reductions as well as the industrial paradigm do not do well with respect to the confidence citizens have in their employment effects. Where a reduction of working hours is concerned, clearly less than half of the total population and also of the employed are, generally polled, of the opinion that shorter working hours could contribute significantly in controlling unemployment. (Footnote 19) (E. Noelle-Neumann/E. Piel (footnote 10), pp 460; 462) In the case of technical progress aided through greater company investments, the majority of citizens makes the association of job elimination and only a minority that of job creation. (Footnote 20) (IfD Allensbach 1981) Questioned about the causes for unemployment, replacement of manpower by machines heads the list of reasons given, and a majority speaks in favor of less rationalization. (Footnote 21) (IfD Allensbach/FSA 1982)

The important concerns of health, environmental protection as well are viewed to be in conflict with the industrial paradigm by most citizens. A majority associates pollution with both technical progress and with economic growth. Technical progress and ecology have not always been in conflict in the view of the public, which is substantiated by the agreement rate to the following statement from the sixties: "As a result of technical progress water and air are being kept clean." In 1962, 61 percent of the population still agreed with this prognosis for the future, in 1969 still 48 percent, but in 1981 a mere 29 percent. (Footnote 22) (IfD Allensbach)

The demand for a more intense work effort to safeguard international competitiveness and jobs does not have majority appeal; 7 of 10 employed individuals, on the other hand, believe that high performance and effort on the job is detrimental to their health. (Footnote 23) (IfD Allensbach/FSA 1982)

It is true then that both general working hour reductions and the industrial paradigm are being met with skepticism with regard to the creation of new jobs. Beyond that, the public sees the industrial paradigm as a violation of the important concerns of health and environmental protection. The reduction of working hours, as long as it is only coupled with concessions to the growth and not the status quo of real income, has the advantage, on the other hand, of realizing the majority priority of increased leisure time versus wage increases.

3. The Distribution Problem

a) Receiving-End Justice

A distribution standard largely endorsed by the public holds that among the unemployed who are able to work only those who are willing to work should be entitled to support from the employed. Are most unemployed persons willing to work, according to popular public opinion? Since this question was first asked in 1975, the majority of the population has been answering in the negative until the year 1982. But since then a change has taken place and today most people believe that those unemployed who do not want to work are isolated cases. (Footnote 24) (E. Noelle-Neumann/E. Piel (footnote 10) p 453) Aid to most unemployed is accepted from a distribution policy standpoint, which is reflected in the fact that a majority of citizens votes against a reduction of

unemployment benefits, in the event that unemployment figures should continue to rise. (Footnote 25) (ibid, pp 458; 461; Secretary of Labor and Welfare (Publ), Challenge of Social Policy, Research Report 92, Bonn 1983)

b) Contribution Justice

At present we are in a distribution policy situation with increased profits and reduced real wages, such as is demanded by the industrial paradigm for the creation of jobs: cost reductions through wage increases which lag behind the productivity progress. Rising profits are intended to constitute the financing and motivation source for job-creating investments. As the population sees it, such a distribution situation is not acceptable, however--higher company profits find approval with a minority only. (Footnote 26) (IfD Allensbach/FSA 1982) As far as shorter working hours are concerned, several surveys show that to finance these a method of "socially scaled wage stabilization"--real-wage concessions only for higher wage earners--can still get a majority vote from the higher wage earners themselves, if the mode of questioning implies concrete job effects. (Footnote 27) (P. Grottian/M. Kueck, Model Berlin: 10,000 New Jobs Within the Self-Help and Alternative Domaine, in: M. Bolle/P. Grottian (Publ), Create Jobs --Now!, Reinbek near Hamburg 1983, pp 128-144)

In summary, the following comparison of the two employment strategies can be made: With regard to mastering the distribution problem and the instrumentality problem, insofar as it concerns general public estimations extending beyond the employment problem, it is working hour reduction that has the advantage. In the citizens' view and in fighting unemployment, it does not violate as much as the industrial paradigm other political and personal values such as health and environment protection and accommodates the majority preference of more leisure time versus wage increases. At the same time, a working hour reduction seems to be more acceptable from a distribution policy standpoint, since wage concessions for one in this instance do not require simultaneous profit gains for job creation, as is the case with the industrial paradigm, and the income concessions for another of the average and below-average wage earner can be kept within limits through proportionately higher contributions from the higher wage earners.

Status-quo concessions in real income for higher wage earners are not acceptable to a majority of those concerned, however, unless they impart effective employment results to the strategies financed with the former; with regard to instrumentality, both general working hour reductions as well as the industrial paradigm exhibit great weaknesses in the view of the public. Both strategies of income solidarity employment policies are confronted with the basic problem, namely that certain income concessions on the part of the employed are faced with uncertain employment effects.

13011/12232

CSO: 3620/161

FORMER AMBASSADOR TO U.S. ON YOUTH ATTITUDES TOWARD USSR, U.S.

Helsinki SUOMEN KUVALEHTI in Finnish 20 Dec 85 pp 26-28

[Article by Tuomo Lappalainen: "We Are An Ignorant People From A Foreign Policy Point of View"]

[Text] Jaakko Iloniemi, the new chairman of the Paasikivi Society, is thoroughly dissatisfied with the level of foreign policy knowledge among the Finnish people. Youth underestimates security policy, and even among active people there are only a few who "would satisfactorily be able to define our country's foreign policy line".

1985 will certainly be remembered for a long time as the year of a rather peculiar foreign policy debate. Indeed, the quantity has been nearly constant, but the text itself has become wilder than in human memory. Now, among other things, arguments have been presented to the effect that now Finland has slid toward to the West and then toward the East, the press is accused of becoming Swedenized, a retired colonel, who criticized the actions of of the UN soldiers who became hostages, is labelled a traitor, and even President Kekkonen's disarmament initiative is called a mistake, which was presented in the wrong time at the wrong place.

Jaakko Iloniemi, who was elected chairman of the Paasikivi Society and thus a kind of higher moral guardian of the foreign policy debate at the end of November, has his task cut out for him. Many also believe that he is the man to meet the challenge. Above all, it is hoped that he will make the society, which has the reputation of being an ossified club of old men, once again into an active opinion setting organization, in which debates would be sufficiently animated so that arguments would be reflected even elsewhere in society.

Iloniemi, himself, has adopted a calm attitude toward these expectations. In his opinion, the invisibility of the Paasikivi Society is not just the result of its members but also of its speakers whose thorough analyses of international politics are not always easily understood. Part of the blame can also be given to the press, in which an analytical discussion falters on the merciless threshold of what is newsworthy.

"Not all matters have to be newsworthy. Indeed, analytical articles can be written about analyses. And such forums which are not actually intended for the press can be used.

"In general, there has not been anything too exciting under these peaceful conditions as far as our point of view regarding international politics is concerned. And it is under these very conditions that there would naturally be a good opportunity for a thorough debate. Since emotions would not control the debate, reason could prevail," philosophized Iloniemi.

Liturgy Is Ignorance

But is it not possible to think that the lack of enthusiasm in the debate is connected with the paucity of real alternatives? It is, indeed, quite clear how Finland will manage its foreign policy now and in the future.

In Iloniemi's opinion, this remark holds true as long as the debate deals only with Finland's own actions and the choices connected with them. To the satisfaction of the chairman of the Paasikivi Society, "we have very few people who are of a different opinion regarding the basic policy lines".

However, it is noted even less that the debate is not limited just to the actions and omissions of Ritari Street.

"We are not talking just about our own affairs and relations with our neighbors and our attitudes toward major international disputes. Indeed, we also talk about those questions themselves quite a lot -- even when they are not of direct daily concern to us," points out Iloniemi.

However, in the same breath he is ready to admit that there is also room for improvement in the level of knowledge among the debaters. Deficiencies can be easily measured by, among other things, the use of conventional sayings and by resorting to the so-called foreign policy liturgy.

"I have the concept that one reason for why established expressions are used so frequently is that the speaker has not subjected the subject to sufficient analysis in order to be able to say anything about it in his own words. Then one must resort to conventional, memorized, or at least almost memorized phrases," says Iloniemi.

"A person must have a very good command of the subject if he intends to say anything new about it. If he, for the most part, knows what the question is about, then he will come off quite well as long as he remembers what some authority has sometime said. And it is strange that even though we have repeatedly confirmed that foreign policy takes precedence over domestic policy, there are still very few active politicians who could even satisfactorily define our country's foreign policy line.

"Frequently, it is, indeed, important to reiterate familiar issues in canonized phrases so that the listeners can be assured of the immutability of the policy line. But in addition to suitable quotes from the scriptures, a good sermon also always includes an explanation of what they mean. And if this has not been included, then it is, indeed, a question of a purely liturgical exercise in which the listener is not given anything else except that which has been given already before again and again."

Policy Line Will Remain Stable

The dark side of unanimity in foreign policy, on the other hand, has included the fact that the few dissenters easily acquire the label of village idiot. In the worst case dissenting opinions may even form a difficult-to-remove obstacle in one's career path.

International political researcher Dag Anckar has twice already created a sensation: the first time a few years ago when he proposed the dismantling of the YYA [Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Aid] Pact and again last summer when he conducted a research project with his colleague, Professor Krister Stahlberg. In this study the researchers from Turku counted the number of times the word neutrality appeared in President Mauno Koivisto's speeches and concluded by arguing that Finland has slipped a couple notches to the East in its foreign policy.

Such reasoning generally arouses two kinds of protest statements, analyzes Jaakko Iloniemi. Some only answer in accordance with the normal rules of a scientific debate by indicating what portions of the issue in their opinion were incorrectly evaluated. But then there are those who seize upon the situation in an opportunistic manner in order to make their own conventional position public.

"Indeed, this is completely normal in a social debate as this is what generally takes place in politics."

Also in other Western countries?

"That which provokes anger varies from country to country, not the method itself. If one observes a Swedish foreign policy debate and compares it to what goes on here in Finland, one can only be amazed at the docile approach of the Finns. If we are accused of labelling dissenters, then in Sweden an actual meat axe is being used."

Nevertheless, Anckar and Stahlberg deserve criticism, points out Iloniemi.

"Such a statement that Finland is sliding sometimes toward the West and sometimes toward the East is, of course, a handy expression, it easily associates all kinds of mental pictures, and provides a framework on which various daily events can be hung. But these are also dangerous means if the idea is to play games with them. Matters should be taken a little more seriously.

"For example, as to Eureka, on the basis of which we now have been suspected of sliding toward the West, we do not even yet know what the whole project even entails. It is a rather loose cooperative idea, with respect to which the French concept, for example, seems to be quite different from the English concept.

"In any case it is not a clear-cut program, much less an organization which one can join or not join. By its structure it is still at this phase an undefined outline of various types of cooperative projects, about which we should not now draw any outrageous conclusions."

Youth Underestimates Security Policy

A certain ideological sliding to the West seems, however, to have gained a foothold especially among youth in recent years. The models are sought from England and the United States while, on the other hand, the Soviet Union is considered to be a closed and oppressive society.

Does this situation worry the chairman of the Paasikivi Society?

"It could be that in our atmosphere of opinions there is a kind of, how would one say it, underestimation of security policy. Our international position is accepted as being self-evident and it is considered that it is an issue which no longer really demands anything. Everything is ready and stable, and there is no need to worry about it.

"Therefore, those who remember or understand that our present secure situation is not any kind of automatic fact should repeatedly demonstrate why this is not so. We who carry a little responsibility for this matter should come out of our shell, participate in debates, and testify that there are problems. Not necessarily today's problems, but, however, potential problems."

Iloniemi hopes that questions would also be raised in forums other than such a prestigious environment as the Paasikivi Society, forums in which youth themselves move under their own terms and language. It is only by this means that a change in the overall passiveness of the times can be accomplished.

"A lessened interest in foreign policy is not any kind of unusual phenomenon. Indeed, it is clearly connected with the fact that the interest of youth toward politics, in general, seems to be less than before.

"From an overly politicized stage in the 1960s and 1970s we seem to have moved to an almost under-politicized situation. Politics are no longer considered to be the central phenomenon of society, but they seem to have become relegated to the active pursuit of an ever smaller faction. And I do not mean mere party politics in the strict sense of the word."

Do Not Compare Koivisto to Kekkonen

Jaakko Iloniemi became familiar to the Finnish people for the first time in the beginning of the 1970s when the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was still on its long path to the summit meeting in Helsinki. He first acted as a special assistant to the chairman at the multilateral consultations in Dipoli in 1972--73 and later as the director of Finland's delegation at the second phase of CSCE in Geneva in 1973--75.

Even now Iloniemi is prepared to give the CSCE a special position among Finland's many arenas of foreign policy activities.

"Issues which are significant from the point of view of European development are dealt with there. And this if anything is of interest to us. In my opinion, there is nothing to complain about if Finland's foreign policy activity

is primarily concentrated on those issues on which we can have some kind of an influence. What sense does it make to concentrate on only those which are either so distant or so abstract that we can only have some kind of opinion on them."

It is fortunate from Finland's point of view that the CSCE seems gradually to have stabilized its position as a forum in which even in difficult times it is possible to conduct a constructive debate without delegates marching out and without other theatrical gestures. Even though sometimes it has seemed that a dead end has been reached, the process has not been allowed to disintegrate since each party has subsequently considered that there is more to be gained than lost in the CSCE.

The critics of Koivisto's foreign policy -- except for Anckar and Stahlberg -- have not exactly been able to clutch to actual questions of content. Sometimes criticism, on the other hand, has been directed at the fact that the president has kept the reins too loose, delegated power for the use of the prime minister, among others. This kind of criticism was presented most recently by special editor of UUSI SUOMI, Doctor of Political Science Martti Haikio in his new book, "Puolueeton Suomi puolueellisessa maailmassa" [Neutral Finland in Non-neutral World]. According to him, we should again return to a foreign policy under greater presidential control.

Social Democrat Iloniemi does not exactly warm up to criticism directed at a Social Democratic prime minister and an ex-Social Democratic president by a Conservative Party thinker.

"We have had various historical phases. When Paasikivi was prime minister, he also seemed to go quite far as a leader of foreign policy. Likewise, when Kekkonen led the government, he played a certain foreign policy role. Thus there is nothing exceptional in the fact that the prime minister has such an unofficial influence.

"But I would not now say that Koivisto is not the foreign policy leader, this would be a conclusion that is too far-reaching. Perhaps, Finland has only matured a little in recent years so that besides the president the prime minister and the foreign minister also understand foreign policy. And is this not a fortunate situation?"

Otherwise, do you see any difference between Kekkonen's and Koivisto's times?

"First one should ask what is meant by Kekkonen's times. He had many different times. That Europe in which Kekkonen worked in 1956 is completely different from the one in which Koivisto is working in 1985. And during his career Kekkonen had various opportunities to draw the line, and in the beginning he was not any kind of an unconditional authority, to the contrary.

"Perhaps, for this reason it is somewhat arbitrary to state that Kekkonen's time was one thing and Koivisto's time, on the other hand, is another. In the

first place, they are quite unequal times with respect to length and in the second place, foreign policy was accomplished under conditions quite divergent from each other.

"Koivisto, on the other hand, could count on an established policy line and a large foreign policy consensus, which came about at the end of Kekkonen's era. And he himself has said that he will not allow the legacy he received to become marred. In my opinion, this is a very good goal."

10576

CSO: 3617/52

KOIVISTO INTERVIEWED ON COALITION ALTERNATIVES, FOREIGN POLICY

Helsinki SUOMEN KUVALEHTI in Finnish 3 Jan 86 pp 2-8

[Article by Pekka Hyvarinen and Mikko Pohtola: "Koivisto Concerned About Turnover of MP's, 'Long Lists Next To Present Ones'"]

[Text] "The wage level of MP's has now been apparently justified," thought President Mauno Koivisto in an interview conducted by the chief editors of SUOMEN KUVALEHTI. But: "I have heard that many MP's would like to tie their salary to the compensation of parliamentary news reporters. This would be the safest solution in their opinion."

Finnish President Mauno Koivisto is deliberating alternatives for changes in the system of electing MP's. At one time there were long lists: "That system could have been improved and a combining of long lists with the present ones would also have been possible so that, for example, everyone would have been included on one list, which would be the main list, and, in addition to this, each would have been on his own list." However, Koivisto remains silent about his own plans to continue. But he does, however, make it clearly understood that an announcement about his possible candidacy is being postponed until 1987, the eve of the elections.

President Mauno Koivisto received the representatives of SUOMEN KUVALEHTI in his office on the third floor of the presidential palace on 12 December 1985. Chief of Staff Jaakko Kalela as well as the president's special assistant Martti Manninen were also present.

Several timely issues were dealt with in a broad discussion. In this summarized version the president's positions placed in quotation marks were culled from a tape in a slightly different order than the actual discussion.

The president considers the rapid turnover of MP's to be a serious subject of discussion:

"It was probably Erkki Liikanen who predicted that half of the MP's will change in the next elections. This will create unrest and insecurity, and continuity will be diminished. The first order of business for many new MP's will be to consider what job can be found next. The turnover in the last elections was also exceptional for the reason that the atmosphere created by the debate on per diem was downright hostile to incumbent MP's."

Koivisto points out that MP's currently remain in office for two terms on the average. He clearly considers this time span to be too short. The long lists previously in use guaranteed more continuity:

"It would be quite possible that a combination of the present lists and the long lists could be put into use. For example, so that everyone would be included on one list, which would be the main list, and, in addition to this, each individual would be on his own list."

Thus Koivisto introduces into the discussion a completely new election system, which would be a kind of intermediate form between the Finnish and Swedish models. In Sweden the parties place their candidates in whatever order they want on the long list, and it is in this order that they are also elected to parliament in accordance with the number of votes received by the parties.

The long lists are criticized, above all, for their party dominance: those located at the bottom of the list obtain a seat in parliament only in exceptional cases. In "Koivisto's model", on the other hand, personal support would also be taken into account.

"Closeness of Elections Creates Anxiety"

Koivisto considers the country's domestic political situation to be especially serious. On the basis of this premise he is somewhat amazed at the public debate in which even the possibility of early elections has been brought to the surface:

"The more general complaint has been that there is too much consensus, that not enough is being done... The government is on a sound foundation. I for one have not observed any kind of signs of a political crisis even though the word crisis appears now and then. In fact, that word has not been used in any kind of very credible connection.

"On the other hand, it is quite understandable that anxiety increases when elections are approaching."

Is there thus an appeal for the ruling parties to go into opposition?

"Perhaps, there is a certain yearning. In parliament there are many such ruling party MP's who have not been able to experience the questionable joy of being in opposition. They do not know how short the descent is and how difficult the next ascent is.

"In the mouth of the public there are many good expressions about what stays warm for how long and after that seems cold.

"Things can be suddenly disrupted and a good time can be had, but after that it becomes necessary to put the pieces back together again."

Even though the atmosphere is peaceful, Koivisto does not want to conjecture about the composition of the government after the elections:

"It would be unreasonable to commence making any pronouncements about that at such an early stage."

Koivisto considers the wage level of MP's now being formulated to be apparently reasonable. He emphasizes that the salary increase is not the consequence of any kind of despotism on the part of incumbent MP's, but compensation has been increased on the basis of existing legislation and the salary solution reached in the spring of 1984. In the president's opinion, the expenditure compensation system rectifies a "bad situation".

"One Ministry Too Many"

Koivisto rejects any proposals for establishing new ministries. The newest ministry we have is the Environmental Ministry, which complains that it cannot function effectively because of a lack of resources.

"In my opinion, we do not need as many ministries as there are now."

What or which ministries would the president then eliminate?

"Anyone can figure out for himself that 11 would be sufficient."

Thus, one should be eliminated. Which one would it be?

"This is becoming too interesting. I will not answer."

"A Higher Understanding of the Class Struggle"

In economic matters Koivisto is known as the leading pessimist of the last decade, who promised one bad and two miserable years. Tomorrow was to be worse than the present day.

"When I predicted difficult matters, they also came about. For this reason, I no longer make such predictions," retorted Koivisto, but continues:

"Apparently, we are, however, faced with difficult questions particularly in the labor markets. The framework in which solutions will be sought next spring is especially narrow. Our real economic development will possibly be worse than what it should necessarily be."

In addition to high wage demands, Koivisto is irritated by the internal disputes among wage earners:

"There seems to be a new higher understanding of the class struggle in which the most important thing is how each wage earner group fares with respect to income. There is much of this kind of thinking... Then it is a question of how the situation can be kept under one's own control, and if not, what kind of repercussions there will be.

"Although, there have been many times before when it has seemed completely hopeless, sometimes more difficult than now, sometimes easier. Perhaps, it

was the easiest in August 1969 when the unions simply announced to the government that they had agreed on the Liinamaa-duo."

"Now Is Not the Time to Borrow from Foreign Countries"

Koivisto has not become an optimist, but, all in all, he is satisfied with the nation's economy.

The competitive ability of the economy is the most important thing for Koivisto, and he is amazed at the consumer frenzy among the people:

"I, however, do not have a very clear picture of what demand is so great. We could get by with even less if it were given an appreciation."

The president does not want to evaluate the work of his successors at the Bank of Finland, but says:

"I have been very happy that interest rates have been able to move as they have. The positive significance of interest rates is now understood better than before.

"This is not any particular theory of mine, but at the time it seemed as if my words fell on deaf ears, particularly in the trade union movement. There they had the idea that the poor were in debt. However, all the reports indicate that the more well-to-do, in particular, have personal debt.

"If a more flexible interest policy had been possible, matters could have been handled in a more civilized manner and it would not have been necessary to interfere so radically in the money supply."

"No Burdens on Foreign Policy"

Koivisto reiterates his conviction in SOSIALISTINEN AIKAKAUSLEHTI, according to which Finland's foreign policy has not changed and will not be changed. He rejects conjectures about leaning toward the West with respect to EFTA membership and Eureka. "The development of Eureka is being carefully observed."

"Our relations with the Soviet Union are on a stable foundation, and there is no particular reason for concern nor are there any profound problems regarding them. There is no issue which could be considered a particular burden on them and which comes immediately to mind."

The president's position also covers relations between the SKP [Finnish Communist Party] and the CPSU, about which "the prime minister and the foreign minister have made some wise statements".

Why does such talk continue to prevail?

"I am the wrong person to answer such a question. If I were to say a cross-wise word about this discussion, I would be committing something for which I could be blamed. In addition, arguments are being presented sometimes in one

direction and then in another. Only last fall it was said that we have leaned to the East..."

"Gorbachev Knows Finland"

The president praises the new Soviet leader Gorbachev for his knowledge of Finland:

"He is a very active individual. He apparently works a long day, and he is well trained for the task for which he has been chosen. We have always considered it important that there is an insight into Finland in the Soviet Union's highest leadership, and this apparently is the case this time also.

"We should be satisfied that the Soviet leadership continues to be very interested in taking care of relations with Finland even though there are many problematical situations in the world, and also preparations are being made in the Soviet Union for its party congress, which is a major event."

Mikhail Gorbachev's official visit to Finland is "not in the too distant future".

According to Koivisto, the role of small states increases when relations between the superpowers improve.

And is it true that Finland plays the role of a physician rather than a judge?

"That is one of Kekkonen's expressions. Naturally, better a physician than a judge. Whether we are capable of being a physician is another matter."

In the discussion the president also touched upon the fuss raised by Swedish Foreign Minister Sten Andersson's recent statements. Andersson disclosed that Koivisto had told him that the Soviet Union's new party leader looks at Finland "from a global point of view".

"We have clarified the matter and we have observed that no damage has been done."

In Koivisto's opinion, there are also economic factors in the background of the improvement of relations between the superpowers:

"Armaments have become increasingly expensive. This money has to come from somewhere else. This in my opinion is a rather definite factor."

"Exports to East Are Exotic"

Koivisto is self-conscious about any discussion of his own activism in his job:

"Naturally, it would sometimes be nice to know what goes on in the mind of the speaker in question... This is normal... If something is done, it is asked why it was not done before."

On the other hand, the president says that he has been active in trade with the East:

"The results have not been too negligible when it is a question of how a high level of imports from the USSR to Finland can be maintained. We tend to see only the export side as being exotic. We want visible export projects, and there is nothing wrong in this, but there tends to be an insufficient interest in imports.

"The position in principle has been that imports increase exports, this is a precondition of exports.

"When there is a desire to balance trade by a high level of trade volume, it to a large degree depends on how a sufficiently high level of imports can be accomplished. This was discussed in the spring of 1982 already when I went to Moscow for the first time in my present capacity.

"However, to my knowledge at this time there are no such new projects which have not already been made public."

"I Probably Gave Too Short A Timetable"

President Koivisto remains silent about his own plans to continue.

"The situation continues to be such that I do not have the right to answer such questions."

The president's arguments are the same as in the March TV-interview: if he were to announce his candidacy for the 1988 elections, his actions would be treated as the actions of a candidate. In the interview in March Koivisto believed that the time for an answer could be "after a year and a half". Nine months have passed since that time, another 9 months are left.

"I probably gave too short a timetable at that time," answers Koivisto now and makes it clearly understood that any announcement of his intentions to continue will be postponed until 1987 on the eve of the elections. He, however, does not want to elaborate on this.

Koivisto says that he is adopting a "calm" attitude toward the unceasingly burgeoning presidential debate.

"The presidential race has calmed down for one reason or another. Apparently, the ingredients for this are no longer there."

The president also considers that the debate about Koivisto's great election alliance, which aroused attention in the fall, did not originate from the initiative of Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa.

"Sorsa said that he was only answering a question presented by the editor. Thus, there arose a debate, which he, however, did not want. It was not his intent to bring the matter up, but he only answered the question presented to him by the editor even though he should not have done so."

But in any event the discussion arose?

"So it did. There are always all kinds of discussions."

"Constitution Could Be Reformed Even More"

Koivisto approves of the constitutional reform being accomplished even though "they could have gone even further".

"I have been amazed at how quickly the whole system can be turned upside down since no agreement could be reached on anything so far and the ideas were rather far-reaching. And thus it happened that the slices remained quite thin. Nevertheless, this is not an insignificant reform in my opinion."

Koivisto says that he has not exactly understood why presidential terms should be limited to two terms.

"If the presidential elections are to be made more important than now in one manner or another, then the president's powers should also be reduced. The number of terms, on the other hand, has not been a general problem in Finland."

The debate, perhaps, resulted from the fact that your predecessor was in office for a quarter of a century?

"Indeed, this for its own part has facilitated this debate. I still would like to emphasize that I would have approved a limit on presidential terms even though it is not a major problem in my opinion."

This is influenced by the fact that in a small country there are few candidates who can measure up to the task?

"Are there more in larger countries?"

10576

CSO: 3617/52

POLLS SHOW INCREASED SUPPORT FOR LEFT, PROGRESSIVES

Independence Party Suffers Decline

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 18 Dec 85 p 2

[Text] According to a poll recently conducted by Hagvangur, Inc, the Independence Party [SF], the Social Democratic Party [A] and the Women's List [SK] have gained following since the elections in April 1983. SF is in the lead with 42.1 percent of the votes, with AB in second place with 16.2 percent. The Social Democratic Alliance [BJ] support is 4.3 percent, the weakest since April 1984.

Hagvangur's last poll conducted in June/July 1985 showed SF with 43.6 percent support, whereas their percentage of votes in the 1983 elections was 38.7. According to the poll, difference in the party's support by sex is minimal, with 42.4 percent of males supporting the party against 41.8 percent of females.

A got 16.0 percent of the votes in the poll of June/July against 17.3 percent in the 1983 elections. Males account for 16.0 percent of the party's support; females for 16.4 percent.

BJ is the third largest political party according to the poll, with 14.6 percent of voters supporting the party--down from 17.3 percent in the elections of 1983. Hagvangur's last poll showed a 12.0 percent support for the party, the present poll showing a gain since then. Males account for 14.9 percent of support for the party, females for 14.2 percent.

The Progressive Party [F] is the fourth largest party but came in second in the last elections. The new poll shows 13.0 percent of voters supporting the party, with 18.5 percent support in the elections and 11.0 percent in the June/July poll. There is a considerable difference in support of the party by sex, with 16.0 percent of males supporting it but only 9.5 percent of females.

The polls shows 8.9 percent support for the Women's List [SK] against 9.1 percent in June/July, with 4.2 percent of males supporting the party and females accounting for 14.2 percent. In the elections of 1983 SK got 5.5 percent of the votes.

The poll shows 4.3 percent support for BJ, down from 7.7 percent in the last poll and also down from the last elections when the party garnered 7.3 percent of the votes. By sex, support for the party is 4.6 percent of males and 3.9 percent of females.

The Humanist Party [FM] got 1.0 percent of the votes, same as in the 1983 elections, but up from 0.6 percent in the last poll.

Considering domicile, urban areas, including the capital area, provide the greatest support for A, BJ and SF, whereas F's following in the capital area is quite small but enormous in rural areas.

Hagvangur's poll was conducted in the period of 28 November to 8 December 1985 with a sample of 1,000. Response percentages were 79 percent gross and 84 percent net. Participants were 18 years old and over, drawn from all over the country and interviewed by telephone. Answers were provided by 494 or 63 percent of interviewees.

Party Support in Elections and Polls

<u>Party</u>	<u>Dec 1985</u>	<u>June/ July 1985</u>	<u>May 1985</u>	<u>Feb 1985</u>	<u>Sept/ Oct 1984</u>	<u>July 1984</u>	<u>Apr 1984</u>	<u>Election Results</u>
AB	14.6	12.0	12.2	10.8	16.1	14.9	9.3	17.3
A	16.2	16.0	21.3	20.5	7.0	6.4	6.8	11.7
BJ	4.3	7.7	5.4	6.0	6.2	6.2	3.7	7.3
F	13.0	11.0	11.9	9.9	14.6	14.7	17.1	18.5
SK	8.9	9.1	7.4	11.2	8.9	8.1	9.2	5.5
SF	42.1	43.6	41.2	40.4	45.7	48.8	52.1	38.7
FM	1.0	0.6	0.6	1.2	1.5	0.9	1.8	1.0

Fewer Support Government Coalition

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 19 Dec 85 p 2

[Text] Hagvangur's poll on voters' support of the government shows that a little over half of those expressing opinion oppose it (50.3 percent), with a little less than half supporting it (49.7 percent). Hagvangur's last poll in June/July showed 57.4 percent supporting the government, with 42.6 percent opposed.

The question was: "Do you or do you not support the present government?" Out of a sample of 1,000 persons 18 years and older all over the country 787 answered the question, with 662 expressing an opinion.

By sex, those expressing opinion showed the majority of males (52.3 percent) supporting the government against 47.0 percent of females. Government support is strongest in rural areas, with 73.7 percent of those expressing opinion supporting the government against 43.7 percent of capital area residents and 53.8 percent of other urban residents.

Support of the Government

Question answered by 787 persons. Earlier poll results shown for comparison

<u>Responses</u>	<u>Nov/ Dec 1985</u>	<u>June/ July 1985</u>	<u>May 1985</u>	<u>Feb 1985</u>	<u>Sep/ Oct 1984</u>	<u>July 1984</u>	<u>Apr 1984</u>
Support	41.8	49.1	45.5	41.9	47.5	58.0	69.6
Do Not Support	42.3	36.5	41.1	41.5	40.3	26.5	20.5
Don't Know	13.5	12.5	11.3	13.6	8.9	12.7	7.9
Refuse to Answer	2.5	1.9	2.1	2.9	3.3	2.8	2.0

Counting only those expressing opinion or a total of 662 persons:

	<u>Nov/ Dec 1985</u>	<u>June/ July 1985</u>	<u>May 1985</u>	<u>Feb 1985</u>	<u>Sep/ Oct 1984</u>	<u>July 1984</u>	<u>Apr 1984</u>
Support	49.7	57.4	52.5	50.2	54.1	68.6	77.2
Do Not Support	50.3	42.6	47.5	49.8	45.9	31.4	22.8

Breakdown of Progressive Supporters

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 19 Dec 85 p 56

[Text] Hagvangur's poll on support of the political parties as reported on in this paper yesterday shows a considerable difference in support of the Progressive Party [F] by domicile and sex. As shown in Table 1 below, the party's strongest support is in rural areas (56.3 percent), followed by urban areas other than the capital area (11.8 percent), but considerably weaker in the capital area itself (6.4 percent).

According to the poll males comprise 16.0 percent of F's supporters, females 9.5 percent (Table 2). Such a difference by sex is not notable for other political parties except the Women's List [SK] where women comprised 14.2 percent of supporters, males 4.2 percent.

Yesterday's news item only took into account figures on poll participants expressing an opinion. Table 3 shows complete break-down of answers to the question: "If parliamentary elections were to be held in the near future, what political party or alliance would you vote for?" A total of 787 persons answered the question, of whom 37 percent refused to express an opinion, a similar percentage to that obtained in Hagvangur's last poll.

The Social Democratic Party's [A] support in the elections of 1983 was incorrectly reported by this paper yesterday. It was 11.7 percent. Another incorrect statement concerned the Humanist Party's participation in the 1983 elections

garnering 1 percent of votes. That percentage figure refers to special candidacies by SF in the West Fjords District and by F in the Northwest District.

Table 1. Support by Domicile

<u>Party</u>	<u>Capital Area</u>	<u>Other Urban</u>	<u>Rural Areas</u>
People's Alliance [AB]	13.1	19.3	6.3
Social Democratic Party [A]	18.0	17.4	2.1
Social Democratic Alliance [BJ]	5.3	3.1	-
Progressive Party [F]	6.4	11.8	56.3
Women's List [SK]	12.0	4.3	6.3
Independence Party [SF]	43.5	44.1	29.2
Humanist Party [FM]	1.8	-	-
	n=283	n=161	n=48

Table 2. Support by Sex.

<u>Party</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Women</u>
People's Alliance [AB]	14.9	14.2
Social Democratic Party [A]	16.0	16.4
Social Democratic Alliance [BJ]	4.6	3.9
Progressive Party [F]	16.0	9.5
Women's List [SK]	4.2	14.2
Independence Party [SF]	42.4	41.8
Humanist Party [FM]	1.9	-
	n=262	n=232

Table 3. Four Polls on Party Support by Hagvanguur, Inc.

<u>Party</u>	<u>Nov/Dec 85</u>	<u>Jul/Jul 85</u>	<u>May 85</u>	<u>Feb 85</u>
People's Alliance [AB]	9.1	7.7	8.3	6.6
Social Democratic Party [A]	10.2	10.3	14.4	12.6
Social Democratic Alliance [BJ]	2.7	4.9	3.6	3.7
Progressive Party [F]	8.1	7.0	8.0	6.1
Women's List [SK]	5.6	5.8	5.0	6.9
Independence Party [SF]	26.3	27.9	27.2	24.8
Humanist Party [FM]	0.6	0.4	0.4	0.8
Will not vote	6.4	5.7	4.0	3.4
Will void	8.3	4.9	5.1	6.6
Don't know	15.7	20.1	17.6	21.6
Refuse to answer	7.0	5.8	5.9	6.9
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Newspaper Analyzes Polls' Meaning

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 20 Dec 85 p 40

[Editorial] Hagvanguur's opinion poll conducted 26 November-8 December 1985 points up more consistency in party support than government support. The swing in party support since the June/July poll was less than 3 percent. The government garnered 57.4 percent support in the middle of the year compared to only 49.7 percent at this time--the weakest support of the present government ever since it took over in May 1983, according to Hagvanguur's poll.

Among parties with increased support The People's Alliance [AB] does best, jumping from 12 percent last June/July to the present 14.6 percent. AB was in focus shortly before the poll on account of their national convention. They themselves figure that the convention served to strengthen their position with the public. On the other hand, the struggle between AB's steering committee and their members of parliament indicates little success in calming the waters of disagreement within the party. It is also noteworthy that AB's support among the voters has declined since April 1983. On two occasions the party has garnered more support than presently, according to Hagvanguur's polls. There was no national convention of the Social Democratic Alliance [BJ] prior to this poll, and the party's support shows a decrease from 7.7 percent to 4.3 percent, lowest since

April 1984. BJ has been beset with problems during the last few months and in spite of the reorganization at the national convention 7 and 8 December it is unlikely that that alone will lead to increased support. If opinion polls are to be believed, 1985 has brought a lot of voters into the Social Democratic Party's [A] camp. Before its national convention in the fall of 1984 Hagvangur's poll shows only 7 percent support for the party. After the convention which put Jon Baldvin Hannibalsson into power party support ballooned to 21.3 percent in May 1985 and this time 16.2 percent claim support of A, making it the second largest party, a place claimed by A since February 1985.

All polls since the last elections show that the Women's List [SK] garners more support in polls than at the ballot box. This is still true, with the poll showing 8.9 percent support against 5.5 percent in the elections. The Progressive Party [F] garnered 18.5 percent of votes in the elections but has been on a downhill path ever since, with only 9.9 percent support indicated in the beginning of 1985. The party now seems to be on the upswing again with 13 percent support, up 2 percent from the poll before. It seems as if Chairman Steingrímur Hermannsson's quarrels with his cohorts within the party have quickened voters' interest in F. It is interesting to note the enormous difference in F's support according to domicile, with only 6.4 percent of capital area voters and 11.8 percent of other urban voters claiming support for the party against 56.3 percent of rural voters. Considering the recent intramural struggles, one might venture to guess that the urban voters are in the party chairman's corner, with rural voters giving their support to representatives in parliament.

As Hagvangur was conducting the poll the Independence Party [SF] was being attacked in public debates, with its opponents trying to blame the party both for the usury case and the Hafskip case. Considering this, it is interesting to note that the party's present support of 42.1 percent is 2.3 percent greater than in February 1985, although 1.5 percent less than in the immediately previous poll, with the party garnering 38.7 percent of the votes in the 1983 elections.

It is easy to explain swings in support of individual parties, but less so swings in support of the government, supported by only 49.7 percent of those expressing opinion. This is the first time that Hagvangur's polls show less than a majority support of the present government since it took over. On the other hand the parties in power enjoy the support of 55.1 percent of those expressing opinion. Government support has decreased 7.7 percent since July 1985. Dissatisfaction with the way the country is being run thus comes down harder on the government itself than the sponsoring political parties. The government enjoys scant (43.7 percent) support in the capital area, great (73.7 percent) in rural areas. Considering these figures and the differentiation by domicile in support of the coalition parties, the conclusion must be that the Progressives are stronger in their support of the government than the Independents. In this way the poll provides politicians with a clear picture of the public's present mood.

9981/7051

CSO: 3626/12

EGCI 'UNIVERSITY LEAGUE' CONGRESS HELD IN BOLOGNA

250 Delegates Meet

Rome L'UNITA in Italian 23 Nov 85 p 5

[Article by Maria Alice Presti]

[Text] They are a "slice" of the movement of '85. They are the university students, enraged, but with a sense of humor, self-assured and realistic. In Bologna, at the congress that opened yesterday, the communist university youths--250 delegates to be precise--have brought into being the first of the eight leagues of the new Italian Communist Youth Federation (ICYP), which last February in Naples chose to be organized as a federation (foreseeing the formation of specific organizations in addition to the one for the university, such as one for the students of middle schools, another for the environment, another for peace, etc...).

The league, federated with the ICYP, is born in the midst of this present ferment in the schools and universities, in this new explosion of needs and hopes, but it does not have intention to take the lead. "We want to defend the students' initiative", says Umberto di Giovannangeli of the National League in the official report, "We want to show that it is possible to unite politics and specializations."

The convention hall of the Corticella civic center is being crowded by young men and women; there's expectation regarding this assembly of university students which will be closed Sunday at the Palasport by Alessandro Natta and by Pietro Folena, national secretary of the ICYP.

"I expect that firm choices will be made regarding the development of this movement in the universities", says with great self-assurance Vincenzo, who is from Naples. The Neapolitans, university students of '85 all carrying briefcases, form a large, lively delegation; they have to their credit a lot of initiatives, proposals based on the central theme of the battle against the tuition law, and also on didactics--the acquisition of knowledge transmitted through that huge, absurd "exam factory" which is the structure of the university. "Be aware," points out Giuseppe, "we show solidarity with the students of middle schools, those that everyone defines as the

youth of '85, but the analysis of the 'slices' of the movement has to be more precise: on the one hand there is a middle school student with all his characteristics, and on the other there is the university student." Generally, as the election data show, the student of the upper middle school responds in a more 'visible' way." "Yes," says Vincenzo, "but this does not mean that the movement should be judged on the simple basis of its visibility."

After the so-called ebb, the universities, for a long time inert if we exclude the presence of Communion and Liberation (CL), are witnessing the rebirth of associations, marches are planned which see the students team up with other components of society; yesterday in Palermo the students marched with the labor unions (IGCL, ICLU, and IUL). "The league in my opinion", says Natalia who is from Palermo, "will be the promoter of a process for protecting the autonomy of the movement." "Indeed", adds Vincenzo from Naples, "a strong democratic fiber will allow the league to have influence."

In conclusion, the University Students League, the first born 9 months after the Congress of Naples, doesn't have, by any means, the appearance of a technical-organizational gimmick, but is born out of a reform process already under way (even the most critical of the young delegates are certain of this fact).

Twentyone thousand signatures against the tuition law, collected in universities all over Italy, bear testimony to one aspect of the league's determination. On another issue, that of the battle for knowledge which is socially productive, one is to be reminded of the formation of a scientific committee which sees university professors and students working together to produce specific proposals on didactics and its interrelationship with research.

And here are the official reports. "Once again you bring into the debate yourself and your organization," says La Forgia, the assessor of the University of the Commune of Bologna, as he greets the youths: "I wish I could participate in the challenge you have decided to undertake."

"Somebody, using some superficial sociological explanation, has said that we are a generation written on water," said Paolo Amabile of the Bologna ICYF, "look, now the demonstrations represent a tidal wave, they show that we are a generation of reformers, even if there are some people that would like us to think only of Timberland and lay down our posters."

"The youths of '85 have an intelligent diffidence towards political parties," said Umberto di Giovannangeli of the National League, "and we are in tune with the need to form a new base and to renew the shape and contents of politics." This does not mean, as some commentators have decreed, that politics is absent from this movement.

Concrete proposals have arisen (and will be further clarified today); among others, the campaign against higher university taxes, compilation of dossiers to document absenteeism practiced by professors who reduce to the bone their university teaching, and more, there is a proposal for assistance centers for

out-of-town students who are taken advantage by landlords and boarding house proprietors. "Falcucci should resign for demonstrated incompetence," again request the students, who would not be satisfied, nevertheless, by a change of the guard, and are asking the PCI to fight now to snatch improvements on the tax law.

Delegates Propose Reforms

Rome L'UNITA in Italian 24 Nov 85 pp 1, 20

[Article by Maria Alice Presti]

[Text] The first league sponsored by the new ICYF is born right in the midst of the fire of the movement that sees, once again, young people demonstrating in the streets. This was confirmed by many of the speakers of the second day of debate at the congress in Bologna (which will conclude today with a demonstration at the Palasport with Natta and Folena). "The reconstitution of the ICYF is a response to difficulties and distrust," said Aureliana Alberici, who has the responsibility for schools and universities nationwide. "It is an aid to self-criticism even within the PCI itself."

"You are creating something new," remarked Luigi Berlinguer, rector of the University of Siena, as he addressed the university students of '85. "Something that fills us with hope. Yes, this movement gives hope to a rebirth of politics. It is utter idiocy to state that this isn't a political movement when it is clear that it wants to redress living and studying conditions, which are concerns of politics." The 2 days of congress at Bologna concluded yesterday evening with the election of the national directorate (60 members) which in turn elected Umberto di Giovannangeli as secretary of the league.

The "youth of '85" in congress have not lost spontaneity or liveliness, in spite of the traditional debate format. They have repeated at the microphone the specific requests they make in street demonstrations. "We want to study, we want places in which to learn, professors that really teach, and we do not accept the increases in university taxes because they hit the students from the poorest social strata."

Among the proposals to come out of the congress (and which will be discussed by the committees formed by the varied people from the entire movement of '85" is a campaign of tax evasion (the refusal to pay university taxes), and also denouncement of didactic evasion, that is, against the practice of too many professors who consider teaching a fringe activity to be neglected. The students of the league don't very much like to be compared to movements which are now history, like those of '68 or '77. "Obviously we don't refuse to discuss comparisons," comments Pucci from Palermo, as Massimo D'Alema, Giuseppe Vacca, and Luca Cafiero are on the podium about to discuss the subject "Universities of the seventies." "But we prefer to be asked about our present-day struggles. Yes, certainly, some observations may be similar to those made in '68; we too, for example, claim that science is not neutral and that it should be used to improve life...but the scenarios of today are so different from those of that time. And we have changed." "Let's take

over the universities to prevent the approval of the fiscal law." It is Vincenzo from Naples that launches this proposal. "Let's think about it; the question of taxes does not concern all, but in the south especially, it can cause real dramas." The interjection is applauded; other youths comment, "Our demonstrations of these weeks have achieved much more than many battles in parliament." "If the PCI doesn't clearly untie the knot of increased taxes," continues Vincenzo from the podium, "it will be difficult to respond to the movement."

The university students have lamented difficulties in their relations with communist professors; when Rector Luigi Berlinguer intervenes, they become silent and attentive. "University teaching is a disaster," he says, "there's no control to the entire management structure of teaching." Berlinguer delivers harsh judgments.

For the professors teaching is almost always an annoyance, and talk about updating teaching methods is not popular in the university. Concerning services for the students and the right to study it is sufficient to dwell on a very evident fact: while in Italy there are only 20 thousand places with beds made available to out-of-town students; in other countries, he reminds us, the average is 100,000. The students' quest, in conclusion, is not only of concern to university students (who have demonstrated in the squares), but also to be undertaken as a general task of the PCI. "The students' quest," he insists as he is applauded at length, "has to be pursued through this clear pressure of the masses, through continuous vindication." "Against the tax law, against the arguments given to negate the social crisis that the tax would bring, the students have intervened with greater clarity and decisiveness than the labor union movement," Aureliana Alberici re-echoed, "and the parliamentary battle of the PCI will have a different outcome because the students are involved." Alberici too, has emphasized the political character of a movement whose efficacy is measured by deeds; the "youths of '85" have, in fact, snatched 4 trillion lire from Falcucci. "In the schools we are witness to strong class discrimination," she reminded, taking up the great theme of the right to study. "School and university have to become important themes within the PCI debate." "To achieve this," she added, "there's need for greater support from the university professors."

"The new university ICYF has not remained simply a good intention on paper," concluded Umberto di Giovannangeli. "In the coming months we will follow through with our initiative against the tax law, we will tackle the question of the quality of knowledge, of teaching methods, and even of job opportunities."

Natta Gives Closing Speech

Rome L'UNITA in Italian 25 Nov 85 pp 1-2

[Text] "It is not the interests of a small sector of society that is in jeopardy, but that of the entire society; it is not the future of a few that is in jeopardy, but that of all generations to come. And therefore, it is

not only the policies of this government, divided and deteriorated that are in question but the policies of all governments and governing classes that have brought the situation to this point of decay."

Alessandro Natta concluded yesterday at Bologna the congress of the University League sponsored by the ICYF. He did it with a lengthy speech mostly dedicated to the problems of young people, to the "deep sickness" which has compelled many youths to come forth, to make an "impetuous demand for life, knowledge, work," to participate in politics in a new, autonomous way. "The students' movement," said Natta, "puts forth again, in all its fullness and worth, the historic necessity that society and politics consider the problems of youths as important and inescapable priorities, and dedicate full attention, investment of capital, and reforms for their solution."

Natta began his speech by emphasizing the "extraordinary relevance" of the students' demonstrations of these weeks. "They don't want comparisons with the past," he went on, "and today it would be too easy to point out how wrong were the perceptions of those that have described this generation as inert, passive, bent down, defeatist." Besides, the movement for peace and the students mobilizations against the mafia and the camorra had already given unequivocal signals to the contrary. A signal of willingness, noted Natta, was underscored months ago by the ICYF Congress. But what is the cause of this willingness to participate on the part of the '85 youth? "To the uncertainties of the future," answered Natta, "is an added dissatisfaction with the present, with the real conditions of the schools and universities, with the limits imposed on the spreading of culture and knowledge, and more generally, with the quality of life." In substance, if this situation continues, there is the risk that the first to suffer would be the youths from families with the least economic resources and, in other forms, would result in an unacceptable and unconstitutional class discrimination. Rather than considering the youths as a resource, "a fundamental force for social and cultural advancement, in fact, it was more preferable to hit at the achievements of these years, the schooling for the masses." Under the banner bearing the slogan "less government more competitive markets" it was decided with careless foolishness to unjustly and disproportionally increase taxes, not for the purpose of improving schools, but to pay interest on treasury bonds and finance the national debt, and patch up the disastrous results of a conservative economic policy."

It is against this paradox that the students, fully supported by their families, have joined the battle and have obtained some initial important results, albeit not yet sufficient.

The list of inadequacies is too long. Natta gave some examples: the lack of reforms in the secondary schools and in the universities long awaited for 20 years; the inadequate relationship between education taught and vocational training; the perennial boycott of experimental teaching methods. "Truly," he continued, "there are those that have knowingly worked for a decline of public schools. This approach is not solely that of Communion and Liberation (CL), but unfortunately has also been embraced by large segments of the DC. We are witnessing a very dangerous stimulus to schools separated

ideologically. "And yet," he continued, "right here in Emilia, a land for years administered by the communists, we have demonstrated how a public education system can coexist with private and religious schools." This is an example of communism's secular and pluralistic concept of school and culture. Instead, recently, it was downrightly proposed to separate the youths by ideology, in "homogeneous" schools or classes. "It would be very dangerous," Natta bluntly commented.

Alarming signals are also coming from the university. For some time the argument has been going around that all the problems have been caused by too many students and the excessively liberal policy of admission. The numbers contradict this argument. In Italy there are 181 graduates per 10,000 inhabitants, while in the United States there are 585, and in Japan 286. Therefore, the solution should not be to limit the number of students. The true malady that afflicts the Italian University, said Natta, is its backwardness in productivity, the meager support for research, the deadening of its role as a center for training and formation of future leaders. Positive and important, therefore, is the fact that at this movement we are undertaking the founding congress of the University League, an organization that Natta hopes will be able, in full autonomy, to gain competence and meet the cultural requirements of the universities.

And here the secretary of the PCI touched another important point of his speech: the relationship between the movement and politics. "Much of the press," he said, "has described the student movement as 'non-political.' And yet, these same young people interviewed by the TV and newspapers, state that they are making politics and that the movement, in its own particular way, is a political force. Truly, whoever tries to explain to the youths that politics is dangerous, has a guilty conscience. He knows quite well that there are well-founded reasons for the protest which indicate clear, well-defined responsibilities. Certainly, the movement is non-artisan and has to remain this way. The young communists do well to fight for its autonomy, to prevent anyone, whomever they may be, to use the movement as an instrument to further their own ends. But this movement criticizes certain political philosophies, also attributable to some youth groups, which are too detached from the youths, too interested in their own welfare and power games, or, as is the case of CL, a political philosophy that tries to barter sincere religious values with bits of power." "The students, instead, want a political philosophy which is subservient to their needs for culture, work, a better life; to their aspirations for justice, solidarity, and peace."

"It is a movement that imposes even on us communists," continued Natta, "a renewal of our political behavior, of our role in society; on the importance we give, in our daily work, to present and future policies concerning work and school."

"Nevertheless," continued Natta, "today's youth has already discovered that it isn't true that all parties behave similarly, not only because of the culpable actions of those that have governed the schools and the country in these tens of years, but also in the way the parties interact with society and movements."

In this context Natta pointed out that in 1968, confronted with a movement which, much more than this one, caught everybody by surprise, Luigi Longo debated courageously with the leaders of those struggles, and that debate was followed by a historic encounter between the working class movement and the youths, causing also a renewal of the PCI. "And now," concluded Natta, "once again we are here, and we have to be in all parts of the country to meet with students, to hear their needs, and help them in a way which they think opportune. There is the possibility of an encounter between a movement which has these signs of progress and a reformist, modern party, a Left that would know how to renew itself, a program that offers an alternative to the way the schools and universities have been run."

New Student Movement Applauded

Rome L'UNITA in Italian 25 Nov 85 p 3

[Article by Maria Alice Presti]

[Text] The university students of '85 were there, the "delegates with briefcase" of the congress of the ICYF League were there, and the traditionally communist population was also there. Yesterday morning at the Bologna Palasport, the "all new" movement was repeatedly applauded during the closing demonstrations of the "2 days" of congress of the youths. The youths of the first League of the ICYF are still: we do not want to lead any street demonstration, we are part of the '85 movement which is autonomous and political [sic]. "They had defined us a generation written on water," says Paolo Amabile of Bologna. "Have they noticed this tidal wave and its significance?"

Yesterday morning the 250 delegates, a bit tired after the congressional work that lasted until night, mingled with the communist population with an air of satisfaction. "Who said that we are yuppie?" says ironically Carlo from Pescara. "Here we are." And they remind those still surprised by their joyous "explosion" in the squares that it was not unexpected; they were present before too, less conspicuous, working among the students of middle school, for peace. In Bologna, for example, just last year they organized initiatives against all massacres.

Ugo Mazza, secretary of the PCI federation of Bologna, is the first to talk from the stand at the University of Bologna, which will be 900 years old in 1988; he is alive with energy, rich of idealistic and cultural tensions. Today he has to "witness a new phase of commitment to free humane, intellectual, and scientific energies," he says, as he warmly greets the young leaders of the league.

Ilda Furtis, delegate from Pavia, talks only a few minutes, with decision and precision. She recalls the reasons for the congress, for reestablishing the organization for your communists, and concludes, "In the universities there are groups against a new university policy which we don't accept."

"They had described us as either moderates or desperates," says Pietro Folena, national secretary of the ICYF, "and, instead, here we are. A new generation of youths has taken up the challenge, and we are in tune with all the youths of the movement." Folena uses the language we heard from the youths during the congressional debate: precise, ironical, not very formal. "Mrs Falcucci," he says, "remembered, after the demonstrations, that she is minister of public education. For years, with her friends of CL, she diverted funds to private schools, letting the public schools rot." "The iron lady has become paper," he continues, "under pressure from youth; and suddenly 4 trillion lire are allotted for school construction." In conclusion, Falcucci and the government have to thank the youth of '85 for this awakening. "The youths are asking for the abolition of the unjust increase of university and school taxes with the slogan 'less taxes for the students, less spending for armaments'." They ask, Folena reminds for reform in the schools and universities, a renewal of the relationship between learning and specializations so as to correctly channel new innovative processes.

At the congress there has often been talk about CL, renamed "Communion and Subsidy" with its predatory presence in the university during the time of "silence." "It is a private enterprise," Folena also said, "that conducts business on the rights of students. But, precisely, the students movement says no to politics as business."

The newborn league has no intention to limit its fight to the tax law, it will go forth and will impose standards on the university, on the kind of learning which is socially useful and favorable to a free, inquisitive, educative process. "The students of the league," further added teh ICYF secretary, "will participate in the labor march which will end in Naples." It is impossible, in fact, to keep learning and work separate if one wants to address the hopes of the young generations. Whoever requests classrooms for the purpose of studying, whoever wants to study computer sciences, will want the opportunity to use his diploma in the job market. "To cure the ills of the university," said Folena, "the tax law proposes to throw out of the universities the majority of students. The real ill of the university, instead, is this: the curricula, the teaching methods, research, are all not up to par; we must invent new professions."

The scientific commission, already formed at the national level, and which sees scientists and intellectuals together with the youth of the league, will contribute to a thorough study of this theme. And it is not at all a "paternalistic" imposition. Very significant, in this respect, was the debate Saturday night (with a full hall in spite of the late hour) on the theme of innovation, with the participation of Andrea Aparo, Achille Occhetto, and Fausto Bertinotti.

University signifies research, and research is being postponed because of economics in the era of the computer revolution. But the students of the league don't seem to us to have succumbed to the considerable charms of the computer. They listened very carefully and then commented as Occhetto did

(who recalled the need for promoting intermediate level professions as part of innovation; and, concerning politics, the necessity to cut across political boundaries on a question in which different segments of society are not divided); and Bertinotti (who reminded us that it is not sufficient to guide the process of innovation, but that it is also necessary to sift critically, so as not to fall into a neo-positivistic attitude which may confuse innovation with progress).

13120/6662

CSO: 3528/25

PCI CHAMPIONS RIGHTS OF FOREIGNERS

Milan L'UNITA in Italian 11 Dec 85 p 15

[Article by Maddalena Tulanti: "Looking for Terrorists Among Dishwashers and Babysitters"]

[Text] Aliens in Rome: "They are hunting all of us." Dramatic testimony during a press conference given by the Roman PCI which calls for a basic law on the immigrant issue.

A hundred thousand aliens in Rome, one-third of the total on Italian territory, most of them holding the most menial jobs (30 percent in agriculture, the same percentage in construction, the rest working for restaurants, as busboys, etc.)-- in other words, jobs rejected by the Italians. Is this really a public problem as the administration tried to approach it? Or is it simply a social issue which is in the process of being settled, as Parliament wants to do, instead? The communists obviously are in favor of the second assumptions and they said so yesterday morning during a press conference staged by the Roman federation which was attended by most of the associations representing aliens in the capital. The position held by the PCI was presented by Franco Funghi, the man in charge of the federation's foreign section, and Deputy Santino Picchetti. The two communist leaders in effect said that the important thing is to insist on the passage of the bill introduced by four parliamentary delegations, that is, the DC, PSI, the DP, and the PCI. It would regulate the entry and residence of aliens in Italy and would give them the kind of legal status which they do not have today since these delicate questions have until now been handled on the basis of the only pertinent police regulations which date back to 1931.

The PCI has restated its commitment "to make a maximum contribution to the solution of the problems of immigrants and to assure their full rights as workers, thus extricating them from their illegal jobs and their disadvantaged condition and guaranteeing refugees the right of asylum and the exercise of democratic freedoms."

The communists furthermore asked the mayor to promote a general meeting which could bring the presidents of the two branches of Parliament together; and they have asked the region for a new commitment to use the funds of the EEC in this field. The PCI will also ask citizens who have resided in Italy for more than 5 years to be able to vote in the administrative elections.

First name: Joseph. Surname: He left that in a Jordanian refugee camp. He has been in Italy for 6 years, spending the first 2-1/2 in Naples and the others in Rome. He speaks Italian without an accent. But he needs to conceal his identity.

"The marks of the attacks of recent months have remained indelible not only in the consciousness of the Italians but also in those of the aliens. Nine of my friends were deported immediately after the bombs on Veneto Street. They had been living in Italy for 10 years, their families are either in Jordan or in territories occupied by the Israelis. Where will they go now? What is their 'fatherland?'"

The PCI press conference had already become a big meeting. There was a need to discuss the attempt by the ruling party to settle issues involving thousands upon thousands of families--100,000 in the capital alone--by decree, once again leaving a void in the law. The sufferings, humiliations, fears, loneliness, and anxiety of a person who is thousands of miles from his homeland and who is continuously rejected in the new community--these prevailed over the initial cold atmosphere during the debate.

"There are 60 million [as published] Italians abroad, but out of them 5,000 belong to the mafia. Does this mean that you are all a bunch of mafia members?" The Italian spoken by Hidalgo, a Peruvian, president of the UCSEI (Central Union of Foreign Students), betrays his origin and his metaphor is as clear as his pronunciation: Some Arab throws a bomb--so how can you indict all of the foreign immigrants in Rome?

Zaran, an Iranian, who has lived in Italy for more than 20 years, speaks out in pure Italian. It was he who started the series of truly moving remarks.

"I came here as a boy. I met my wife here, my children were born here, and then I got a separation. Now I run the risk of being sent away (where? to the regime of Khomeyni?) Because I no longer have an Italian wife and because I have no legal status. I am still the father of Italians and the same law that does not protect me and demands that I go away also forces me to support them and to educate them. This is justice?

And his friend Vartagnan sounded off: "I, too, came to your country as a youngster. I got my degree here 15 years ago but I never found a niche for myself here. The most menial jobs are reserved even for college graduates. At any rate, I did not come here just to earn a living; I also came here in search of a little bit of freedom. I did not get it." He stopped but then he started up again: "If you do not want us, stop selling weapons to our countries and perhaps the wars will end and then we could go back." He concluded, almost meditating: "You are looking for terrorists among dishwashers and babysitters; that is ridiculous." *

The attack on the press came quite on schedule. It was mounted by Joseph who likewise has no other name and who is also from Iran.

"The minister can draft decrees because the Italian press is silent, because it reports only the attitudes of xenophobes and not the silent expulsion which is taking place at this time with regard to thousands of young aliens."

"We are fighting to return home, not to stay here," said Gime, from Eritrea. "What I am trying to say is that the antidemocratic regimes that govern our countries forced us to leave, just like the wars did. The blame of the Italians is secondary even though we are subjected to slow and sophisticated repression on their part which perhaps is more cruel than in other European countries."

"Yes," came the ironic suggestion by Nofer, from Sri Lanka, in Italy for the past 12 years, "it would be better if you were to close the border with beatings or rifle fire; your position would then be clearer. Instead, you let us come in and then you watch us in the middle of the night to search us, you burst into our apartments with your rifles drawn while, after 16 hours of work in the laundry establishments, we get together for a meal."

5058

CSO: 3528/39

BRIEFS

DECREE LAW ON FOREIGNERS POSTPONED--Interior Minister Scalfaro was sure that there would be no problems for his decree-law which is intended to govern the stay of aliens in Italy. Instead, everything has been postponed until next week. Why? "There was no more time left to discuss it," said Scalfaro as he emerged from the meeting. Other ministers however explained the confusion that sprang from the content of this decree. "There was fear of useless aggravations and bureaucratic formalities," said Martinazzoli, adding: "Craxi himself expressed concern over the possible repercussions on tourism." What did the decree provide for? The introduction of the crime of "illegal entry" into Italy. The obligation for all aliens in Italy, if they wanted to work, to get an "identity card," limited to the duration of the residence permit and issued by the community of residents. The obligation for anybody who, for any purpose whatsoever, shelters an alien or hires an alien to report to the police within 8 days. An appendix to this last rule consists of a proviso applicable to someone who has a (non-"registered") alien as his dependent: In other words, countless families and small crafts and commercial enterprises. Aliens who reside in Italy legally number 434,000. Estimates as to "illegal" aliens vary between 800,000 and 1 million and more and of those at least 500,000 are holding jobs illegally. [Text] [Milan L'UNITA in Italian 30 Nov 85 p 3] 5058

CSO: 3528/39

DECLINING COMMUNIST DAILY MAY FOLD IN 1986

Amsterdam DE VOLKSKRANT in Dutch 9 Nov 85 Supplement p 1

[Article by Arno Haijtema and Frank van Zijl: "The Last Battle for the Small WAARHEID"]

[Text] Is it a cow, DE WAARHEID? "Go ahead and say a crazy bull," said the editor in chief laughing. The "People's Newspaper for the Netherlands" is sad and celebrates at the same time. The newspaper is close to death, but they are still celebrating. If 1986 again produces a deficit, then they can forget it. A campaign which was seen as a last ditch rescue operation failed. But editor in chief Constant Vecht still wants to play his last trump card: a small WAARHEID for large left.

Tomorrow, the newspaper DE WAARHEID will celebrate its 45th anniversary in the "De Hoeksteen" building in Amsterdam. But it would be nearly impossible for this to be fun. Because whether it will reach its 46th anniversary is definitely questionable.

Hence, an appeal will be made to leftist Netherlands: "People, DE WAARHEID could slip away. It really is sink or swim now. We are appealing to you. If you want this newspaper to survive, then now is the time to hitch on."

Six months ago the alarm bells at DE WAARHEID were rung extra loudly. Editor in chief Constant Vecht openly admitted that the new campaign would be a last ditch rescue operation. Is DE WAARHEID a cow? Is DE WAARHEID being stifled? How do you find out about DE WAARHEID?

Those teasers were supposed to produce at least 1,000 subscriptions. But the campaign failed. Not only because there is no longer any money to provide all the promised answers, but especially because the number of 1,000 was not reached. That is disastrous and even though everyone on the editorial staff realizes it, the communists remained firm. Editor in chief Vecht (36 years old): "The campaign did achieve a few things. The decline was not brought to a standstill, but it was very drastically limited. The outflow and inflow of subscribers are beginning to grow toward one another. Last week we lost 50 of them, but we also got 43 in return. And the campaign has in any case also produced a resurgence of activism. That is something to continue to build on. It offers some prospect."

DE WAARHEID is coming back with a dash. Vecht: "We are going to deal with a change in format, the so-called weekend format. It is a challenge to try something new, but largely of course it is also a camouflage for the page reduction."

The small WAARHEID will also become somewhat cheaper, the editorial staff will be reduced from 19 to 14 people, and then, well, if there really is solidarity in socialist, communist, Leninist and run of the mill leftist Netherlands, then there will be a paper which confirms this unity.

But there is little reason for optimism. Given the developments of the newspaper in recent years, it is obvious that the latest rescue operation is not much more than a spasm. According to Vecht, if DE WAARHEID wants to remain a daily newspaper it will have to get through 1986 without a loss. That is an absolute condition. The editor in chief is not all that sure of his ground. "Honest is honest: I don't know how it will end. Look, it would be a capital sin if DE WAARHEID were to disappear. Even though that would not mean the end of the world, it would mean a serious decline."

The newspaper has had to take a number of blows in recent years. DE WAARHEID is in debt up to its ears. Especially with the Industrial Fund for the Press, but also with several creditors who are carefully kept secret. The deficit must be gigantic, but on the Hoogte Kadijk in Amsterdam everybody maintains a stony silence.

What is known is that in 1981 DE WAARHEID suffered a fiscal loss of 450,000 guilders. Fortunately, that same year the first 400,000 guilders of the 2 million guilders in total assistance from the Industrial Fund for the Press were also released, as a result of which the deficit for the Benepak Foundation, which publishes DE WAARHEID, stayed at 850,000 guilders. (Benepak stands for "promotion of the press of the Dutch working class.")

But loans must also be paid off, and the 2 million guilder one puts a heavy burden on the newspaper. At the time, an agreement was made with the assistance fund that the loan would be paid off in 10 years. Including interest, that means 50,000 guilders per quarter. It is further known that in 1984 the CPN [Communist Party of the Netherlands] reduced its contribution to the newspaper from 500,000 to 300,000 guilders. What the party's contribution is at the present time is also kept secret.

Vecht became nervous when asked about the details of the newspaper's financial situation. "I don't know," he said.

[Question] As editor in chief, you have to know what the debts are, don't you?

[Answer] Roughly, but I won't give you any figures.

[Question] Why not?

[Answer] Too great a risk.

[Question] ???

[Answer] That then tomorrow the creditors will appear on the doorstep.

However, the editor in chief's reticence cannot gloss over all the misery. DE WAARHEID's income from advertisement is minimal; you only have to open the 6 page "thick" newspaper to know that. And the fact that circulation is not the best possible either is proven by the single Mercedes station wagon which leaves the Hoogte Kadijk at noon, half filled with newspapers.

In the past, a smoke curtain was always raised when the topic of circulation figures came up. Right after World War II, DE WAARHEID experienced an absolute period of prosperity. With a circulation of 300,000 copies, the people's newspaper was the largest newspaper in the Netherlands. Partly because of the Dutch people's anger about the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956, half of the subscribers turned their backs on the communist newspaper.

"We have always been very careful with that loss of subscribers, because that took the spirit out of it. It is a question of tradition in a communist stronghold," said Vecht.

In the seventies, DE WAARHEID gave its circulation figure as about 60,000. In 1978 they even spoke of 69,000 for a moment. In reality many fewer newspapers were already rolling off the presses at that time. Later on Vecht admitted in an interview that in 1975 DE WAARHEID had 26,000 readers.

According to Vecht, in October 1984 the paid circulation figure was nearly 16,000. His latest figure was 12,000. That includes 2,000 so-called VZ [Friday, Saturday] readers, who buy the newspaper only on Fridays and Saturdays when it is two pages thicker.

Vecht: "Don't forget that many people read this newspaper in addition to another daily paper. In times of crisis the first one to go is DE WAARHEID." But, he admitted, the distressed financial situation of DE WAARHEID and the slump in the newspaper's circulation are not separate from a number of "internal and external difficulties."

DE WAARHEID as a newspaper is always made for and by the CPN. The newspaper was the party's megaphone, with an eye on Moscow. The editor in chief was also always a member of the party leadership. Because of its strong ties with the CPN, the newspaper has always been very vulnerable.

This manifested itself particularly in 1983 when people in the party started grumbling. A conflict developed between horizontals ("stepped cadres") and the so-called renovators, who no longer wanted to cover Soviet policy with the cloak of love.

The power struggle within the CPN was fought to a not insignificant degree over the heads of the editors of DE WAARHEID. Some of them, such as assistant editor Elsbeth Etty and editor in chief Bart Schmidt, threw in the towel after serious quarrels.

The newspaper's position was a matter of vehement discussion. Was DE WAARHEID a megaphone for the CPN, or a newspaper which held a microphone in front of the party? The megas, especially the older guard, and the micros, who pleaded for a newspaper for the left as a whole, proved to be irreconcilable.

The editorial staff fought on the side of the renovators. There needed to be room in the columns for the struggle of women, of anti-racism, and of homosexuals. In spite of all the thunder and lightning between the third (editorial staff) and the fourth floor (party) at the Hoogte Kadijk, the renewal continued.

In June 1983, the internal partisan political struggle was settled in favor of the micros. At one CPN congress, the proposition was adopted by a majority of the votes that DE WAARHEID should be a newspaper which could also make harsh comments about the situation of the Jews in the Soviet Union.

DE WAARHEID changed from a parish paper to a newspaper directed toward the left as a whole. And Constant Vecht jumped into the snake pit.

The change in direction of DE WAARHEID has left its tracks behind. The megas not only cancelled their subscriptions, but they also flatly refused to spread DE WAARHEID any longer.

"It is sometimes said that the split in the CPN was the greatest deathblow for us. That is not true at all. At the time of Poland and Walesa, when we defended Solidarity in our columns, we received many letters: 'clerical dog' and 'fascist.' But, as a result of the split within the CPN, approximately 2,000 people cancelled their subscriptions. That loss is not significantly greater than at any other time."

Vecht also has to admit that the goal, to create a paper for the left as a whole, did not materialize. Fifteen percent of the readers of DE WAARHEID come from the PSP [Pacifist Socialist Party] corner, 7 percent from the PPR [Political Party of Radicals] corner, and 10 percent from the PvdA [Labor Party].

Vecht: "The thing that has played us some terribly nasty tricks is the fact that leftist cooperation did not materialize. We beat the drum so much about that. We hoped that it would create a new burst and that DE WAARHEID could roll along with it. But that did not succeed."

Last weekend the former horizontals set up their own orthodox communist party, the Alliance of Communists in the Netherlands [VCN]. Doesn't Vecht consider the alliance paper MANIFEST (which is said to have more than 3,000 subscribers already) a threat to his new DE WAARHEID? "No, the people who read that newspaper gave up their subscription to DE WAARHEID 2 years ago already."

LABOR PARTY LEFTIST STLEN HITS WILLOCH FOREIGN POLICIES

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 7 Dec 85 p 14

/Commentary by Reiulf Steen under the "Thoughts in Time" rubric: "In Search of a Foreign Policy"/

/Text/ The Foreign Minister has given his report.

Nobody can maintain that it was in any way an exciting report which he made to the Storting concerning the foreign policy situation and the international state of affairs. But now I would be the last person to maintain that excitement should be a high-priority requirement for a foreign policy report. There is too much excitement--or, in today's language, too much "action"--tied to events in the international community. It is not excitement that is lacking for the blacks and the coloreds in South Africa. It is not excitement that is lacking for the peoples in the small republics that make up the narrow strip of land from Mexico to Colombia. It is not excitement that is lacking for the peoples in the Middle East either. Or in Afghanistan.

In other words: It is easy for me to forgive a foreign minister for not being exciting.

No, there is something else that is more important to pay attention to: The report was not a report about foreign policy. It did not concern itself with a coherent concept of how Norway is to conduct itself vis-a-vis the forces--economic, social and political power--which create conflicts and dangers in the world. It did not deal with how Norway is to help promote certain foreign policy goals. It also said very little about what such goals Norway must have.

Lars Korvald, the former leader of the Christian Peoples Party, was a wise politician. On one occasion he opened a foreign policy debate in the Storting with the assertion that "Norway is a little country in the world." This statement has since been a subject of much ridicule. It is related to another formulation which allegedly originated with Torolf Elster: Socialism is what the labor movement at all times has in mind. We Norwegians are clever at ridicule and a lot of clever ridicule has been produced concerning both of these formulations.

Let me stick my neck out by maintaining that both assertions contain important truths--truths which nonetheless are often overlooked. Norway is indeed a little country in the world, and to a great extent this fact must have a decisive influence on how we conduct our foreign policy. But this should not mean that we remain without a foreign policy. To the contrary, of course, it is more important for a small country than it is for the large ones to have a well-conceived, coherent, thoroughly discussed foreign policy with clearly defined goals. Our actions from day to day must be considered in light of the goals we have. This is a far more difficult task for a small country than for a large country and greater demands are therefore often placed on the governments of small countries than on those of large countries for wisdom, knowledge and insight in the area of foreign policy. Finland is a shining example of what a small country can achieve through an intelligent foreign policy which is based on a consistent philosophy and which has clearly defined goals.

Without pleasure, it must be said that we are approaching a state of affairs where--just as during the years between the wars--we are without a foreign policy. It is to Halvard Lange's undying credit that, working together with a group of gifted professionals having great knowledge of the international situation, he gave Norway a foreign policy. I do not think that one must necessarily agree with Halvard Lange in all his words and deeds, but nobody can deny that he, and the Foreign Ministry under his leadership, was professional, operational, and enjoyed an international respect that was sensational, taking the country's size into account.

We are now reacting to individual events. The starting point for the reactions is a judgment of what Reagan and the United States thinks. The guideline for the Foreign Ministry leadership is that, wherever at all possible, we will associate ourselves with the policy of the United States. Is this an expression of friendship? It is of course not that. On the contrary, it is an expression of servility, a characteristic as little related to friendship as the dog is related to the cat. When Halvar Lange was so highly respected, as he was both in Washington and in Moscow as well as in most of the other capitals of the world, this was because he never concealed his friendship with the United States, but also because he never confused friendship with servility.

What is it, primarily, that Norway needs as a guide for its foreign policy? Well certainly we need to know what sort of relations we want to have with the one of the two superpowers with which we have a common border. But do we have any consistent and well-considered Soviet policy? I still have not met anybody who has discovered one. We have always considered the Nordic region to be one of the main pillars of our foreign policy. But, under this government, we are in the process of achieving worse relations with Sweden than we have had since 1905 while, from Finland, they watch the Norwegian capital with friendly astonishment. Nordic cooperation in the political and institutional spheres has stagnated. And what about

Europe, the continent of which Norway is a part? I am incapable of discovering any European policy, apart from positions on individual questions such as, for example, EUREKA cooperation. Important enough, of course, but not a sufficient basis for a consistent, decisive European policy.

Also, because Norway needs a foreign policy, we need a change in government as soon as possible, a governmental change which should take place well before 1989. For this latter, there are a countless number of different grounds, and I hope to have occasion to return to them in this column.

13032/12276

CSO: 3639/52

1985 PROVED DIFFICULT YEAR FOR COALITION, PROGRESSIVES

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 31 Dec 85 p 3

[Commentary by Bjorn Talen: "Growth for Norway--Bad Year for Politics"]

[Text] 1985 was the year when things really began to go much better for Norway. The government's laboriously constructed sprinkler system caused the economy to pick up speed, yes, in fact, so much so that the sprinklers soon will be needed for cooling things down.

Unemployment has been brought down to a more normal level, auto sales are setting new records and business has had Christmas-like sales all year--both respecting food and normal consumer goods as well as unquestionable luxury consumer goods.

People never have had so much money (or so many credit cards) at their disposal, and this does not pertain only to a few newly rich stock market and finance comets.

And even though we did not make it to Mexico, Bobbysocks Norway swung its way to the European top in the Grand Prix, while having soft-rocked itself to yet greater heights.

For sure, it has been a good year for Norway. But despite the fact that most people never have had it better, things are not so good in the political flower garden where it was nearly too much of a bad year to even calculate. Within the government, there is order in the flower beds, and the prime minister will not let root rot set in such as happened with the Borten government. But things are growing wildly in Parliament following the voters having attempted to pull the weeds out of the garden without taking the roots along with them. And those who know weeds know that this will only cause greater problems than before.

Liberals' Fate

Things went the worst of all for the smallest and the greenest plant, which as in all years, has been bothered by root suckers. The attempt at replanting ended up in particularly poor soil for the old Liberal voters. The Labor Party's red roses did some frantic blooming during the hectic weeks of the late summer, but then withered quite well. And even the finest blue carnation lost some of its crown leaves. 1985 was the first year when forces within the Conservative Party began to put question marks after various aspects of Kare Willoch's political talents. Certainly, no one can budge his solid

leadership, but it is not completely without basis that a good portion of Conservatives both at the top and the bottom are talking about Jo Benkow possibly having been the right man to have pursued the flexible parliamentary policies which the situation calls for. Both his unbelievable success on paper and at moving ahead show that the man likely comes closer to people's heart-strings than the stiffer and cooler prime minister.

Star Player

Nonetheless, Kare Willoch continues to be the non-socialist camp's star player in a special class with increasing popularity in the tribunals.

"It was Willoch who at the end managed to stop the dangerous attacks which the Labor Party had going. The victory was carried off throughout the country by means of some quick counterattacks, even though the governing camp had missed the opportunity for directing the play."

Already in his New Year's speech, the prime minister named health and social policy as an important area where we now can afford to concentrate more effort because of the economic progress. This also has been done, and even more patients are being treated by the health authorities with the new private offerings as supplements. But at the same time, it is equally strange that the government does not focus on a concrete social welfare policy reform and face the election, for example, with a more flexible retirement age for the most burdened groups. Otherwise, the government has implemented a series of necessary reforms to get the economy moving. The Norwegian people are better off under the Willoch government, but in the health and social sector, there are--as the prime minister himself has pointed out--seriously unmet needs.

Passive Play

Because of this passive play, the opposition camp was able to wreak havoc quite freely on this part of the playing field. It can continue to do this to a certain degree since the otherwise capable and sympathetic governing council repeatedly shows itself to be a not-overly competent defensive player. Many likely were surprised that neither the prime minister nor the largest governing party comprehended the consequences of what the voters are saying in this area.

This also revealed Willoch's weaknesses as team captain. He does not have the necessary forces to switch players or reshape the team when the need arises. For example, there are increasing numbers who ask whether the culture minister continues to be the asset for the government which he supposedly was--in the beginning--with his "cutting-edge" media policies. The district radio stations have had problems as idealism gradually has burned out, and the Conservatives risk being excluded when the issue of TV2 is to be decided. It is not much help to have a majority of the people in support when one fails to have adequate political back protection. And despite the fact that cultural life is blossoming like never before, there is a large rift between Lars Roar Langslet and many of the central people who lead the cultural organizations. It is not clear whether the rift is the fault of the latter.

Little Foresight

Most surprising, however, was the prime minister's lack of tactical foresight in connection with the election. It was overwhelmingly probable in advance that the parliamentary election would have the exact results which in fact occurred. But there was little which suggested that prior to the election, Willoch had sat himself down with Kjell Magne Bondevik and Johan J. Jakobsen in order to discuss how one ought behave under the circumstances. In any case, things were in a total mess on election night and the days immediately thereafter.

Nor have there been any clarifications during the fall, and for this, the centrist parties' parliamentary spokesmen must bear the blame. It was rather unlikely that the Center Party's vice chairman would not permit himself to read Carl I. Hagen's wishlist, only later to declare that the national budget was improved as a result of Progress Party influence. Or that Harald Synnes and Johan Buttedahl would put the government's life at stake in order to avoid political concessions to Hagen, and thereafter to give the Progress Party all the political honor it could want by saying that the result was better than their own government's original proposal. The prime minister presumably would be tempted in this connection to use an expression from his predecessors: This doesn't hang from a manure fork!

Expensive Arrogance

But in view of all of the parliamentary calamities arising out of Hagen's swing position, the Conservatives also must take their portion of the blame. A more proper treatment of the Progress Party's elected representatives would not have forced such lemming-like reactions within the Progress Party. Instead of having made a clean political break early on, the Conservatives chose to contemplate the Progress Party and its voters from above and below. Both the Conservatives and a majority of the conservative press amused themselves at Hagen's expense when he promised to support the government prior to the election. This arrogance gradually has cost politically.

No, none of the governing parties has any special reason to look back on 1985 with joy. An election now would result in a clear socialist victory. Under the circumstances, the Conservatives are maintaining themselves well. But the trend is most disquieting for the Christian Democratic Party: 12.4 percent in 1977, 9.4 percent in 1981 and 8.3 percent in 1985. Since the parliamentary election in September, the party has been down around the 7-percent level. The Center Party does best in the election itself, but has a reduced margin of safety within which to operate.

Not Jubilee Year

Despite having acquired its great new parliamentary honor, 1985 also was no jubilee year for the Progress Party. More the opposite. The bombastic predictions of "15 parliamentary seats" turned into a halving of the 4-man delegation. Internal bickering, the lack of "feeling" for the trends among young people, and an ultraliberal idealizing has scared the voters away. And for a party which was formed in order to limit public spending, it must be difficult to explain why it joined up with the "spending parties" in order to jack up the national budget.

On the Old Track

Is there, therefore, reason to proclaim the Labor Party as the year's victor? The new year can be celebrated with the best Gallup poll results in years, and the party enjoyed a healthy advance in the parliamentary election. But that means little. Despite free chances, there were few touchdowns. Gro Harlem Brundtland was brilliant in the election campaign and she has noted the party's alternative proposals with support from the opposition bench in Parliament.

But the Labor Party has not managed a self-renewal. The voters have the most general confidence in the Labor Party as respects, for example, health and social policies. But the party's proposal for solutions do not contain any new thoughts. They involve only blowing on the embers through greater public spending. The uncertain security policies frighten many and the freedom debate which Gro Harlem Brundtland now wants to start should have begun many years ago. The voters have had the taste of a freer and more open society and have no clear assurances that the Labor Party will not slam the doors again.

Non-Socialist Majority

Despite everything, there is relatively little which the Labor Party can do in the near future with the non-socialist majority in Parliament. But the party obviously has justifiable hopes that the same majority gradually will act so selfishly that it will become the cause for advancement by the Labor Party. Much will depend on the coalition leaders' ability to hold the camp together. Kare Willoch has the possibility of becoming the longest-sitting non-socialist prime minister since Gunnar Knudsen and likely will do his utmost to fulfill the task which the voters have handed him.

12578

CSO: 3639/54

SOVIET EMBASSY SHOULD BE FORCED TO CUT STAFF DUE TO SPYING

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 22 Dec 85 p 2

[Editorial: "What Does the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Say?"]

[Text] It is the judgment of the Swedish Security Police that there is a clear trend toward increased Soviet intelligence activity in our country.

As was noted in a parliamentary bill this year [1985] aimed at limiting Soviet representation in Sweden, a number of attention-getting instances of misuse of diplomatic immunity have occurred. Expulsions have increased and a large number of Soviet citizens have been denied entry in recent years.

In his book "Industrial Espionage" (Timbro, 1984), journalist Charlie Nordblom says, on the basis of intelligence reports, that of the just over 200 official Soviet representatives in Sweden, almost 80 are suspected of being officers in the KGB and the GRU. Just over 900 more Soviet citizens are registered in the country.

Nor is there a lack of permanent Soviet institutions here; besides its embassy, the Soviet Union has an oversized trade delegation on Liding Island and a similarly overstaffed consulate in Goteborg, as well as a number of firms and agencies serving as bases for the single-minded penetration of Swedish politics and industry.

Activities have long been directed at established Swedish parties and organizations. In more recent years, those activities have been expanded with an eye to technological development and research in the business community and political activist groups, especially within the peace movement.

In a survey of the importance of peace activism to the Soviet Union's strategic goals in the Nordic region ("The Soviet Union and the Peace Movement," Timbro, 1985), journalist Peppe Engberg throws light on the way that contact work operates.

From our own spy cases and recent examples in our vicinity--the Treholt case in Norway, for example--we are aware of the Soviet Union's more discreet intentions in addition to the obvious aggression and expansion that have been

demonstrated for decades in East Europe, the Baltic States, and many other parts of the world.

So we cannot plead lack of experience or knowledge when it comes to Soviet communism's modus operandi.

As if that extensive Soviet presence in Sweden were not enough of a problem by itself, the Soviet Embassy now intends to increase its permanent presence in Stockholm.

A year ago, acting on behalf of the Soviets, the ABV construction firm applied to the municipality for a development permit: it wanted to erect several apartment houses, including school premises, in the Tvattbaljan neighborhood on Stora Essingen Island. In a letter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the ambassador expressed "his high esteem" for the ministry and his gratitude in advance for "a favorable resolution of this matter."

The project has encountered local resistance. Among other things, the Essinge Association Board, on which the democratic parties are represented, has opposed the development. Residents of the area have vented their protest through appeals and petitions.

After being duly processed at the local level, the matter has now been shelved pending a reaction from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Foreign policy is not a municipal concern, of course, and this is not a trifling matter.

There is a pronounced numerical imbalance--in the Soviets' favor--in the diplomatic presence of the big powers in our country, just as balance is also lacking in Swedish representation in the Soviet Union. According to the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations, we have the right to limit Soviet representation if we consider it reasonable to do so.

The occasion for using that right could not be more urgent. Soviet representation in Sweden ought to be reduced. Doing the opposite, as symbolized by granting the Soviets permission to increase their permanent ownership of property, would mean sending an entirely erroneous signal concerning our aspiration to be independent of the dictatorship that is violating our territorial integrity.

11798

CSO: 3650/103

KARIN SODER GIVES VIEWS ON CENTER PARTY FUTURE

Economy, Taxes Weak Areas

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 15 Dec 85 p 20

[Commentary by Sven Svensson: "'Mother' Takes over the Center Party"]

[Text] The crown princess has now become the queen--or perhaps a kind of "mother figure." Karin Soder may become the first female party leader in Sweden. In the chaos that has ensued from the coup against Falldin, she will now try to lead the Center Party back to solid ground.

A three-stage rocket was going to make Olof Johansson the Center Party's new leader and change the Center Party into a "key party." That was the planned coup behind Thorbjorn Falldin's dramatic abdication, in which he sank with flag aloft.

In the first stage, Thorbjorn Falldin was to be removed as party leader. In the second stage, Olof Johansson was to be chosen as the Center Party's new leader, and in the third stage, the Center Party would be set free from the nonsocialist bloc and transformed--hey presto!--into an independent key party.

That transformation was supposed to take place at the meeting by the party's executive group at the end of February, when the Center Party's new course is to be established following a poll of the membership.

The first stage succeeded more quickly than expected. Like a proud farmer, Falldin quickly grabbed his hat and left. With a cellar full of potatoes and the combined pension of a cabinet minister and a member of Parliament, he grabbed the chance to resign quickly with his honor intact.

Falldin gave proof of his political skillfulness first. Thanks to his performance at the press conference last Thursday, the other two stages in the planned coup were brought to nothing.

Following the dissociation by Falldin, Olof Johansson has less chance than before of becoming the new party leader, and the Center Party's shift in the direction of a general key party is more improbable than before.

There was scarcely any established organization behind the planned coup. When Thorbjorn Falldin raised his voice, the plans collapsed like a house of cards. Behind the "coup" was a collection of ill-defined idealists, environmental activists, political dreamers, and power-hungry local politicians.

Hardly anyone believes that Olof Johansson himself was involved in the plans for a coup. But the general opinion is that he must have been aware that groups within the Center Party wanted to use him to oust Falldin.

The day after the election, Falldin had stated--probably sincerely--that he was eager for revenge and intended to stay on. He did not feel that anyone else could do any better.

During the fall, however, Falldin must have realized that his position was shaky--and not only in the youth association, which had protested at an early stage during a postelection conference in Storlien.

It is evident from the course of events that a few schemers pulled some strings to get rid of Falldin.

Reply

Falldin was visited on the afternoon of Wednesday 27 November by the head of the election committee, Inge Pettersson, who informed him that he no longer enjoyed its confidence. Falldin replied with a Biblical formula:

"Your will be done!"

Because of circumstances, Falldin was forced to act for a few days as though nothing had happened. The funeral service for party secretary Gustaf Jonnergard was being held the next day. And POLITISK TIDSKRIFT came out on Friday, with several writers demanding Falldin's head on a platter.

Great pains were taken to distribute that issue of the magazine among the mass media. It carried a preface by former Center Party leader Gunnar Hedlund, who happened to be heading up the action against Falldin and for Olof Johansson as new party leader, although he did not approve of Johansson's candidacy.

The Center Party's 75th anniversary was celebrated in Falkoping on Saturday 30 October and Sunday 1 November [dates as published, presumably November and December intended] with a speech by Falldin, who reiterated that he was eager for revenge. The explanation is that Falldin could not deviate from his earlier gospel. If he had, interpretations would have started and many reporters would have asked what the election committee thought.

Karin Soder

After taking a break at home in Ramvik, Falldin made more direct contact with Karin Soder on Tuesday 3 November [as published, presumably December intended]. She was persuaded to take over the party leadership until the party congress in Uppsala in June.

On the next day even Olof Johansson was informed, but the news of Falldin's decision to resign was otherwise kept within a restricted circle. The parliamentary group's executive committee did not learn of it until the time came to go from words to action.

According to the timetable agreed on, the Center Party was supposed to discuss policy first and then the makeup of the party leadership.

It was a mistake on the election committee's part to contact Falldin at such an early stage. But the most serious error of all was Olof Johansson's nomination for party leader immediately after Falldin's press conference, with the rest of the presiding committee to consist of KDS engineer Borje Hornlund and Helena Nilsson, who has no experience in Parliament.

Bloc Politics

Thanks to Falldin's press conference, the Center Party is now rooted in the nonosocialist bloc even more firmly than before.

In parliamentary elections, the Swedish people go to the polls to choose a government. The parliamentary system requires that the Center Party state its position on the government question--now more than ever. It is not enough to say that the Center Party is not a socialist party. Its position as a key party would be interpreted by all general nonsocialist voters as a flirtation with Palme and lead to more election losses.

But the fact that the Center Party will also be forced to state its position on the government question in the future does not rule out political arrangements with the Social Democrats.

As the precondition for doing so, its political profile must be so clear that the voters can identify the advantages gained from a compromise with a big party.

In the chaos that has ensued from Thorbjorn Falldin's resignation, Karin Soder will be a sort of "mother figure." In the general confusion, she suddenly came to symbolize security and continuity in the Center Party. And as Sweden's first female party leader, she will receive a lot of free publicity. She also enjoys great credibility in both the Liberal and the Conservative Party.

Problems With the Boys

Karin Soder's candidacy for party leader is not entirely free of complications. Swedish politics is concerned to a large extent with the economy and taxes, and those are not Karin Soder's strong points. She may find it difficult to hold her own against the "boys"--Bengt Westerberg and Ulf Adelsohn--in the duels among party leaders.

Karin Soder's election as new party leader will mean that, at least in the Center Party's inner counsels, Nils G. Asling, former minister of industry and

now a member of Parliament's Finance Committee, will be in a stronger position in that central political area. The troublemakers in the youth association will be offended. Falldin's ouster was not supposed to have that result at all.

In the areas of foreign and social policy, on the other hand, Karin Soder can act with full authority. Because of her days as a minister, she has a complete grasp of those areas. Her experience as a teacher is also valuable.

Generally speaking, she is a person rooted in the people and not a political "spring chicken." That should benefit the Center Party's position among "ordinary people," to use the party's own expression.

As minister of energy, Olof Johansson once made a mess for both Thorbjorn Falldin and himself when he stood on the steps of the Government Office and shouted to his youth association that "now we will put a stop to nuclear energy." That earned him an obvious and perhaps not entirely fair reputation in various nonsocialist circles as an impossible troublemaker.

Energy issues have now been taken over by other Center Party members, primarily Member of Parliament Ivar Franzen, while Olof Johansson has come to specialize in computer questions—not exactly a big votegetter. And as a Stockholmer, Olof Johansson is forced to recognize that the party's worst election results were in his own constituency.

At 57, Karin Soder must be regarded as a transitional solution, just as Olof Johansson is scarcely a winner in the current situation. The Center Party must therefore make every effort to dig up a politician in his 40's who can put on rather quickly the mantle of an obvious crown prince.

Many people feel that they are surely called, but so far no brightly shining star is to be seen over the horizon.

SDP 'Collective Society' Assailed

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 15 Dec 85 p 5

[Op-Ed article by Karin Soder]

[Text] In the Social Democratic Party [SDP], the idea of the "People's Home" has been replaced by belief in a strong, centralizing, and collectivist society. The idea that the decentralizing Center Party would be interested in beginning closer cooperation with the SDP under those conditions is absurd. That is what Center Party leader Karin Soder says below as she explains her party's political line.

Thorbjorn Falldin's resignation as leader of the Center Party has been taken in some quarters as a pretext for speculations concerning disunity and changes in the party's political line as well. It is important to repudiate those speculations even though a little reflection shows one that they collapse

under their own absurdity. A political party's program and policy are not the concern of any individual, whether party leader or not. Least of all in a people's party such as the Center Party, where internal democracy is strong.

On the other hand, the Center Party has reason to sharpen its political profile and indicate more clearly where the party stands on various issues.

Two specially appointed postelection groups have tackled that clarification of the political platform. But the renewal and refinement of policy and organization are also being pursued further in the parliamentary group and in various permanent bodies in the party organization.

That task is being carried out on the basis of the party program adopted in 1981. The work can be described as political renewal and sharp definition on a firm foundation of ideas.

The Center Party stands on its own two feet in politics. Decentralization and a free economy in combination with a clear social profile and a strong emphasis on the quality of life and a good environment are broadly characteristic of the party's action.

The party has always and consistently promoted private ownership and individual authority in private matters. At the same time, we have combated the concentration of power, whether private or by the state. With the passing of time, that ideological element in our program has developed into an overriding ideology of decentralization that characterizes the modern Center Party to a large degree. This is of importance not only to economic life but also to the dissemination of power and influence in general, regional development, cultural life, and so on.

During the 1970's and 1980's, the SDP has become clearly more socialist and collectivist in tone than previously. One need only mention such ideas as the wage earner funds and collective membership. In the SDP, the idea of the "People's Home" has been replaced by belief in a strong, centralizing, and collectivist society in which the individual must take a back seat.

The idea that the decentralizing Center Party would be interested in initiating closer cooperation with the Social Democrats under those conditions is absurd. The Center Party's voters are probably more interested than those of any other party today in the fact that the socialist parties have been reduced to a minority in Parliament and that the Social Democrats have been deprived of the chance to follow up on their policy of wholesale change and their collectivism.

It is especially important to break up the hegemony which the Social Democrats are defiantly trying to establish in the administration and in cultural life by increasing the number of political appointments and by other means. That development constitutes a danger both to individual rights and to variety in cultural life.

In the area of social policy, the Center Party has actively contributed through the years to the building of today's welfare society. No one who really listens to us needs to have any doubt that we are among the defenders of the welfare society today as well. Here there are clear boundary lines separating us from both the Right and the Left.

For the Center Party as for the Social Democrats, [social] solidarity represents a word of honor. The difference between the Center Party and the Social Democrats in that area lies in the Center Party's strong emphasis on basic security but also in the conviction that solidarity can be realized by means other than local and central government institutions. This makes it possible to combine security with personal freedom.

To a large extent, the Social Democrats place an equal sign between solidarity and official activity. This makes Social Democratic social policy clumsy, expensive, and partly ineffective. The growing number of "new poor" in particular are testimony to that.

The difference between the Center Party's and the SDP's views on social policy was first demonstrated in earnest during the battle over the ATP [general supplementary pension plan]. At the moment, family policy is in the foreground. And the differences reappear in that connection. The Social Democrats accept few variations in the shape of child care. All available resources are to be channeled into the construction and operation of day care centers. In opposition to that is the Center Party's demand for child care benefits for all--basic security combined with freedom of choice in the matter of child care.

Ultimately, the difference goes back to views on the actual job of providing care. Like other work in the home, home care--for children, the elderly, and the sick--has low status in Social Democratic eyes. As such, it is viewed as not deserving any economic compensation from society. Just recently, we also witnessed the Social Democratic-dominated labor union treating mothers who care for children in their homes in a condescending manner that would not be possible in relation to any other group of wage earners. Only if the job of caring for others is done in institutions and collectives is it legitimized as something important as far as Social Democrats are concerned.

For the Center Party, the care itself--not the form it takes--is the important thing. The condition for good child care is freedom for the parents to choose the type of care that suits them best: a day care center, day care with a family, cooperative forms of child care, or care at home. Society's economic contributions must be provided in such a way that everyone can freely choose whether to devote more of his or her own time to the children or pay the cost of good care by a housewife who takes in children or at a day care center.

When it comes to emphasis on the quality of life and environment, the Center Party constitutes an alternative to both the Social Democrats and the Conservatives. The current issue of auto exhaust is just one of many examples of how easily the Social Democrats and Conservatives can agree on environmental issues.

Especially during the last election campaign, the Social Democrats attempted to undermine the credibility of the Center Party's environmental policy by suggesting that the Center Party would be dependent on the Conservatives if there were a nonsocialist government. But the opportunities for putting the Center Party's environmental policy across in cooperation with the Social Democrats are scarcely any better. There are long stretches where the Social Democrats stand for the same environmental policy as the Conservatives. The crucial factor for a genuine breakthrough in environmental policy in Sweden is a stronger Center Party--not constellations of government parties themselves.

The opportunities for government cooperation will continue to be based primarily on the differences between decentralism and collectivism--between private ownership and socialism.

Those nonsocialist starting points will continue to determine the Center Party's course in the future. People in the cities and the rural areas, the young and the old, and women and men will be able to feel that they have a political home in the Center Party.

Paper Lauds New Clarity

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 17 Dec 85 p 2

[Editorial: "The Soder Line"]

[Text] Karin Soder has taken the reins in the Center Party. Unlike her predecessor, she does not want to wait for internal reports before stating her party's policy for the future. Her article on DAGENS NYHETER's Op-Ed page last Sunday shows that she intends to fill the void that has appeared and to use this chance to take the lead in the debate, a lead that is hers by virtue of the SIFO [Swedish Institute for Public Opinion Polls] figures showing a high level of confidence in her.

Her first inescapable task is to put an end to all speculation that without Falldin, the Center Party will become a key party or a prop for the Social Democrats. Karin Soder describes the idea of closer cooperation with the Social Democrats as "absurd." She writes that the possibility of cooperation in government will be determined primarily by the differences between decentralism and collectivism--between private ownership and socialism. In other words, her goal is nonsocialist cooperation in government.

The debate within the Center Party has long been conducted in different terms. After the 6 years of nonsocialist government, it was urgent for the party to be first and foremost itself--to be judged on the basis of its own policy, not on the basis of its membership in the bloc. The same attitude had existed earlier in the Liberal Party, whose so-called emergency committee of 1983 felt that the party had lost out by too much cooperation with others: the Liberal Party would have to draw a line when it came to compromises in order "to demonstrate that ideas, not power, are the party's guiding stars," as the committee put it.

Such an approach is natural in a party experiencing a crisis. Today the Liberal Party views things differently. It is not by saying no to cooperation with other parties that the Liberal Party has again grown strong. On the contrary, Bengt Westerberg professed himself from the start to be an adherent of nonsocialist three-party cooperation, thereby winning the confidence of general nonsocialist voters. It was only after that that the Liberal Party had a chance of gaining a hearing for its own policy on specific issues. It does not do to appear vacillating on what the voters view as the main issue.

Today the nonsocialist side is less of a rightwing isolation booth than it was in 1983, and that makes it easier for the Center Party to join in than it was for the Liberals back then. If the Center and Liberal Parties stick together to any degree at all, the policy of the middle will carry weight.

Karin Soder is not one of those who are looking for a fight or provoking their opponents. Anyone hoping for cooperation across the bloc boundary need not despair. But it is good that Karin Soder is explaining where the Center Party stands and making it clear that if the government needs more stable support in Parliament, it will have to turn to the entire nonsocialist opposition and should not entertain any illusions about the Center Party as a horse-trading partner.

Other Papers Comment

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 17 Dec 85 p 2

[Editorial Roundup: "After Karin Soder's Article"]

[Text] Conservatives and Liberal Party members naturally shout with joy when the Center Party leader hitches her party behind the nonsocialist wagon, writes FOLKET (Social Democratic) in its commentary on the Op-Ed article by Karin Soder that appeared in DAGENS NYHETER last Sunday:

"On the other hand, it is not so certain that opinion in the Center Party will react as favorably. In the debate conducted in POLITISK TIDSKRIFT, Center Party Members of Parliament Gosta Andersson and Nils G. Asling were almost alone in calling for further cooperation with the Conservatives in the government.

"Instead, most of the debaters wanted to return to the Center Party policy represented by Gunnar Hedlund. That policy, it was claimed, rested on the definition of a center party as a party in the political center. Such a party is in a position to take action in different directions. Otherwise, it is not a center party."

Bloc politics and sharp polarization were not something sought by the Center Party. They originated with the Social Democrats and the Conservatives, emphasizes SKANSKA DAGBLADET (Center Party), which says:

"It is on a clearly stated nonsocialist basis that the Center Party will be able to constitute a serious alternative to both the Social Democrats and the

Conservatives, and it is only on that basis that the Center Party has a chance of gaining a hearing for its ideas. Vacillation on that point may make Social Democratic control of the government permanent and thereby thwart the possibility of pursuing a Center Party policy for the foreseeable future."

The entire hullabaloo in the Center Party goes back to Falldin, says the criticism in the Center Party's weekly VASTERBOTTNINGEN. The Social Democratic VASTERBOTTENS FOLKBLAD comments:

"That was straight talking. VASTERBOTTNINGEN believes that order will be restored by the party's upcoming conference. That may not be so certain. Falldin's coup in connection with his resignation had the effect, of course, of strengthening his own wing, which now has a good chance of heading the party."

11798
CSO: 3650/91

SODER VOWS TO HONOR PACT WITH CHRISTIAN LEAGUE

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 22 Dec 85 p 8

[Report on interview with Center Party leader Karin Soder by Sven Thiessen of the Wire Press Service; date and place not specified]

[Text] "The most important social reform at present is the introduction of a child care benefit enabling parents to devote more time to their preschool children. Children need their parents, and the parents need their children."

So said Member of Parliament Karin Soder (Center Party) in an interview with the TT.

Following Thorbjorn Falldin's resignation, Karin Soder will be the Center Party's acting chairwoman until it holds its congress next June. She notified the election committee last March that she wanted to resign as deputy chairwoman, and she has not changed that decision.

Today she declines to say whether she is willing to become the party's permanent chairwoman.

Karin Soder says: "The important thing for me now is to row the boat during this half of the year."

She was minister of foreign affairs from 1976 to 1978 and minister of social affairs from 1979 to 1982 in Falldin's two governments. One of her reforms was the Saturday closing of state liquor stores.

Equitable Reform

The child care benefit being proposed by Karin Soder and the Center Party would amount to 24,000 kronor per year. As the first step, it would be paid for children up to the age of 18 months.

Karin Soder says: "Many women are now forced to shorten their working hours to devote more time to their children because society does not give them the support they need. Single mothers have the longest working hours."

"Under our proposed child care benefit, a normal wage earner could shorten her working hours by three-fourths without losing any money. This is an equitable reform, even for women who choose to stay at home."

Party in Crisis?

The Center Party lost 13 seats in last fall's elections. Is the Center Party a party in crisis?

"Yes and no. If by crisis you mean disaster, the answer is no. The Chinese ideogram for crisis also means opportunity.

"My hope is that after the conferences and discussions now underway out in the sections and after the analysis group has finished its work, we will be united as to policy. And that the fuzziness that existed in our message will be obliterated."

Is the Center Party needed when we already have two nonsocialist parties?

"Yes, without a doubt. The Center Party is needed. We are needed as a nonsocialist party that has never hesitated to stand up for the weakest. That applies both to people and to regions.

Doing Their Bit

"It was not by accident that we fought for a lower retirement age for those engaged in heavy work and eventually put it across. Today we are fighting for a supplementary pension for those not covered by the ATP system. We are radical in the sense that we want more equality both between people and between regions."

Should the Dagmar reform in the field of medical care continue in force?

"The Dagmar reform is very beneficial from the standpoint of getting resources for medical care distributed more evenly all over the country. But the reform has not turned out to be everything we wanted it to be.

"In many places, the Social Democrats have been too restrictive in allowing private physicians to do their bit for medical care. The Dagmar reform should be refined to make it an equitable reform in the field of medical care and take advantage of the resource represented by private physicians and spare-time practitioners."

Pact Should Be Honored

Should the Center Party continue its cooperation with the KDS [Christian Democratic League]?

"We made an pact with the KDS and we obviously should honor it. The analysis group is considering the question, and I imagine that the KDS is doing the same. Then we will have to consider how we want it to work in the future."

Should the Center Party concentrate on a new nonsocialist three-party government in preparation for the next election?

"Since we are a nonsocialist party, we want to work on behalf of a nonsocialist government. But it is important, naturally, for a government based on nonsocialist principles to formulate its program so that we can accept it. The political content will be the determining factor in our decision to participate."

Which individuals do you take as your political models?

"I have had 15 years of political schooling under Thorbjorn Falldin. His knowledge of various issues is unequalled. He demands well-substantiated statements, in which not even one figure can be wrong, both of himself and of others. He is a great politician who has been misunderstood for long periods.

Broken Promises

"Gunnar Hedlund, who is another kind of politician, has also played a role as a model. I have also had models in Bertil Jonasson and, before him, Bengt Borjesson. In Parliament they have brought up the problems of individuals and fought tirelessly to help individuals. They are the modern equivalent of the old lay judges. They help to uphold respect for political work.

"If we go back farther, I can think of Marta Leijon, a woman in the Center Party who fought at an early stage for women ministers in the church and contributed to equality in that area."

11798

CSO: 3650/92

POLL SHOWS GAINS FOR LIBERALS, SETBACK FOR CENTER, MODERATES

Liberals Largest Nonsocialist Party

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 22 Dec 85 p 8

[Article by Ake Ekdahl]

[Text] The number of Liberal Party sympathizers has tripled in half a year's time. At the same time, the Conservative and Center Parties have suffered statistically reliable setbacks. This is shown by the DAGENS NYHETER-IMU [Institute for Market Research] voter barometer for November and December. If there were an election today--a little over 2 months after the parliamentary election--Bengt Westerberg would suddenly be able to lay claim to the post of prime minister.

The nonsocialist bloc in total has 50.5 percent of the vote, compared to 47.5 percent for the Social Democrats and Communists combined. And according to the IMU survey, the Liberal Party is the largest nonsocialist party. This confirms the trend shown in similar polls this fall by SIFO [Swedish Institute for Public Opinion Polls] and the SCB (Central Bureau of Statistics), which use a different polling method than the IMU.

The IMU conducted its interviews for this poll in two rounds during the period between 11 November and 4 December, using home visits and "ballots." On both occasions, it polled about 1,000 people between the ages of 18 and 74.

Since May, when the IMU conducted its previous poll of party preferences, the Swedish people have had a general election, and during the final phase of this polling period, the other big political event of the fall occurred: the unexpected resignation by Center Party leader Thorbjorn Falldin.

Same Direction

The election was a big success for the Liberal Party, and the winds of public opinion are continuing in the same direction. In December, the Liberal Party was recorded as having 21 percent of the voters. That is a good deal more than its election result and an increase of 14.5 percentage points since May.

Setbacks were suffered by all the other parties, chiefly the Conservatives, who dropped to 19 percent, or somewhat below their election result and 6 percentage points worse than in May.

The shift within the nonsocialist bloc is clear as a trend over a rather long period both before and after the election.

The long-term trend shown in the table below is an average calculated on the basis of seven polls over the past year. This measurement reduces the effect of momentary increases and decreases for individual parties.

Voter Opinion

	Nov 1985 917	May 1985 837	April 1985 870	Dec 1982 942	Long-term trend Dec 1985
Number of interviews					
% stating preference					
Social Democrats	43,0	42,5	45,5	46,0	43,2
Conservatives	19,0	25,0	25,5	25,0	24,9
Center Party	9,0	12,5	12,0	14,0	11,8
Liberal Party	21,0	6,5	6,0	4,0	9,0
VPK	4,5	6,5	4,0	4,5	4,5
KDS	1,5	3,5	3,0	2,5	2,7
Environment Party	2,0	3,5	3,5	3,5	3,3
All others	0,0	0,0	0,5	0,5	
	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	
Unable or unwilling to state preference	4,0	5,5	4,5	4,0	

The interviews were conducted during the period
from 11 November to 4 December.

The Liberal Party's substantial leap has just begun to show up in the long-term trend. It may be recalled that when the party was experiencing its crisis in 1982-1983, its voter support dropped to 4.9 percent in the summer of 1983. Since then the rise has been steady.

Correspondingly, the setbacks for the Center and Conservative Parties have not yet shown up in the long-term trend, either. The Conservatives peaked at 26.5 percent in February 1984.

The Center Party has been dropping steadily from the 14 percent it had in April 1984.

Trend

The absolute figures obtained by differing methods of measurements differ in the three polls conducted this fall (see the comparative table below). But

Election and Poll Results Compared

Party	Election	IMU Poll	SCB Poll	SIFO Poll
Conservatives	21.3 (-2.3)	19.0 (- 6.0)	20.4	18.5 (-0.5)
Center Party	10.1 (-5.4)	9.0 (- 3.5)	9.7	8.0 (-)
Christian Democratic League	2.3 (+0.4)	1.5 (- 2.0)	1.8	2.0 (+0.5)
Liberal Party	14.2 (+8.3)	21.0 (+14.5)	17.9	24.0 (+0.5)
Social Democrats	44.7 (-0.9)	43.0 (+ 0.5)	43.6	44.0 (+1.0)
Left Party-Communists	5.4 (-0.2)	4.5 (- 2.0)	5.1	4.0 (-0.5)
Environment Party	1.5 (-0.2)	2.0 (- 1.5)	-	-
All others	0.5 (+0.2)	0.0 (-)	-	1.5 (-0.5)

The figures above show the results of the September election, the IMU's poll in November-December, the SCB's poll in October-November, and the SIFO poll in November.

The figures within parentheses show changes since the preceding poll or election (the 1982 election, the IMU poll for May 1985, and the SIFO poll for October 1985 respectively).

the trend as measured by all those methods points in the same direction. The Conservative setback amounts to a couple of percentage points since the election, while the setback for the Center Party is about 1 percentage point. The KDS [Christian Democratic League] is down half a percentage point since the election, the Liberal Party is about 7 percentage points above its election result, and the Social Democrats and the VPK [Left Party-Communists] are just under their election results.

During the 6 months that have passed since the previous voter survey in May, and with an election having been held in the interim, many noteworthy changes have occurred among the voters. The Conservative and Center Parties have both suffered statistically reliable setbacks. The same is true of the KDS and the Environment Party. The Liberal Party is the only party to have grown, and in its case the number of sympathizers has tripled in the space of half a year.


Changes between two consecutive polls should be interpreted with great caution if it is not indicated that they are statistically significant. Instead, one needs to pay attention to trends over the three latest surveys or to differences in relation to the long-term trend.

The statistical margins of error for an individual survey are as follows: about 3.5 percent for the Social Democratic Party, about 3.0 percent for the Conservative Party, about 2.5 percent for the Center Party, and about 1.0 or 2.0 percent for all other parties.

The long-term trend is calculated as a moving average for the seven most recent surveys.

The polls were conducted using a national representative probability sample of Swedish citizens between the ages of 18 and 74. The interviews were conducted during home visits. The question asked was this: "Which party do you consider best?" Preferences were expressed using "ballots" and "ballot envelopes."

DAGENS NYHETER-IMU Poll



This poll has been copyrighted by DAGENS NYHETER and the IMU.

Nonsocialists' Disunity Seen Increasing

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 22 Dec 85 p 8

[Commentary by Sven Svensson: "No Realistic Basis for Bloc Cooperation"]

[Text] Voter barometers indicate trends, not absolute figures. The Liberal Party's rise to become the largest nonsocialist party in today's IMU poll should therefore be accepted with great caution. Many voters have jumped onto the winner's wagon, and 21 percent for the Liberal Party does not constitute a likely election result in the future.

These public opinion figures reinforce the civil war that is already underway among the three nonsocialist parties. Conservative Party leader Ulf Adelsohn, criticized by his own people for being a part-time party leader, is sharpening his elbows to take back votes from the Liberal Party. Gone is the talk about voters moving directly from the Social Democrats to the Conservatives.

Adelsohn's fate depends exclusively on his ability to cast suspicion on his main competitor, Bengt Westerberg.

This fall's most dramatic event was Center Party leader Thorbjorn Falldin's sudden resignation at the end of November. Karin Soder will now try to spruce up the Center Party's shabby image after four consecutive election defeats.

As acting party leader until the Center Party holds its congress in Uppsala in June 1986, Karin Soder is concentrating hard on casting suspicion on the Social Democrats. Her thesis is that the Social Democrats no longer stand for a "People's Home" policy and that they have become a party of apparatchiks in which the exercise of power is more important than political content. Karin Soder has a good chance of becoming permanent party leader in June.

The question is whether there is much chance of making inroads among the Social Democrats, that being a precondition for a nonsocialist majority in the 1988 election.

The election results of 1985 show unequivocally that dissatisfied Social Democratic voters would rather stay home on election day than vote for a nonsocialist party. In the old traditional Social Democratic constituencies, among them Bergslagen, the election results dropped to an unexpectedly low level.

What that indicates is that a recovery by the Center Party will have to be achieved primarily at the expense of one or two nonsocialist parties. On the basis of today's IMU figures, an improvement for the Center Party will have to mean losses for the Liberal or Conservative Party or perhaps both.

Political mobility is taking place mainly among nonsocialist voters. The socialist bloc is remaining stable at around 47 or 49 percent.

Since the election, the eruptions have been taking place within the parties, not in Parliament. Falldin was forced to resign following something resembling a coup on the part of the election committee, while dissatisfaction is bubbling among the Conservatives, the Social Democrats are wrought up over the lack of contact with the people, and the VPK has removed its women's delegation. Only in the Liberal Party does trust prevail.

The result is that this fall's Parliament has been boring and tame. Only on three issues has a fair amount of heat been generated: the increase in the state's interest rate on housing, the expansion of child care, and the rules governing catalytic emission control devices on new automobile models.

In the first two cases, the Social Democratic government received help from the Liberal Party. Bengt Westerberg felt that it would inspire confidence if he stuck to the policy he had pursued before the election, but was criticized for it by the Conservatives.

In the case of catalytic emission control devices, the Conservatives wavered back and forth. Eventually the two most centralistic parties in Parliament--

the Social Democrats and the Conservatives--were able to grab hold together and delay emission controls for a year. And to make that alliance really unholy, even the VPK joined in the agreement.

Now that the fall's trial period is over, no one really knows very much about Olof Palme's new government, either.

What the new minister of defense, Roine Carlsson, Minister of Communications Sven Hulterstrom, and Deputy Minister of Social Affairs Bengt Lindqvist all have in common is that they have led an obscure existence. Their competence has not been seriously tested, whereas Bengt A. Johansson, the new deputy minister of finance in charge of wages, has emerged more distinctly and more deliberately.

On the other hand, Sten Andersson, the newly appointed minister of foreign affairs, was in hot water immediately because of the events in the Baltic Sea. Every honest Swede is indignant at the confrontations between the Soviet Navy on the one hand and the Swedish foreign intelligence vessel "Orion" and fishing boats from Gotland on the other. Despite a few sidesteps in the beginning, Sten Andersson has probably come through the ordeal thanks to his good humor and a clearly expressed will to consult the nonsocialist opposition. It seems that Sten Andersson has taken over some of the contacts through dialogue that used to fall upon Prime Minister Olof Palme's shoulders. But Palme will have real tough job this spring, when he makes an official visit to Moscow and tries to make the new Soviet leaders see reason.

Political interest is currently centered on the belt-tightening budget that Minister of Finance Kjell-Olof Feldt will present at the start of the year.

The contents of that budget diverge on important points from the polished message presented during the election campaign.

Back then, the crisis was practically a thing of the past. Now Feldt is tightening the belt a few more notches.

Every government agency or organization that has had an advance peep at the proposed budget is already moaning over the unpleasant cuts. The very worst effects will be felt by the municipalities and by housing consumers without exception.

But not until Parliament begins debating the budget in earnest this spring will we know how successful the Social Democratic government will be in its attempts to push through its economy measures with the help of bouncing majorities in Parliament. The oft-planned Conservative intention to effect economies is going to be an interesting trick question this spring.

There is no basis for organized cooperation over the bloc boundary. A comparatively small nonsocialist party under constant surveillance by the other nonsocialist parties and with hypersensitive voters behind it cannot cooperate with a 45-percent party like the Social Democrats.

Not until several consecutive elections have pushed the Social Democrats down to a little under 40 percent will it be possible for organized political cooperation over the bloc boundary to become a realistic topic of discussion. As long as the Social Democrats are able more or less to dictate the conditions for cooperation over the bloc boundary, we will have to put up with bloc politics.

11798

CSO: 3650/92

LIBERAL PARTY EXECUTIVE QUESTIONS PALME PLAN TO VISIT USSR

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 23 Dec 85 p 3

[Op Ed article by Andres Kung, reporter and member of the Party Board of the Liberal Party]

[Text] The prime minister has now said what many people were expecting. He is going to visit Moscow this spring.

During his visit, he intends to say that Sweden wants good relations with the Soviet Union. But those relations must be based on mutual respect for the basic rules of international law and territorial integrity.

That deserves to be said. And to be sure, it also should be possible for a Swedish prime minister to say it in Moscow. We can be on visiting terms even with the representatives of odious dictatorial regimes as long as they do not prevent us from expressing our democratic convictions.

Necessary Steps

The question, however, is whether the Soviet Union respects either international law or our territorial integrity. The very next day after the Swedish prime minister officially announced the plans for his visit, the Soviet government newspaper IZVESTIA published a scarcely concealed threat concerning intentions to "take necessary steps" in the Baltic Sea. Those steps are to be taken not only on grounds of international law but also in accordance with "current international law and Soviet legislation."

Unlike his predecessor, Sweden's current minister of foreign affairs reacted with model clarity and sharpness. He said it would be inconsistent with international law to take unilateral action in a disputed area.

Lacking in Self-Respect

Another question is whether we can expect any respect from the Soviet Union if we fail to show self-respect, which is the impression given by recent behavior on the part of the JO [parliamentary ombudsman] and the JK [attorney general]. Like so much else in Swedish society in recent years, their actions have

probably given the Soviet leaders reason to hope that the more pressure they exert on us, the more we will kowtow.

In a state that drew much attention, the JO recently defended the passive behavior of Swedish police in connection with last summer's escape drama on Oland. A Soviet trawler fished a refugee out of the water just off the Oland coast and continued searching for the second refugee just a couple of hundred meters from the beach while Swedish police looked on without interfering.

Police Did the Right Thing

According to the JO's statement, the police did the right thing by doing nothing, since it is "only in inland waters, in which the fishing boat in question did not seem to be, that intervention can take place." He referred to the law on Sweden's territorial sea (1966:374) and the related decree.

It is true that waters 12 nautical miles off the Oland coast are Swedish territorial sea. But according to the JO, those waters are our territorial waters and not "inland waters," since there are no islands or other land territory beyond them.

Absurd Consequences

But common sense ought to have saved the JO from a legal interpretation with such absurd consequences. The way cannot reasonably be open for foreign vessels to hunt refugees within Swedish territorial waters.

Nor can it be the duty of Swedish police to stand on the beach with their arms crossed while refugees are plucked out of our waters to be taken away to long punishment in a prison camp. If the JO has grounds for his interpretation--an unlikely possibility--then the law must be changed as soon as possible.

Prosecution of SVENSKA DAGBLADET

On the same day that Olof Palme announced his intention to visit the Soviet Union, the attorney general requested the government's permission to prosecute SVENSKA DAGBLADET for a series of articles on the Soviet Union. And an otherwise so slow-moving government hastened to grant permission to prosecute.

The fact that the government is allowing the JK to prosecute an opposition newspaper that is loathed by the government in general and Olof Palme in particular may seem alarming from the standpoint of domestic policy.

But it also augurs no good from the standpoint of foreign policy that a leading opposition newspaper can be prosecuted for publishing widely known facts and speculations about Soviet war preparations against our country.

Insufficient Reason

The fact that SVENSKA DAGBLADET may have obtained the specific information in question from secret sources ought not be sufficient grounds for prosecution,

since the factual information could just as well have been obtained from open sources. Probably even the government does not challenge the information about Soviet diversionary units that may be brought into action against Sweden in connection with an invasion.

And who will deny the information about "Polish picture salesmen" rampaging through the country?

It was hardly by accident that a researcher who called attention to facts particularly displeasing to the Soviet regime during the TV debate on Maj Wechseltmann's submarine film was visited the very next day by those "picture salesmen."

Self-Deception

Of course, let Sweden's prime minister travel to Moscow if he thinks that by doing so, he will be able to bring the Soviet superpower to respect international law and territorial integrity at least as far as Sweden is concerned. But such respect is not likely to be achieved by deceiving oneself or others concerning the true situation.

It is true that the Swedish Government's latest statement said: "We have created respect for our determination to defend our country's territorial integrity by all available means." The country's political leadership also stated that relations with the Soviet Union had been normalized. But are relations between Sweden and the Soviet Union really as good as relations usually are between neighboring countries?

Latest Six Months

Let me draw attention once again to the following incidents, which were reported in the Swedish press over just the past 6 months:

1. In April 1985, Swedish fishing boats were boarded from a Soviet surveillance vessel in the disputed area between Gotland and the Baltic coast.
2. In June 1985, a Soviet bomber penetrated Swedish airspace after approaching Gotland.
3. In July 1985, a Soviet fighter plane crashed as it was pursuing a Swedish plane over international waters.
4. In October 1985, a Soviet minesweeper "collided" with the Swedish radio intelligence ship "Orion" in international waters.
5. In December 1985, the Swedish fishing boats "Elisabeth" and "Poseidon" were chased away from fishing waters in the Baltic even though they are licensed to fish there. According to the captain of one of the Swedish boats, a Soviet vessel 10 times their size sailed directly at them. Only a couple of centimeters separated his boat from being sunk as a result of that brusque Russian outrage. The fact that Swedish authorities apparently neglected to

pass on Soviet radio warnings of imminent military gunnery practice scarcely justifies the rough way in which the fishing boats were turned away.

Not Normal

Anyone who refuses to see a pattern in isolated events such as these can naturally "take comfort" in the fact that the special circumstances in each individual incident are open to debate.

But the repeated incidents do not indicate that all is normal between Sweden and the Soviet Union. One can also ask a number of rhetorical questions that shed light on relations between Sweden and the Soviet Union.

Rhetorical Questions

Has Raoul Wallenberg been allowed to return to his brother and sister here?

Have the Estonian defectors Leila Miller and Valdo Randpere been allowed to bring their little 2-year-old daughter here?

Has the Russian defector Valentin Agapov been reunited, after all these years, with his mother, wife, and sister?

Has it been possible for the Lithuanian who defected in Oland last summer to be joined by his comrade, who was dragged on board the Soviet trawler?

Have Dmitri and Karin Nayanov, the old couple who demonstrated outside the Soviet missions in Stockholm and Goteborg last fall, been allowed to bring their Alfred here from Riga?

Are yachtsmen from Sweden free to call at ports in our neighboring countries of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania just as they were in the period between the wars?

Are people in the Baltic States and the rest of the Soviet Union free to visit Sweden--as is fitting for free citizens in friendly neighboring countries?

Abnormal Is Normal

If not, what is it that is really normal between Sweden and the Soviet Union? Probably even the Social Democratic government is not happy over the fact that the Baltic Sea, which in times past was a friendly connecting link between free peoples, has now been turned into a moat between free and oppressed peoples. When did all those abnormal things become normal, Olof Palme?

11798

CSO: 3650/103

ANNIE MARIE SUNDBOM NAMED TO POST AT UNITED NATIONS

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 24 Dec 85 p 7

[Article by Sune Olofson]

[Text] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs will soon have a new woman ambassador. SVENSKA DAGBLADET has learned that socionomist Annie Marie Sundbom will become head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' NGO Section.

NGO is an acronym for "Nongovernmental Organization," an agency whose job it is to promote Swedish government and foreign policy in contacts with scientific, political, cultural, union, and religious organizations in Sweden and around the world.

Bernt Carlsson says: "The NGO's emphasis is to be on organizations active in Sweden and associated with the UN Economic and Social Council."

Annie Marie Sundbom is replacing Ambassador Bernt Carlsson, who has been named under secretary for Nordic affairs and Svante Lundkvist's deputy as minister for Nordic coordination. Bernt Carlsson is also Prime Minister Olof Palme's special envoy in the Middle East.

Annie Marie Sundbom had been chairwoman of the Stockholm Municipal Council, but she left that post after the election.

11798

CSO: 3650/103

REAGAN'S REPORT ON CYPRUS SEEN AS PRE-ELECTION GAMBIT

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 28 Nov 85 pp 1, 13

[Article by Tanju Akerson: "Reagan's Surprise Cyprus Report"]

[Text] U.S. President Ronald Reagan, in his Cyprus report to Congress, spoke of the existence of a "second document" which the Turkish side has rejected and even the UN secretary general considers "dead" and implied that the Greek Cypriot side was the one open to compromise.

New York - U.S. President Ronald Reagan's speaking, in the Cyprus report he presents once every 2 months to Congress, of the existence of a "second document" considered dead in UN Secretariat General circles is described as "support for Kyprianou from the U.S. administration." Reagan mentioned at the beginning of the report that the UN secretary general had announced that the Greek Cypriot side accepted the amended text, which could serve as the basis for agreement, in June. Reagan noted in the report that Denktas had sent a letter containing his views on the document which the secretary general had forwarded to him and requesting negotiations.

President Reagan, later in the report, recounted the UN secretary general's initiatives and pointed out that the sides had met in New York on 12-13 September. Noting that the secretary general was continuing to make good will initiatives, the U.S. President said, "During this time, American officials have actively supported the secretary general's good will initiatives and have asked the sides for cooperation and constructive behavior."

Reagan's mentioning the existence of a second document considered dead in UN Secretariat General circles is seen as unexpected following the recent developments.

Drawing attention to the use in the report of the statement, "The Greek Cypriot side accepted the second document which had been revised by Perez de Cuellar," diplomatic circles contend:

"The impression is given in listing developments on Cyprus in the report that the Greek Cypriot side is the one open to compromise and that the Turkish side is not. Yet, while no mention is made of the Greek Cypriots' negative

attitude which led to breaking off the summit in January, there is mention of a 'second document' which the Greek Cypriot side likes, and this at a time when even the UN secretary general has given it up for 'dead' and begun preliminary work on a new document. This is valuable foreign support prior to the elections to be held in December for Kyprianou, who is accused by his opponents of disregarding the opportunity for agreement with the Turks and, therefore, prolonging the presence of Turkish troops on the island. Kyprianou can now easily say to AKEL and Kliridhis, 'You accuse me of not being in favor of agreement. You see, the United States is stressing the intractibility of the Turks, not me.'"

8349

CSO: 3554/018

SWEDISH DEFENSE CAPABILITY SEEN REDUCED, WORRIES NORWEGIANS

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 5 Dec 85 p 4

[Article by Margit Silberstein]

[Text] Oslo--Norwegian officers are worried about Swedish defense capability and Swedish neutrality. At a conference over the weekend, it emerged that there is great concern over the fact that the Swedish Armed Forces are being weakened at the same time that the military threat is growing.

The conference was sponsored by the Armed Forces Academy Association, whose members are high-ranking officers and high officials from the ministries. Its topic was Nordic security policy in general, but the discussion turned out to be mostly about Sweden. The conference was not open to outsiders, but the lectures and discussions were reported in the newspaper AFTENPOSTEN.

The newspaper reported: "Despite increased activity by the Soviet Union in the Baltic and the Norwegian Sea, a definite reduction in Swedish defense efforts has been noted during the 1970's and 1980's. There are many indications that Sweden's relative defense capability has been weakened, a trend that is continuing at the same time that the military threat is growing."

Less Confidence

It was also pointed out during the conference that for many years after the war, people in Norway never had reason to question Swedish military capability, which is the very foundation of the credibility of Swedish neutrality in wartime. But now that confidence in Swedish defense is being worn down.

The question was also raised as to whether the reduced appropriations for the Swedish Armed Forces and Swedish conduct in relation to the Soviet Union were the initial stages of an adjustment to the new realities of power politics. Many participants in the conference said that if Sweden is pressed, its concept of neutrality will not necessarily mean anything more than that the government will try to keep Sweden from being drawn into a war. It is feared that Swedish neutrality will not necessarily keep Swedish territory or airspace from being used in an action against Norway.

Oddmund Hammerstad, under secretary in the Norwegian Ministry of Defense, told SVENSKA DAGBLADET: "In the context of the big powers, it is obvious that Norway occupies the most important strategic position in the Nordic region, but the path to the Nordic region's west coast (that is, Norway) may lead through Finnish and Swedish territory."

The Norwegian chief of defense warned a few days ago that the military threat against Norway is growing. The Soviet Union is stepping up its activity on the Kola Peninsula, which borders on Norway, Sweden, and Finland. Among other things, the Soviet Union is expanding an ever-larger helicopter base on the Kola Peninsula for surprise attacks. According to Oddmund Hammerstad, there is also a special force of at least 700 Russian commando troops on the Kola Peninsula.

Hammerstad says: "We know in detail what the Russians are doing on the Kola Peninsula. We monitor every plane that takes off from there, and we follow developments with very close attention."

Commandos a Threat

Commando troops, the buildup in the number of helicopters, and the naval infantry, whose only duty in an armed conflict would be to land in Norway, constitute the most serious threats to the Scandinavian Shield from the Soviet bases on the Kola Peninsula. Commandos are trained in peacetime for their duties in wartime, when they are sent in during the transitional phase between peace and war to pave the way for an invasion. The duty of the well-trained special force is to gather intelligence about such things as power plants, communications, ports, and bridges for their work of sabotage. In particular, commando units are to create confusion and paralyze the military and police command by killing key individuals who have been picked beforehand.

11798

CSO: 3650/97

INTERNATIONAL STUDY OF SOVIET NORTHERN FLANK THREAT REVIEWED

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 7 Dec 85 p 11

[Review by Horst Bacia of book "Nordeuropa--Ausfalltor der Sowjetunion zu den Weltmeeren" [Northern Europe--the Soviet Union's Sally Port to the World's Oceans], published by Deutsches Marine-Institut. Verlag Mittler, Herfort 1985; 162 pages: "Concerning Supremacy in the Norwegian Sea; The Risk of a Nuclear Escalation in the North"]

[Text] The big Soviet naval maneuvers have been similar for years. But this time the number of the participating ships was especially large. The main exercise took place farther south than in the past: at 65 degrees latitude between central Norway and Iceland. Parts of the Arctic Fleet with the aircraft carrier "Kiev" and the cruiser "Kirov," the most modern and biggest ships of the navy, there simulated missile and air attacks on the maneuver enemy who brought along four large amphibious landing ships from the Baltic Sea and presumably represented a NATO convoy with troop reinforcements for northern Norway. More than 40 submarines were deployed to form barriers against this formation heading north and an aircraft carrier group, namely at the North Cape, west of the Lofoten, north of the so-called "Giuk" line (Greenland, Iceland, United Kingdom), west of Ireland, as well as in the North Sea. Several hundred aircraft participated in the exercise.

The concentration of the Red Fleet and shortly thereafter the naval maneuver of NATO in the same waters are demonstrations and a reminder of how important the north has become in the interplay of forces of the alliances. The plan of the exercise of the Soviets, it appears, indicates growing confidence in their own forces because of new ships and weapons systems. Moreover, its course reveals how the Soviet Union would act at the beginning of a conflict with NATO in the north. The Arctic Fleet would have the mission to gain control over the Norwegian Sea as quickly as possible.

The main feature of such an offensive would at first be defensive in nature. Because almost two-thirds of all Soviet submarines equipped with strategic nuclear weapons are stationed in the north, including the two thus far completed giant "Typhoon" class submarines with 20 launcher tubes each, what is involved to start with and above all else is to defend against any threat to the sea-based nuclear second-strike capability--be this threat on the surface, under water or in the air. In the interest of expanding their own defensive lines,

such an offensive very probably also included the attempt to take at least northern Norway with its airfields by surprise raids. At the same time, with the control over northern Norway and the Norwegian Sea, the prerequisite would be created for attacks on the sea routes across the Atlantic, whose maintenance is of decisive importance to NATO.

Especially the mixing of tactical and strategic weapons and missions by the Soviet armed forces in the North make this region explosive in terms of security policy. Experts have repeatedly pointed that out. A small volume, which was published in the Deutsche Marine-Institut series, acquaints people with the arguments that find little attention in the Federal Republic. It contains lectures and contributions to the discussion at an event which was held some time ago in Bonn by the Marine-Institut, an association founded by naval officers.

John Erickson, an expert on Soviet military questions who teaches at Edinburgh University, points out in his article that the region designated as "north flank" in NATO is designated as a "theater of war" in the terminology of the Soviet military. Following the reorganization pushed by Ustinov and Orgakov, Soviet military affairs are organized into five such "theaters of war" each with a high command of its own. One of the consequences is said to be the "blurring of the differences between strategic and tactical armed forces." In Erickson's view, the dilemma on the northern theater of war consists in the fact that a Soviet offensive in the Norwegian Sea would be answered with a countermove which "can be interpreted as an attack against Soviet strategic nuclear weapons." In the north, the "strategic heartland" of both superpowers, the risk of a nuclear escalation, Erickson believes, is much greater than in Central Europe. And he warns against "the present fixation that only offensive operations against the Kola Peninsula can protect the NATO sea routes."

Admiral Train, the former supreme commander of the NATO naval forces in the Atlantic, explains why the naval war for the control of the Norwegian Sea must be started by the Soviet navy based on the geopolitical and strategic situation. If the Soviet navy failed to do so, NATO could even abstain from combat operations there. For without control over the Norwegian Sea there are no possibilities for interrupting the "sea bridge" of the alliance which at first runs far south in the Atlantic (from the Caribbean via Madeira to Europe). However, it is conceivable, Train believes, that the "political leadership" decides that it is in the interest of the alliance to attack and neutralize the Soviet Northern Fleet in its bases on the Kola Peninsula. If the Soviet high command were to decide on an offensive, then Norway and Iceland would definitely have to be held. Without airfields there, NATO would be unable to control the Norwegian Sea. "If we lose the Norwegian Sea we lose the sea bridge. If we lose the sea bridge, then we have lost the war in Europe."

Instead of developing conceivable war scenarios, the experts from the Scandinavian states describe above all the present situation in the north. They call to mind that "vital interests" are at stake there for the Soviet Union and that the NATO deterrence must not be so strongly emphasized "as to have a provocative effect." Linking deterrence with a special caution that recognizes specific security interests of the Eastern superpower (no stationing of foreign

troops or nuclear weapons) has been a feature of the Danish and Norwegian security policy since the founding of NATO. This attitude is a component of the frequently described "Nordic balance." The idea is the changes of the "status quo" would affect the balance which--politically--is present by the NATO membership of Norway and Denmark, the neutrality of Sweden and the special relations of Finland to its eastern neighbor. But does this balance continue to exist militarily as well?

As far as the Norwegian Sea is concerned, both superpowers exercise a measure of reserve there. Neither the Soviet Union nor the United States which would be especially entrusted with taking care of the alliance tasks there, maintains naval forces in these waters at all times. "Mediterraneanization" of the north--in other words more or less permanent presence, Johan Jorgen Holst feels, could lead to tensions and have a destabilizing effect on the political order in Northern Europe. In view of the equipment of ships with long-range Cruise missiles, he warns against "going too far by the U.S. naval policy," which would probably entail "Soviet countermoves." More unambiguous is Katarina Brodin of the Swedish defense ministry who feels that the ideas of the U.S. Secretary of the Navy Lehman concerning the action to be taken in order to get down "to the root of the maritime threat" had "caused considerable anxiety" in the Nordic countries. That is correct, in the security policy discussion in those countries, too, there frequently emerges a fear that was hardly known in the past: Namely the fear of becoming involved, in the words of Holst, in "the affairs of others" in a conflict of the superpowers flaring up somewhere else in the world.

12356

CSO: 3620/196

FRENCH NUCLEAR SHIELD SAID TO OFFER NO GUARANTEE FOR FRG

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 21 Dec 85 p 3

[Article by Karl Feldmeyer: "France Cannot Offer Nuclear Shield to FRG--The Logic of Independent Nuclear Power--Operational Coordination With NATO"]

[Text] Bonn, 20 Dec--The brief visit the Federal chancellor paid to the French president and the agreed coordination in the training of general staff officers provoke questions concerning the quality of German-French cooperation in the military and security-policy sphere. The efforts for close cooperation are almost as old as the FRG. They aimed at first at an integrated European army, with the European Defense Community, or EVG, intended as a decisive step in that direction. The EVG had already been passed by the Bundestag when the French National Assembly allowed it to founder. What followed then is well known: the admission of the FRG into NATO and the WEU (West European Union), the difficult years for NATO with de Gaulle, and the French withdrawal from the military integration of the alliance.

This presented a serious practical obstacle in the way of the high degree of cooperation with France which the FRG was constantly striving for. Not until the debate about counterarming and until the French became irritated about pacifist-neutralist trends in the FRG were new efforts made to intensify cooperation. One of the first actions by Federal Chancellor Kohl was the conclusion of an agreement on 7 December 1982 with President Mitterrand establishing a German-French Committee for Security and Defense. The foreign and defense ministers of both countries are represented on this body. Three working groups deal with the political-strategic sphere, military cooperation, and armament cooperation. These bodies meet twice a year.

The basic attention which forms the background of the security policy and military cooperation efforts has not changed in any way, however. The efforts continue to be determined by the basic decisions made by de Gaulle. Thus the legal basis for the presence of French forces in the FRG continues to be the stationing agreement which was concluded by Bonn and Paris when France quit the military organization of NATO. This agreement settles the presence of the French II Corps with headquarters in Baden-Baden and its three divisions in Trier, Landau, and Freiburg but does not say anything about the most important questions of practical cooperation in the case of war. This includes the problems involved in operational planning, in fact the clarification of

operational intentions altogether, the question of troop assignment, and particularly all the questions deriving from the fact that France is a nuclear power--a nuclear power independent from NATO and existing parallel to it and not integrated into NATO planning. This represents the core of the problem. Only part of these questions between France and NATO--not between Paris and Bonn--have been clarified to this day. The most important problems, those of nuclear action, have not.

From the French point of view this is not due to a lack of readiness to cooperate; it is the inevitable consequence of France considering itself an independent nuclear power. However, this includes, the way it sees it, above all the capability of nuclear independence. It is for this reason that France has left the NATO military organization, and it is for this reason that its nuclear armed force, unlike that of Britain, is not included in the action planning of the alliance. The sole and whole purpose of the French nuclear force is to insure France's existence. And only with that in view is France prepared to take the risk to its own existence (of which it is fully aware) connected with the employment of its nuclear force.

The buildup of its own nuclear power is evidence not only of France's absolute desire to hold its own as an autonomous power but of its readiness, if need be, to pay it the price of self-sacrifice. It is important and necessary to be quite clear about this state of affairs, for it explains why France cannot afford any nuclear protection to other countries. For one thing, the material prerequisites for that are lacking; for another, France, like any nation, believes that one must not risk total physical annihilation except as a last resort to insure one's own independence.

It is important to be clear about that, particularly for the Germans in the FRG, because, for one thing, this enables one to understand the behavior of the French. For another thing, this can guard against making demands of France, because of an incorrect evaluation of the situation, which it is in no position at all to fulfill--even if it wanted to do so. This is particularly true of ideas which amount to allotting to the FRG a place under the French nuclear shield. France cannot do that. At best it has a choice between adhering to a policy aiming at national autonomy and return to NATO military integration, and thus the nuclear protection of the Americans.

This is out of the question as far as France is concerned. This attitude has far-reaching consequences, particularly for military cooperation between France and NATO, which as things stand can only take place on German soil. It is essentially limited to questions of defense planning, particularly to the question of what France would do if the FRG was attacked. As far as the responsible NATO commander, Europe Center is concerned, it is a question of the character of the French forces which will then be on German soil. Will they be neutral or allied, and how will they act? France has never left any doubt about the fact that it would not be neutral in such a case. But it reserves for itself to a large extent the determination of the moment, scope, and quality of its intervention.

So far three agreements have been concluded about this question, not with the FRG but with NATO. The first cooperation agreement was concluded by de Gaulle's chief of the General Staff, Ailleret, and the NATO supreme commander for Europe at the time, General Lemnitzer, in 1967. A further agreement with the NATO commander, Europe Center followed in 1984. Both were finally included in an overall agreement concluded in 1978 between the chief of the French General Staff and the NATO commander, Europe Center. It settles cooperation in case of war between NATO and the French 1st Army, which in all comprises eight divisions grouped in two army corps, one headquartered in Metz, the other in Baden-Baden.

The coordination valid at this time does not provide for assigning the French armed forces to a NATO commander (France is not prepared to do so) but regulates cooperation and its prerequisites. The exact contents of this agreement are secret, but there is reason to assume that it clarifies the extent to which the conventional forces of the French 1st Army are to be employed.

It is considered certain that the French will not participate in what NATO calls front defense, that is the defense of the FRG as close as possible to the inter-German border.

At the time when France would employ its armed forces, in other words, the FRG would already have been occupied in large part, and its front defense would have been broken through or would have failed. This makes a case for the French regarding themselves as a strategic reserve which would be available only when the scope and success of an attack made it clear that France itself was in jeopardy.

In this case too, however, France reserves employment of its nuclear forces, without entering into obligations about this with NATO or bilaterally with the FRG. This is also ruled out by the assignment of tasks to these weapons within the French defense concept. Whereas NATO with its strategy of "flexible reaction" is prepared to commit nuclear weapons as a political signal, France cannot do so, if only because of its much more limited nuclear potential. French action plans (this is beyond dispute among military experts) are determined by purely military considerations. The task of the French short-range missiles, "Pluto" and the future "Hades," would be to hit an aggressor as effectively as possible.

Judging by all that it has been possible to learn, there is no coordination with NATO or the FRG Government, or even any information, concerning the employment of all these weapons. It is ruled out, from the French point of view, by the consideration that one wants to continue to have a completely free hand as regards the use of these weapons in order to be able to make optimum use of the incalculability of their employment, and thus their deterrent value. For NATO, this entails considerable problems because, as a result, it is not in a position to consider French nuclear planning in its own deliberations on the subject. For the FRG, however, the resulting liability is even far greater. It has to put up with the fact that a closely allied country not only denies it any say but even any information in questions affecting the physical existence of the FRG.

Within NATO, the FRG can take part in forming plans, and it may be assumed that it is taking full advantage of that. Thus it is likely to have exercised some influence on reducing the nuclear arsenal in Europe by a total of 2,400 warheads, just as it may be assumed that it is participating in changing the planning of nuclear targets resulting from the change in nuclear armament, particularly the stationing of far-reaching medium-range missiles and cruise missiles. This very contrast between full information and participation also offered to the FRG by NATO in the nuclear sphere and the French attitude in all these questions shows how narrow the limits of security policy cooperation are.

All this indicates that in the future too, notwithstanding all goodwill and all the understanding which is likely to exist in Paris for the precarious situation of the FRG, cooperation in the strategic and security policy sphere will remain very limited. The agreement concerning joint maneuvers, joint armament projects, and now also joint general staff training illustrate sufficiently the limits of what is possible. Anything going beyond this to a substantial degree would represent a change in the French security policy concept.

8790/12948

CSO: 3620/190

AREA DEFENSE COMBINES KEY ZONE DEFENSE, HARASSMENT TACTICS

Vienna TRUPPENDIENST in German Oct 85 pp 491-495

[Article by Gen Hannes Philipp, army commander: "Area Defense--A Tailor-Made Concept"]

[Text] Mission and Factors

The military national defense is assigned to the Federal Army in the legal bases for this. The Federal Army's mission is oriented toward the three "motivating cases": the crisis case, the neutrality case and the defense case.

In the CRISIS CASE, it is a matter, "in the event of international tension or a conflict with the danger of an extension to Austria, of countering any attempt at such an extension, of defending the borders, and of preserving air sovereignty."

In the NEUTRALITY CASE, it is necessary, "in the event of a military conflict in the vicinity...to make possible the maintenance of neutrality on land and in the air" and "to prevent the penetration of foreign troops into Austrian territory."

Finally, in the DEFENSE CASE, it is important, "in the event of a military attack against Austria, to take up defensive operations at the border" and "to achieve a full military defense capability in the shortest possible time and recover areas that may have been lost."

This mission must be fulfilled "in a geographic area in which two rivaling and highly mechanized military alliances oppose one another." Our country sees itself in an environment that is not only capable but also equipped and ready to use military power. Austria's position in the middle of Europe--in an area where the most important North-South and East-West communication lines cross--almost automatically makes it the march-through and assembly area of warring blocs in the event of European conflicts. Although in general our country will not represent a direct target for attack, it does have value as a march-through area and thus as the operational objective of foreign powers. Additionally, Austria, as a small neutral nation, must provide for its own security with all of the means available to it.

In view of these factors, Austria was forced to go its own way in its considerations on fulfilling the defense mission, considerations that take into account the geostrategic situation, its own forces and resources, and those of potential aggressors. The National Defense Plan clearly expresses this above all in the "Principles of Military National Defense." By way of introduction, the principles point out the threat to and credibility of the strategy of heading off the enemy, the requirements of the operational preparations, and a rapid mobilization capability. The mission of the Federal Army is presented unmistakably as a defensive concept whose goal is exclusively the defense of its own country. Reference is also made to the consequences regarding the defense system and to "task-related qualitative armament, equipment and training with regard to the guaranteeing of effectiveness in the face of a potential aggressor"

Combat Operations--Goals and Consequences

In addition, the Principles of Military National Defense also make clear how, in the event of military operations against Austria, the Federal Army is to conduct combat operations even in the face of superior groupings of forces. The goal thereby is that even "after the loss of areas that are to be defended vigorously and that are of operational importance for an aggressor, the holding of the largest possible territory is guaranteed over a long time to preserve the republic as a viable subject of international law." Further--and especially--the National Defense Plan also points out the "necessary conclusions," in which it is clearly established that a potential aggressor "is confronted with combat procedures that underrun his technical superiority and exploit identifiable weaknesses." One's own combat procedures should be inopportune for the tactical doctrine and weapon systems of a potential aggressor. The Federal Army should not commit itself to a possibly decisive battle, operations should be divided into a large number of engagements, and the Federal Army should avoid rapid annihilation and maintain its combat capability over a long time. The advantages of its own terrain and utilization of knowledge about its own area as well as the deeply echeloned fortification of permanent installations should contribute to the effectiveness of operational preparations. The aggressor's intention of securing terrain for carrying out his operations should be hindered but above all he should not be given the opportunity to establish a rapid fait accompli so as to have unhindered use of the occupied area.

A summary of the tasks reveals the following strategic military goals, whereby these represent only part of the nation's deterrent strategy:

- the necessity of the provision of a qualitatively and quantitatively adequate defense potential;
- the capability of a timely military reaction;
- the capability of employing the defense potential even over a long period of time.

In the practical application of these goals, it is a matter of

- preventing a potential aggressor from achieving his strategic and operational objectives,
- hindering the complete occupation of Austrian territory,
- obstructing the unhindered utilization of lost Austrian territory and
- establishing the preconditions for the recovery of this territory.

Area Defense Concept

Mission and objective produced the concept of area defense, just as it is expressed in the National Defense Plan in the principles as well as in descriptions of the operational tactical components. Summarized in a sentence, one could understand area defense to mean a defense concept oriented toward heading off and defending [against an aggressor]. Depending upon the type and scope of the threat and the associated objectives of a potential aggressor, the concept of area defense includes four different operational combat procedures:

- engagement in key zones,
- engagement in area-security zones,
- spatially limited defensive operations, and
- security operations.




Figure 1. Central Area and Key Zones in One of the Possible Threat Cases

Key:

1. Scheme
2. Key Zones
3. Area Security and Harassment
4. Central Area

These combat procedures can be applied concurrently or alternatively. Seen together with the cases named at the outset, one can assign SECURITY OPERATIONS to the CRISIS CASE and the NEUTRALITY CASE. The crisis case as well as the neutrality case represent merely secondary effects of military conflicts on our national territory. Only the defense case must deal with a military attack that directly affects Austria. The spatially limited defensive operations can also be seen as a military response to a partial threat in a defense case. The most probable occasion, however, is a threat involving a forcible march through Austria whose strategic and operational objective is outside of Austria. It is obvious that this can be linked with a partial or complete military occupation of Austria to establish political facts. But not just political facts can be established through such an occupation; this can also occur with the objective of occupying an operational base against a third country.




Figure 2. Key Zones and Area-Security Zones (Basic Model)

Key:

1. JaK = Harassment (raid-type operations)
2. SZ = Key zones
3. Base area

This threat is countered primarily through the operational procedures of zone engagement. In every case, the defensive disposition that is taken helps to demonstrate the country's neutrality and to produce that deterrent effect that represents the primary goal of Austria's security policy. With the area defense concept, a path has been taken since the mid-1970's that also provides a credible response to the overall threat. The defensive preparations are thereby to be organized in such a way--and this also produces the military deterrent effect--that it is obvious to every potential aggressor that he can achieve his objectives within his required time but above all with the forces available to him in the given area only with great difficulties. Not only the

expected expenditure of time, personnel and material but also the political consequences may well relate very unfavorably to his desired objective.

Area defense and above all the operational procedures for engagement in key zones and area-security zones take these considerations fully into account. In unfavorable areas, as a general principle, combat is not accepted. Area defense turns away from traditional front thinking and imposes other laws upon the attacker. A weaker defender may not attempt to equal an attacker who is making full use of the most important elements of combat--firepower and mobility--to carry out his operation. Otherwise, the disproportion, above all in resources, would lead to his rapid annihilation. With area defense, on the other hand, the aggressor is consciously confronted with the entire area as the defensive disposition and thus the magnitudes time and space are applied against him. The aggressor is forced into a combat procedure that does not allow him to put into play his technical superiority and his strengths. The decisive place is not left to the aggressor. But above all, full use is made of the weaknesses of a mechanized attacker, namely the weakness of the infantry and the necessity of securing rear lines and areas.

Combat Procedures

All of these considerations must be consistently reflected in the defender's own concept and work to his own advantage. This occurs in the combat procedure "engagement in zones." The essential meaning of engagement in key zones is in the prevention of penetration and in the attrition of offensive forces. Its effect is strengthened through the fortification of permanent installations and prepared positions and barriers. Rapid thrusts along the movement axes in key zones are hindered and attacking formations are pushed off into intermediate terrain that impedes movement. The harassment forces that are used against the attacker's flanks and rear strengthen this effect. Engagement in key zones is essentially carried out by infantry defense forces, most of which are employed in fixed areas.

An essential element of engagement in key zones is represented by COUNTERATTACK FORCES, whose task is to wear down the penetrating enemy, mop up breaches, and recover occupied terrain. As a rule, they are made up of units of the mechanized troop.

But the desired effect is achieved only through the succession of several key zones in an aggressor's main axis of effort. The specific situation results from the greatest possible impairment of the flow of the enemy's operations as well as from the most favorable preconditions for one's own defense. The KEY ZONES themselves are subdivided into successive, spatially divided key areas. The objective of this is to achieve a fragmentation of the striking power, whereby the enemy not so much "bounces off" but is to be "distributed" and "absorbed." With regard to the success of defense, the consolidation of permanent fortifications is of decisive importance. In front of and between the key zones are AREA SECURITY ZONES, in which the attacker is retarded and worn down. Later on, he is not allowed to have unhindered use of the area.

Combat in these area-security zones is seen as action around barriers and as harassment.




Figure 3. Spatially Limited Defensive Operations (Basic Model)

Key:

1. Fixed-area militia remains
2. Reserve

The action around barriers is supposed to put a stop to the penetration of the attacker and force him to make a detour into intermediate terrain, thus establishing a favorable precondition for the employment of harassment forces. Both the action around barriers and harassment are led by fixed-area forces that best meet the preconditions for this through their local knowledge and mission-related training.

Harassment occurs in various phases, whereby the most effective method is doubtless represented by action against "bottled up" enemy forces. In this way, the attacker is forced to integrate infantry forces from the spearhead of the attack further in the rear, which doubtless leads to a slowing of the progress of his advance detachments in unfavorable terrain. Harassment in depth with the objective of preventing the enemy from having unhindered use of the area is mainly achieved through the action types raid and ambush as well as through other harassing actions. They require a high degree of troop leadership and put high demands on training.

Harassment is a combat type initially directed against forward elements, but primarily against the flank and rear of enemy strike forces, finding worthwhile targets mainly in a highly technical mechanized aggressor. But the harassment must be carried out on such a large scale that its effects are operationally observable, thus completely supplementing the engagement in key zones. Harassment, however, should never replace engagement in key zones.




Figure 4. Harassment--Phase I (Basic Disposition)

Key:

1. Operational Zone
2. JaK = Harassment
3. Sp = Barrier




Figure 5. Harassment--Phase II

Key:

- | | |
|---------------------------|---|
| 1. Operational zone | 5. Raid |
| 2. JaK = Harassment | 6. Ambush, combat around barriers, harassing action |
| 3. Ambush | |
| 4. Raid, harassing action | |

The combat for the central area, which must be held to be preserved as a "viable subject of international law," is waged in accordance with the principles of the combat procedure engagement in key zones but presents itself as spatially limited defensive operations. This action is carried on by fixed-area forces. A lasting defensive effect is achieved through the fortification of permanent installations, above all at the entrances to the central area. The inhibiting character of this area benefits the defender and permits a force-saving engagement.

National Political Goal Setting and Indispensable Resources

Austria's highest security-policy objective is obviously that of not being involved in a defense case. Therefore, all efforts must be undertaken in the direction of a deterrent strategy so as not to allow Austria to become the target of an aggression. "Should the deterrence fail, however, then area defense offers, as no other procedure, the guarantee that defensive military operations in the sense of a political objective will be successfully concluded. The objective is not resistance for the sake of resistance but defensive operations with the intention of ensuring a nationally usable result." One must therefore be successful in ensuring that an aggressor cannot quickly establish a fait accompli and one must maintain sovereignty over as much of his own territory as possible. With the buildup of the militia-like reserve and with the further equipping of the standby forces, the instrument for the implementation of area defense is continuously strengthened. This process is still far from being concluded. One thing must be stated in this connection: full efficiency of area defense will not be achieved until the FORCES to be employed in the fulfillment of the basic concept are FULLY AVAILABLE. This is especially true for the blocking and harassment forces of the fixed-area militia but the mobile militia must also be further developed. The WEAPON SYSTEMS INDISPENSABLE for modern combat must be procured and supplemented. Although the infantry is probably the sustainer of large-scale area defense, it nevertheless cannot dispense with highly technical weapon systems to assert itself on the battlefield. There should be no contradiction between area defense and the militia on the one hand and high-quality equipment and mechanization on the other. Area defense will be efficient only through the existence of both well-equipped components. It was established for this.

Area defense

--is the response of the small country to the large military challenge of a possible overall threat from superior forces and resources,

--works as a deterrent within Austria's overall security efforts,

--ensures a politically usable result in the defense case, namely the preservation of the largest possible national territory in the defender's own hands,

--underruns the technical superiority of a potential aggressor and exploits the inherent weaknesses of his system,

--relies on the specific Austrian realities of the terrain as well as its own social structure and

--is thus a tailor-made Austrian defense concept.

9746

CSO: 3620/146

FIXED FORTIFICATIONS, BLOCKING FORCES LINKED TO AREA DEFENSE

Vienna TRUPPENDIENST in German Oct 85 pp 567-571

[Article by Col Hans Widhofner and Col Fridolin Gigacher: "Blocking Forces--Development to Date and Present Status"]

[Text] Blocking forces are fixed-area forces supported by permanent fortifications--that is, fixed installations, prepared barriers and field fortifications--that fight from blocking positions. They include the crews of fixed installations and the forces of the external defense, including other combat and support elements. The blocking forces are organized according to tactical aspects into tailor-made blocking battalions as well as independent blocking companies, guard blocking companies and blocking platoons.

The main combat form of the blocking forces is defense from emplacements. With their antitank guns in fixed installations, the blocking forces form the backbone of antitank defense in the key zones.

Because the antitank gun in the fixed installation is the core and thus the most important weapon of the blocking forces, special importance is attached to the selection of the location where a fixed installation will be set up. Once established, a fixed installation cannot be displaced. In accordance with the area defense concept, on the basis of the overall threat description, blocking forces are employed in possible areas of emphasis and along the main movement axes as the backbone of the prepared defense and thereby fixed installations are set up as well. The emplacements and the locations foreseen for the fixed installations are reconnoitered by each zone command together with the military command and are recommended to the army command through the corps command. The final determination is made by a commission made up of representatives of the specified organizations as well as the special-construction department of the Ministry for National Defense and the blocking forces inspector.

A participant once described the course of such a determination of the location of a fixed installation by commission as follows:

"The gentlemen came with the idea of finding a narrow passage here suitable for pass blocks in the true sense of the word, that is, an area whose obstruction would truly make any further advance of the enemy impossible.

They were therefore not a little surprised when the passage in this valley was everywhere described as 'to go around' and by no means did they find a defile but only a terrain suitable for a blocking position. After the various members of the commission had presented their opinions, the representative of the army command found that the location in the valley somewhat farther back near the waterfall would be better. Someone else thought that the location originally chosen near...would be good enough but that the planned installation was not situated on the right spot. A third person was of the opinion that the planned fixed installation would be good but it seemed to him to be too large and too expensive. Another participant took the view that the actual point to be fortified, that allows counterattacks as well as defense, would be neither where the army representative thought it should be nor where the other gentlemen thought but further to the east. They finally unanimously agreed to the spot originally selected as well as to additional amplifications through field fortifications for the rifle elements."

Commissionings actually do occur like that or at least in a similar manner. To be sure, the commissioning described here comes from the memoirs of the ordnance master Baron Daniel von Salis-Soglio, several times blocking troops inspector, and involves a commissioning of fixed installations around the year 1860 in the area of Verona, whereby use was merely made of today's expressions.

But the example also shows that the commissioning method already has a tested tradition and is being continued in the Federal Army. A great many fixed installations and fortifications were built in the last century, most of them outside of our present national territory and therefore no longer of special interest for us.

So much for the blocking forces of the old army.

Fortification of the Country in the Time of the Federal Army of the First Republic

It is not well known that an area defense of Austria was already planned in the Federal Army of the First Republic and that numerous mine, demolition and plug blocks were set up throughout Austria. Not so long ago in Tirol, in setting up plug and demolition blocks, it was noticed that such blocks had already existed at the foreseen spots but it could not be explained whether these blocks had been established by the former German Wehrmacht or by the French occupation force. Not until the blocking plans of the Federal Army of the First Republic were examined was it discovered that the blocks still current today were set up by that army. The same thing is true, for example, for a plug block in Carinthia. It shows that today's national defense corresponds--at least in part--to the area defense of the Federal Army of the First Republic.

Blocking Forces in the Federal Army of the Second Republic

The first steps in the direction of national fortification and blocking forces in the Second Republic were taken on a smaller scale beginning about 1958.

With the introduction and implementation of the area defense concept, within a few years so many fixed installations were built throughout Austria and so many blocking forces were organized that the following measures were the logical result:

For uniform coordination and training, the corresponding basic guidelines as well as the necessary training and weapons regulations were drawn up.

A blocking forces inspector was installed in 1981 and subsequently proposed the establishment of a central training site for the uniform training of command and training personnel. In 1982, as a first step toward a blocking forces school, the "Blocking Forces Work Staff" was established, which was able to take up instruction and training operations as early as 1983.

Tasks of the Blocking Forces Work Staff

--The Blocking Forces Work Staff must look after the training of the training and command personnel of the active-service and reserve forces. The emphasis is thereby on the training of commanders from the group to the company levels.

--It is responsible for the preparation of training principles, service regulations, duty aids and instruction sheets or their drafts.

--It is to cooperate in the review of tactical and technical questions that involve combat from and around permanent fortifications and to this end it must request and carry out the necessary demonstrations and tests.

In 1983, after more than 1 year of collecting the necessary basic knowledge and purposeful preparation for future training and instruction work, practical training began in the form of courses. Through mid-1985, a total of 822 key soldiers of the active-duty and reserve forces were informed and trained at this training site.

Besides the current work on drafts of additional service regulations such as, for example, "The Tank Destroyer Detachment (PAK 52)" or "The Tank Destroyer Platoon (PAK 52)," a training film, "The Antitank Gun Group in the Fixed Installation," is also now in the making.

The example of the use of structural steel grids to increase the passive protection of the antitank gun or tank turret is cited within the scope of the testing and trials; joint investigations are under way in close cooperation with Switzerland, the Western neighbor with somewhat more experience in the area of fortresses and fortifications.

Current Tactical and Technical Problems of the Blocking Forces

--It was already noted in TRUPPENDIENST, No 1, 1984, that the inclusion of the older generation of antitank installations in the current defense concept causes numerous substantial difficulties. The command and operational principles worked out for our conditions in Austria cannot be applied at all

in combat from such installations or can be applied only partially, for the fire zones are still so large that not only the manually achievable aiming speed is not adequate but also the required duel situation does not exist because the ranges of fire are too great. But the interaction of fire with the corresponding tank blocks required in every antitank installation must be improved as well.

--Protection of the crews of the fixed installations against irritants and chemical agents exists through the soldier's self-protection equipment just as it does for all other troops. But since the fixed installations are especially dangerous for an enemy and therefore are primary targets for engagement, consideration must be given to whether or not they need NBC protection beyond the existing equipment.

--The night operations capability of the antitank installations with the artillery and grenade launcher beacons as well as with battlefield illumination with antitank barrels and flare guns is still inadequate. Only with the implementation of the prepared night operations concept will the blocking forces attain a satisfactory night operations capability.

--The active antiaircraft defense is currently inadequate. In the case of passive antiaircraft defense, something can be achieved through camouflage and deception. But active antiaircraft defense can only fulfill its mission if the number of antiaircraft guns is increased and supplemented through antiaircraft missiles with the appropriate range.

--The maintenance of permanent fortifications is still no particular problem; the blocking forces are, after all, still too young. It is necessary, however, to use the time meaningfully and to give some consideration as to whether the current organization will continue to be the most practical one in the future as well. A glance at the neighboring country to the West should also be helpful.

--The current organizational structure of the training companies of the parent militia regiments makes it more difficult to improve the training of blocking forces. There are currently pure training platoons for infantry, heavy infantry, antitank defense, etc. For the blocking forces, however, training needs to be in the functional unit "blocking platoon," in which generally infantry as well as heavy infantry and antitank guns are present. In many cases here, it would be necessary that the S 3 of each parent militia regiment make possible the early training of blocking platoons through a duty roster for the cadre qualified for training as blocking forces.

Resolving the epitomized problems will require much work and even greater efforts.

The army command put together a working group with the participation of all involved agencies of the Ministry for National Defense. For each combat installation, it will determine and introduce the measures necessary for upgrading combat effectiveness. From this measure, one can expect an increase in the combat effectiveness of the entire blocking force, together with the resolution of the various impending problems.

But it should also be pointed out that in broad circles of the Federal Army there is still a contradictory view and outlook on troop protection and on secrecy in questions of the permanent fortifications. But conviction about the deterrent effect of our peacetime defensive preparations can be attained by the individual soldier only when he not only participates regularly in exercises with, around and in permanent fortifications but also is motivated by comprehensive information to defend them. That is valid not only for every soldier of a blocking company but also for all of those who secure and support the defense of a blocking company. A fixed installation must not be a secret within the forces and among the soldiers. Troop protection and secrecy must be directed outward. Within the forces as well, no secret should be made of the fact that all of our visible defensive preparations in peacetime will naturally be known by a potential enemy; they do, after all, represent a conscious component of our deterrence strategy. Precisely for this reason, a bureaucratically narrow and petty handling of the approving of soldiers' access to fixed installations during training and in exercises is in part justifiably considered to be incomprehensible bumbling. In short, in so doing, precisely the opposite of the desired effect is achieved:

--the noninvolved soldier develops the wrong idea about the blocking forces;

--the involved soldier loses confidence and is finally no longer completely convinced that the active camouflaging and deception measures are so necessary and effective.

Current Improvements in the Combat Effectiveness of the Blocking Forces

--Through the purposeful procurement of a large supply of "Centurion" tank turrets, it was possible, in planning for the future, not only to take the next step in the realization of the developed stage but also to tackle the improvement of combat effectiveness through the replacement of older antitank guns. The associated far-reaching standardization of type will be positively reflected not only in combat effectiveness and training but also in maintenance.

--The procurement of arrow ammunition for the weapons of caliber of 10.5 cm is practically completed and, with its velocity of just under 1,500 meters/second, makes a very definite contribution to an actual improvement of our antitank capability and to the control of the duel situation.

Here it should also be pointed out that all of the live firing with antitank guns at fixed installations heretofore possible despite peacetime security regulations, that is, with operational installations in the terrain of operations, have produced encouraging and reassuring results. There was thereby a radical removal of prejudices that must be considered disinformation.. Thus six sabot projectiles were fired with a 10.5 cm "Centurion" antitank gun in a fixed installation at 40 x 40 cm cardboard targets at a distance of 950 meters, achieving a dispersion pattern of 20 x 30 cm.

--In pilot projects of exemplary initiative, construction of field fortifications has shown such positive results that it has now become possible to begin systematic peacetime development uniformly throughout the army with emphasis on the blocking forces. Parallel to this, the procurement of a system of prefabricated units for combat and protective shelters was introduced to make appropriate provisions everywhere, even where no peacetime construction is possible.

Through the establishment of a corresponding construction capacity in the respective command areas, it is now already possible to look back on 2 years of troop experience in the construction of fixed installations.

--In the training of blocking forces as well, exercises in combat or functional units have at least begun. A rethinking process--here training of riflemen, there antitank training--has begun in favor of cooperation.

Summary

Throughout the course of human history and the history of warfare, permanent fortifications have always been oriented toward the weapon system that is threatening them; they were always protection, help and tools for soldiers.

It is important both today and in the future, therefore, to orient oneself toward each specific threat and to draw conclusions therefrom. But these must also be implemented in order to allow a realistic chance in a possible duel to fulfill the mission of acting as a deterrent in accordance with the defense doctrine.

9746

CSO: 3620/147

MILITARY MEDICAL CAPABILITIES, SHORTCOMINGS REVIEWED BY CHIEF

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Dec 85 pp 42-46

[Article by Bundeswehr Surgeon General Dr Hansjoachim Linde: "The Medical Service of the Bundeswehr; Tasks, Organization, Equipment"; first paragraph is WEHRTECHNIK introduction and last paragraph provides some biographic data on the author.]

[Text] Just as the Bundeswehr military services, the medical service, too, would have to pass its test in a possible national defense emergency. Since in that situation saving and maintaining of human lives would be involved, all preparations have to be made in peacetime especially in this field--aside from the obvious medical care of the soldiers--to be able to meet the responsible task in terms of personnel and material in every respect. In the following article, Surgeon General Hansjoachim Linde, MD, inspector of the Bundeswehr medical and health service, comments on tasks, organization and equipment of the Bundeswehr medical service.

As part of the armed services, the medical service makes its contribution for FRG defense readiness. It is its mission to ensure the medical care of the soldiers in peacetime, in crises, in a state of tension and in a national defense emergency as well as after the end of operations.

To meet this comprehensive mission, the operational principles must be oriented on

--scientifically substantiated medical requirements for the treatment of the sick, injured and wounded,

--military structures and tactical operational doctrine,

--the organizational structure of the medical service and

--the overall defense policy goals of the federal government.

In peacetime the free unit medical care of all soldiers is in the center of all medical service efforts.

However, of equal importance are also preparations to ensure effective medical service care of the soldiers in case of a national defense emergency.

Furthermore it is important to create the conditions for operational cooperation with the civilian public health services, which benefits the entire population in peacetime as well as also in the case of catastrophes or national defense emergency.

Precautionary measures must also be taken for the mutual support of the allied armed forces as part of the alliance commitments and bilateral support agreements.

The importance of a functioning medical service for the operational readiness of the armed forces must not be overlooked. Only a soldier who knows that in case of injury he will be provided with medical help will be prepared to risk his life and health in fulfilling his defense duty.

The inspector of the medical and health service is responsible to the federal minister for defense for the technical command of the following subareas:

- medical service of the army
- medical service of the air force
- medical service of the navy
- medical service of the central Bundeswehr sections
- medical service in the armed forces recruitment and replacement service.

For the organizational area

- of the Bundeswehr central medical service sections

The inspector beyond that is also the next administrative superior.

The medical services of the other subareas, according to a 1978 decision by the minister, remain organizationally assigned to the military services or the areas; however, it has been assured that all planning and all organization and personnel measures which affect the missions of the medical and health service are prepared and issued not without participation of the inspection of the medical and health service, one of the 14 independent staffs/departments of the federal ministry of defense. Similarly the participation in all measures and decisions of the budget is assured.

Furthermore, the inspector of the medical and health service is the person responsible for the entire Bundeswehr medical material.

Central Bundeswehr Medical Service Sections

With the Bundeswehr medical office, which is directly subordinated to the federal ministry of defense, the inspector possesses--analogously to the other inspectors--a higher command authority to which the central Bundeswehr medical service sections are directly subordinated in peacetime. They take care of medical service tasks which extend beyond individual military services for the entire Bundeswehr, namely:

--central instruction and training activities as well as research at the Bundeswehr Medical and Health Service Academy in Munich;

--diagnostic and therapeutic activity and providing expert opinions in the Bundeswehr central hospital, the 11 Bundeswehr hospitals and in the Bundeswehr medical center in Bonn;

--special diagnostic and research activity in the central institutes of the Bundeswehr medical service in Koblenz and Munich;

--regional special diagnostic, examining and appraising activities take place in the four research institutes of the medical service in military districts I, II, III and V.

--data acquisition and analysis activities in the Institute for Military Medicine Statistics and Reporting in Remagen.

Moreover, Bundeswehr hospitals in Koblenz, Hamburg and Giessen with emergency ambulances in Koblenz, Hamburg and Ulm are participating in the civilian rescue service in addition with rescue helicopters, thus serve the civilian population and at the same time ensure the training of medical personnel in life-saving measures.

Army Medical Service

The army medical service, which in peacetime as well as in case of a national emergency has the greatest share of the personnel, is organized into the unit medical service and the medical units. The unit medical service is performed in the forces and units. Each battalion has a unit medical officer who provides outpatient care for the soldiers in a dispensary. Medical centers supplement the unit medical treatment in the garrison by more far-reaching diagnosis, therapy and expert opinion. They also take care of occupational and social-medical tasks, operate a joint bed station in the garrison and central medical facilities such as laboratories and physical therapy.

The medical service troops are organized on corps and division level in companies and battalions and have mobile field hospital platoons and means for movement of casualties. About 46,000 stretcher cases can be transported at one time. This number is raised to 57,000 by additionally available hospital trains. With the aid of the quickly mobile field hospitals, concentrations of surgical capacity are to be formed wherever there are a sizable number of casualties.

Air Force Medical Service

The air force medical service, aside from the unit medical care, must fulfill additional specific tasks which are derived from the air force mission. These tasks consist of air and space medicine, training of flight surgeons, medical service counseling and support in the field of air transport of casualties as well as preventive medicine and medical care of the flying personnel.

The Aeromedical Institute supports the air force medical service in taking care of these tasks. In the center of the institute's work are maintaining and improving flight safety.

Navy Medical Service

The navy medical service, which is divided into navy medical squadrons for permanent naval bases and other facilities on land and in the ship's medical service aboard ships, is supported by the Navy Ship's Medical Institute with regard to medical service questions in the field of naval, submarine and diving medicine and in cases of diving accidents.

Medical Service of the Central Bundeswehr Sections

The medical service of the central bundeswehr sections fulfills unit medical tasks and represents common interests of the medical service with medical officers in NATO staffs, in the Bundeswehr Command Academy and in other organizations.

Medical Service in the Armed Forces Recruitment and Replacement Service

The medical service in the armed forces recruitment and replacement service is a part of the Bundeswehr administration. Its task is the medical induction examination of draftees in kreis selective service agencies and induction centers.

In Case of a National Defense Emergency

To fulfill its tasks in case of a national defense emergency, the Bundeswehr medical service has at its disposal especially

- the unit medical service which is integrated into the forces of the army, the air force and the navy;
- medical units in company strength with the airborne and home defense brigades;
- medical units in battalion strength on division and corps level in the field army and with the territorial army;
- medical regiments on military district level in the territorial army with a total of 174 reserve hospital groups of 1000 beds each;
- 76 hospitals with 200 beds each;
- 260 physicians groups for special fields;
- 30 medical, chemical and veterinary-medical examination points; and
- 12 Bundeswehr hospitals with about 5,300 beds,

which as part of the personnel and material mobilization must achieve their operational readiness within a relatively short period.

A special position is occupied here by the Bundeswehr hospitals, which, independent of mobilization, are able to raise their bed capacity by 50 percent and become surgical key hospitals for attached reserve hospitals.

Personnel and Supplies

To be able to meet its mission in peacetime, crisis and war and after conclusion of operations, the military service requires personnel and supplies in appropriate number and quality in line with the prevailing situation.

In this connection, aside from the personnel component, considerable importance is also attached to the material equipment. Hereby principal importance is attached to the medical supplies, although supplies from other technical fields must not be disregarded for the operational capability of the medical service.

As regards medical supplies one must differentiate between "medical supplies, nonexpendable supplies and materials" and "medical supplies, individually issued expendable items." In the case of medical equipment, one differentiates between ("white") equipment which is primarily used in permanent medical installations such as Bundeswehr hospitals, institutes, medical centers, etc and the equipment for the outfitting of field hospitals. The latter primarily serves the equipping of the medical service in wartime--nevertheless parts of this equipment is already used in peacetime for training requirements and for reasons of economical utilization.

The equipment of the permanent medical installations used as part of the free unit medical care in peacetime because of its constant use is subject to continuous replacement and adaptation to a civilian installation of comparable standard, so that the soldier dependent on these installations is no worse off than comparable civilian clients. The equipment of the medical service installations stands up to the comparison with civilian installations. Thus the Bundeswehr hospitals enjoy a good reputation far beyond the military area.

The items of the field medical equipment, aside from the already mentioned exceptions, are earmarked exclusively for the fulfillment of the medical service tasks in wartime. Continuous use is replaced here by long-term storage predominantly in equipment units, whereby the operational readiness of the equipment is maintained by constant care and maintenance far beyond the period that would be usual for such equipment in case of continuous utilization. Criterion for replacement in this case is the no longer present effectiveness, taking into account in each case the level of medical knowledge and the availability of budgetary funds for timely replacement. We'll have to come back to that.

The "medical supplies, individually issued expendable items" include especially medicines and surgical dressings, including medicines for medical NBC protection, medical and surgical instruments including suture material, dental instruments and dental supplies as well as X-ray and laboratory supplies. The level of supply depends upon the demand expected in a war and after conclusion of operations in accordance with the established ranges.

While medicines and surgical dressings in the civilian area are destined for early use, the medical service requires that for the part of the defense

stockpiles that is not replaced by turnover in connection with the free unit medical care, the serviceability be always guaranteed. For this purpose, the medical service possesses a staggered control system which continuously checks the medical supplies, individually issued expendable items, for further serviceability as part of the long-term storage using the latest processes of analysis. This assures that the medical service always has at its disposal fully serviceable individually issued medical supplies.

Problem Areas and Possibilities for Solutions

In Peacetime

The medical care of the soldiers at present is assured with some restrictions. These restrictions are the result especially of the lack of long-term medical officers and of medical specialists. This fact forces us at this time to fill the existing gaps with medical officers performing basic military service and to meet the need for medical specialists by utilizing civilian installations. It will be increasingly possible to meet the lack of long-term medical officers in the coming years by the increased influx of former medical officer candidates who, after receiving their license to practice medicine, must undergo a one-year clinical advanced training in a Bundeswehr hospital. The thus increased availability of long-term medical officers also permits more advanced training to medical specialists. At present, 1100 medical officer candidates study at German universities; annually 160 to 180 medical officer candidates leave the universities to serve as long-term or career medical officers.

In Wartime

The transition from peacetime organization to national defense emergency organization within a span of a few days signifies for the medical service addition of personnel and establishment of the operational readiness of the cadre-strength medical units as well as the medical units existing only as equipment holding units in peacetime, of 76 "hospitals, 200 beds," and 174 reserve hospital groups of 1000 beds each, exclusively from equipment-holding units. For this purpose, military personnel must be increased from 25,500 to about 128,000 soldiers, civilian personnel from 8,500 to 43,500.

The mobilization reserve demand for military personnel is quantitatively met, however, there is a qualitative shortage of reservists with special functions. This gap can only be partially closed by deliberate measure since the medical service, particularly in the case of medical specialists, depends on the available manpower in the civilian area for medical specialists. How to meet the demand for female technical and nursing personnel has not yet been satisfactorily settled either.

Also still unsatisfactory at this time is the material supply of the medical service, especially in the case of

--medical supplies and

--means of transportation for casualties.

In the case of medical supplies, i.e. in the case of medical equipment, as well as in the stockpiling of individually issued expendable items (medical supplies) there continues to be a shortage. As part of the maintenance or reestablishment of the operational readiness of the medical service, it is regarded as a priority task to eliminate the gaps in the field medical equipment within a short time and to replace outdated equipment by a new generation. In the case of the individually issued expendable items (medical supplies), the necessity exists to replenish the defense stockpile and to adapt it to the level of present medical findings. While the rising budget estimates in the past few years have brought about noticeable relief, however, a solution of existing problems has only become possible by the measures provided within the framework of the armament planning inventory. It was these measures that created the prerequisites for filling the most essential gaps with regard to medical supplies at the beginning of the '90's and in the coming years to replace step by step the existing equipment by modern equipment.

A marked improvement can also be noted in the case of the means of transportation for casualties because of the tightened delivery of the new "ambulance, 2 tons."

Parallel to the measures already instituted, investigations are now taking place at the behest of the minister to circumscribe the problem areas of the medical service and to develop specific possibilities for solving them. In addition to the measures already mentioned, included here are

- improvement of the infrastructure situation in the wartime stationing objects for Bundeswehr hospitals;
- optimizing the stationing of the hospitals;
- preprogrammed availability of helicopters for transporting casualties;
- equipping the medical service with means of telecommunications;
- improvement of training and advanced training of reservists.

Through the instituted measures the situation of the medical service will noticeably improve by the end of the 90's. Parallel to that, however, the necessity arises to reexamine structure and resources of the medical service in a continuing process, taking into account the changing environmental parameters. The soldier must be certain that optimum medical service will be provided to him in peacetime as well as in case of a national defense emergency. The required funds for this purpose will be available and the training, further training and advanced training of the personnel assured so that modern medical findings can be optimally applied when used in treating the individual as well as also in the case of mass casualties.

For a national defense emergency, close civilian-military cooperation in the medical service sector is urgently necessary because there cannot be any qualitative difference in the treatment of patients, be they soldiers or civilian persons. However, to fulfill this demand requires supplemental legal foundations.

[Some biographic data on Hansjoachim Linde, MD, Bundeswehr surgeon general]

Hansjoachim Linde, MD, Bundeswehr surgeon general, inspector of the Bundeswehr medical and health system. Born in 1926, was a serviceman [in World War II] and a Russian prisoner of war for one year. After release, studied medicine, state examination, received his MD, and clinical training. Entered the Bundeswehr in 1957. Here chief of an air force medical squadron, assigned as flight surgeon of a fighter bomber air wing, department head and consultant in the federal ministry of defense, command medical officer and medical commander of a territorial command, commander of the Bundeswehr medical academy and office chief of the medical office. Inspector since 1982.

12356

CSO: 3620/198

HAWK BASE DEFENSE SYSTEM ADAPTED TO PROTECT AIRPORTS

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Nov 85 p 90

[Article: "Norwegian Air Defense for the Protection of Facilities and Installations"]

[Text] The air defense of airports confronts all NATO members with problems. No uniform mix of the air defense systems was attained in the individual countries because of limited funds and in some cases because of considerations for their own industry. Norway chose NOAH, which stands for Norwegian Adapted HAWK. In the Hawk procurement, in which almost all NATO countries had participated, Norway stood apart. The surprise was all the greater when in 1984 Norway decided in favor of a HAWK system for the protection of facilities and installations. The Norwegian solution looks as follows: 18 firing units for 6 batteries with target illuminations radars, loaders, and launchers were leased, in other words borrowed, from the Americans. The standard HAWK requires a pulse acquisition radar, an improved continuous wave acquisition radar, a rangefinder radar, an information and coordination center, a battery command post, a target illumination radar and finally 3 firing units or launchers. At first glance it is obvious that the new technologies make possible the realization of a radar which assumes the tasks of the 3 first-mentioned radars. Together with Hughes Aircraft, the Kongsberg Vaapenfabrikk founded the HKV (Hughes/Kongsberg Vaapenfabrikk) combine in Reno, Nevada, which develops the so-called ARCS acquisition radar and control system. This system consists of the radar part, the so-called LASR (low altitude surveillance radar), a modified artillery radar of type TPQ-36 FIREFINDER, and a multifunction console KMC 9000 from Kongsberg.

The LASR is a modular low-altitude surveillance radar which automatically detects and tracks air targets (fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters) and moreover is very resistant to interference because of frequency hop, pencil beam and low secondary lobes and small peak output. Through Doppler data processing, clutter by land, sea or rain as well as chaff is eliminated. In contrast to the PATRIOT antenna, the antenna operates with 30 rpm with simultaneous beam sweep in azimuth and altitude. The radar is mobile on a two-wheel trailer. It operates in the X-band and has a band width of 6 percent. The tactical control officer and the technical control officer sit at the multifunction console KMC 9000 which can be installed mobilely in a container as well as firmly built in. The data are received by a plasma panel with contact-sensitive surface.

Alphanumeric as well as also graphic data can be displayed here. For this purpose there is a trackball and an input keyboard.

Especially interesting in the case of the ARCS is the so-called interlacing possibility. The displays and the calculators are located in the fire distribution center. In addition, the shelter accommodates telecommunications facilities and radar signal processors. While two operator places are available, one operator can also perform all functions. These operators are called in English tactical control officer and fire control officer. The interlacing signifies that each three ARCS controlling a HAWK battery are interlaced with a fourth ARCS which controls a battery of eight 40-mm L/70 antiaircraft guns. In addition, infrared-guided manportable antiaircraft missiles, such as STINGER or RBS 70 can be connected with the individual ARCS. The interlacing is accomplished by two types of communication, for one thing by a digital data system for radar data and also for the voice communications. The situation display of the entire network is available in every fire distribution center. Radar equipment can be turned off and on to make enemy defensive measures more difficult.

12356

CSO: 3620/151

HELICOPTER, FIGHTER PILOTS LEAVING FORCES AS CRISIS GROWS

Acute Personnel Shortage Disturbing

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 4 Dec 85 p 6

[Article by Erik Liden]

[Text] The Armed Forces have gotten into a acute personnel crisis. Over the past 2 years, 2,731 persons have left the defense forces and only 1,139 others have been recruited.

That was announced by OB [Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces] Lennart Ljung at a meeting with the press in Stockholm on Tuesday evening.

Capt Peter Nordbeck of the Defense Staff's Planning Section said: "There is to be rationalization and savings of 10 billion kronor over a 10-year period. At the moment we are saving even more than that because of the drastic loss of personnel through resignations."

Five Hundred per Year

The net reduction in Armed Forces personnel is supposed to amount to about 500 persons per year. But over 800 persons are leaving the Armed Forces in 1985.

Nordbeck said: "The worst thing is that even lieutenant colonels and majors in the 35-40 age group are leaving us for better paying jobs in industry. They have cost us 6 million kronor since their conscript training. Replacing them with newly trained officers is impossible both in peacetime and in wartime."

The turnover in the higher ranks normally amounts to 2 percent per year, but now it is twice that at 4 percent.

Lennart Ljung said: "Another serious problem is that 10 percent of those who undergo officer training back out as soon as they are appointed second lieutenant."

By then their excellent benefits have allowed them to save a great deal of money which they then use for civilian training.

Staggered Pay

The OB did not want to say officially how training benefits might be changed, but he mentioned the spreading of bonuses, pay, and so on over the first 5 years of an appointment.

Comments on the acute defection by pilots included an expression of hope that the government and the employer's department would find solutions providing economic security.

The OB also explained the rapid military technical and economic development in the rest of the world that further underscores his request for 125 billion kronor during the period covered by the next defense decision (1987-1992).

The OB said: "In Norway, a government bill has been submitted that will add 3 percent to the defense budget in real terms."

The FRG and the GDR are proposing similar increases, while our government's planning directives are so far indicating that the defense appropriation will remain unchanged even after 1987.

Helicopter Pilots' Complaint Unreceived

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 4 Dec 85 p 6

[Article by Bjorn Hygstedt]

[Text] A month ago the dissatisfied helicopter pilots in Berga sent a letter of protest to Navy Commander in Chief Bengt Schuback. When they did not receive an answer, they decided to look for civilian jobs through a want ad. But their letter had never been delivered, as was learned when the navy commander in chief made his long-planned visit to Berga on Tuesday.

Early in November, the 17 dissatisfied pilots at the 1st Helicopter Squadron in Berga wrote a letter to the navy commander in chief in which they expressed their criticism of, among other things, the poor work environment and low pay.

The letter met with silence on the part of Navy Commander in Chief Bengt Schuback. And long-standing irritation increased among the helicopter pilots. The result was that last Monday, they sought new, civilian jobs in a want ad that attracted a great deal of attention.

Meeting With Commander in Chief

The helicopter pilots finally got to meet with their commander in chief on Tuesday. Berga was the Tuesday stop on a lengthy tour by the navy commander in chief.

Vice Adm Bengt Schuback said: "Naturally, I would have acted more quickly if only I had received the pilots' letter. But somewhere along the way it disappeared, and no one knows where it is."

What the pilots presented Bengt Schuback with instead during yesterday's visit was an 11-point program with demands--or proposals, as the pilots call them--for improvements. But none of them is willing to comment on the program in detail. Nor, for reasons of integrity, do any of them want to be photographed.

"No Trumpet"

"The navy commander in chief has not assigned priority to flying activity. We have been treated unfairly for too long. They have invested more in equipment than they have in personnel," said Capt Torbjorn Cederqvist, and he drew a parallel with the situation of an orchestra with no members:

"And no one is playing the trumpets anymore."

Added to that is the pent-up discontent over pay in comparison with that of other pilot groups stationed in Berga, where the rain even comes in, and over the unsolved problems of employment when pilots are removed from flight duty at the age of 50.

"Desperate Act"

Bengt Schuback takes a very serious view of the criticism by the helicopter pilots. In general, he sympathizes with the pilots' demands.

"But their advertisement was a desperate act. If we lose too many of them, it will mean a tremendous setback for antisubmarine defense. Without them, the antisubmarine force will be paralyzed to some extent, and the new coastal corvette system will suffer a great deal."

According to Bengt Schuback, it will take many years to replace the defectors, especially since all the instructors in the helicopter squadron are among the 17 discontented pilots. Until they are replaced, submarine surveillance from the air will have to be suspended.

Bengt Schuback will now try to find a way to meet the pilots' demands. Otherwise, there is the obvious risk that all 17 will go into civilian jobs.

A number of firms have already responded to their want ad.

Squadron's Pilots Quit

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 4 Dec 85 p 6

[Article by Erik Liden]

[Text] On Tuesday, 17 air force pilots from Wings F15 in Soderhamn and F17 in Ronneby announced their resignations from the Armed Forces at the same time that the first contacts for negotiation were being made between the Employer's Department and the Association of Swedish Military Officers (SOF).

The Air Force Staff's personnel chief, Col Sven Kamsen, told SVENSKA DAGBLADET: "The situation is extremely serious. Even though the air force command, in cooperation with the government, has come up with proposals on compensation, bonuses, higher pay, and so on, the defections are continuing. Soon we will be unable to man all the fighter aircraft and/or to provide advanced training for new pilots."

Twenty-seven pilots had already given notice earlier. That happened after former Minister of Defense Anders Thunborg reached an agreement with the airlines, primarily SAS and Linjeflyg, that they would cut back on their recruitment of air force pilots, with about 20 pilots to be recruited during 1985 and 1986.

11798

CSO: 3650/97

AIR FORCE COMMANDER SVEN-OLOF OLSON WARNS OF FUNDS SHORTAGE

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 14 Dec 85 p 2

[Article by Leif Carlsson]

[Text] Generals have it tough in a very special way. The politicians always want them to do--or try to do--altogether too much with altogether too little. With a grim expression on their faces, the gentlemen with the stars and braid point out that that is impossible. Afterward, with straight backs and tough countenances, they must tell everybody that the Swedish Armed Forces, whose weaknesses and shortcomings they know better than anyone, are in fact quite big and strong. Saying anything else would be defeatist and undermine the will to resist (as well as being bad for their careers).

Probably no one suspects Lt Gen Sven-Olof Olson, the air force commander in chief [CFV], of being in despair or ready to give up. As far as is known, he has not advanced in his career in any way other than by being competent (and certainly not by drawing the attention of those around him to the fact).

As a result, it is very fitting to listen carefully when, in the latest issue of CIVILA FORSVARSTIDNINGEN (No 8, 1985; 11 kronor), he expresses himself on the condition and needs of air defense. He does so without moaning or complaining, but with an audible growl:

"What worries me is that the air force has had to sustain such large cutbacks in recent years. Our air defense is no longer strong enough in proportion to the surrounding threat, I am sorry to say. In a clear trend, offensive air strength in our vicinity has increased in recent years. The range of aircraft has increased, and that makes it all the more important that we have good air defenses. The fact is that it is more important now than ever."

Small but really good: that--naturally enough--is the CFV's opinion of the branch of service he has the honor and good fortune to be responsible for:

"Qualitatively, we have very good air defense--very modern. Quantitatively, however, we are now at a critical level. It is my firm opinion that the cutbacks must be stopped now!"

The air force can never renounce quality. A fighter plane that cannot fly as fast and high as its opponent is of little use. On the contrary, it is an extremely expensive coffin for the one sitting in it.

It is obvious that the general, who feels he has nothing to worry about when it comes to quality, is extremely concerned about quantity. Hard figures show that he is correct. Twenty years ago, we had 24 interceptor squadrons--now we have 11. Of the 12 attack squadrons, barely half are left. Of five reconnaissance squadrons, three remain. The air force's anti-aircraft missiles disappeared long ago--it is true that that had something to do with the State Holding Company's balance sheet.

When the general surveys his area of responsibility--incidentally, he happens to be the same age as his branch of the service--he has reason to think about the popular example in mathematics: take half of a calf and a half and deduct half of that.

Faced with empty plates, he has nevertheless let it be known that he needs "at least one squadron" more for air defense. He also points out quietly that it would be "a colossal waste" to eliminate prematurely the three Draken squadrons that will continue to be in good shape to do their job for a long time to come.

Oh well, after all, the reader will say, isn't it true that generals are always fighting the most recent war?

As a matter of fact, they are not. It is politicians and writers who devote themselves to that kind of warfare.

Some people have heard dad talk about some stupid captain in the emergency forces. Others seem to remember that they wore a bloodstained shirt in what they think was the Vietnam War--more or less the way Great Britain's King George IV thought he had been present at Waterloo.

Very naturally, a general cannot pursue such fantasies: he has his difficult and fascinating work to think about. "A war on the pattern of World War II is something we are not going to experience again." The CFV scarcely believes that he must arm himself against raiders with thousands of bombers. On the other hand, he feels that "a nuclear war cannot be completely ruled out."

It seems almost as though he has not read those politicians and journalists who have pointed out that such a war is impossible, unthinkable, and the like. Nor has he taken Maj Wechselmann with due seriousness. She has decreed that such a war in Europe is prohibited, and that's that!

11798

CSO: 3650/103

BILDT LEADS ATTACK ON GOVERNMENT DEFENSE POLICY

Dissatisfied with Antisubmarine Defense

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 17 Dec 85 p 8

/Article by Dick Ljungberg: "New Political Squabble About the Submarines. 'A Sorry Mess' Says Bildt"/

/Text/ It is unfortunate that the prime minister does not wish to render an account of his cumulative appraisal of the foreign underwater activities before the Swedish Parliament. This was the sentiment of conservative Carl Bildt in the Parliament on Monday.

Carl Bildt had posed four questions to Olof Palme on the submarine incursions after 1982, the conceivable reasons for them and the Swedish countermeasures. Palme turned the questions over to Defense Minister Roine Carlsson for a response.

There was a brief and quite conventional reply and Roine Carlsson did not permit any real debate. There were merely two brief responses and they were demonstratively directed toward Ingemar Eliasson (Liberal Party) and not to the interpellator.

Roine Carlsson declared in his written answer that the government stands behind the appraisals of the submarine incursions made by the submarine commission and the 1984 defense committee. Sweden's territorial integrity is to be maintained with all available means.

The ongoing expansion of submarine protection is being carried out in accordance with the submarine protection plan of the OB /Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces/. The Defense Forces have obtained the resources and powers proposed by the commander, Roine Carlsson asserted. "Within the framework for a balanced development of our defense we shall increase our ability to turn back incursions so that anyone considering an incursion into our territory will no longer consider it worth the cost."

"A Shabby Answer"

The sorry performance of the prime minister in not answering himself perhaps was not completely unexpected, opined Carl Bildt and he characterized Roine Carlsson's response as "curt and parsimonious."

"That is unfortunate. It creates the impression of a government that only reluctantly faces these serious questions," said Bildt.

"The incursions may be an expression of the expectations of one side to extort a right to be able to operate in Swedish territory more or less undisturbed. This can lead to apprehensions and anxiety on the other side. To the extent that these expectations or misgivings are well-founded, the fundamentals of the Swedish policy of security and neutrality are undermined," said Bildt and wondered whether the defense minister shared that evaluation.

More Incursions

He also wanted the government to evaluate the extent and nature of the submarine incursions in 1983, 1984 and 1985 and ventured that the incursions reported by the commander in 1985 were probably more numerous than in 1984.

"We have had reports on incursions deep into our archipelago areas during recent months, reports taken very seriously by the commander and which the government must reasonably be aware of.

Bildt also contended that the defense minister was untruthful when he claimed that the defense force had received the resources it had requested. The truth is that the government established the economic limits for the commander, which forced him to restrict the plan to the lowest of the ambition levels worked out by the Navy.

Just as Carl Bildt, Ingemar Eliasson contended that Roine Carlsson's talk of a 'balanced development of our defense' boded ill for the next defense resolution.

"The fact that instead of a clarification in the Parliament the prime minister chose to speak at the Foreign Policy Institute could lead one to suspect disregard both for the importance of the question and for the Parliament," said Eliasson.

Roine Carlsson stated in two brief replies to Eliasson that the civilian governments always referred to the 1972 defense resolution (which worked out the submarine protection) and that he could not make a statement with regard to the future before the recommendation of the defense committee had been received.

Carl Bildt will now pose the questions that remained unanswered on Monday in a new interpellation.

Disagreement on Budget Figures

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 17 Dec 85 p 2

/Editorial: "Submarine Debate Without Palme"/

/Text/ A reasonable submarine debate in the Parliament between Olof Palme and Carl Bildt would have been a good thing. Unfortunately, the joint ability of the gentlemen was not put to the test on Monday because the prime minister passed the buck with respect to an interpellation from the defense and security expert of the Conservatives to Defense Minister Roine Carlsson. Everybody lost in this maneuver.

A factual discussion is not promoted by Carl Bildt calling the prime minister's absence a "not unexpected sorry performance." On the other hand, there must be some substance to Bildt's assertion that the impression is created of a government that only reluctantly faces the submarine questions and debate on the issue. Ingemar Eliasson of the Liberal Party also sharpened his tone and said that the absence of the prime minister could engender suspicions that the government is disdainful of both the significance of the question and the role of the Parliament. (In contrast, Palme has discussed the submarine question at the Foreign Policy Institute.)

For his part, the defense minister chose not to have any debate at all. Rather than reading his response aloud, which actually merely implied that the government accepts the appraisals of the antisubmarine protection commission and the sitting defense committee, all that Roine Carlsson did was let the civilian governments share the blame for the fact that the deficiencies in antisubmarine protection since the 1972 defense resolution were not remedied sooner, and this in a reply for Eliasson's ears alone. He could be right there.

It is evident in any case that Bildt and Eliasson followed a similar reasoning on a couple of points with a definite importance. Even if submarine incursions of indeterminate nationality have actually been made by someone, analysis and cogitation should not put a stop to the need for diplomacy, said Bildt. And Eliasson was of the opinion that continued incursions--deep into the archipelago in recent months according to Bildt!--in view of what has previously been demonstrated cause strained relations with the Soviet Union, which Palme should make clear in his visit to Moscow.

Even more difficult to understand is the reluctance of the two opposing politicians to improve antisubmarine defense "within the framework for a balanced development" of defense. The danger of new imbalances is definitely real.

It is certainly difficult for Carl Bildt to entice the prime minister into a discussion on whether alien operations on Swedish territory in the power block can lead to expectations or apprehensions that undercut the Swedish policy of security and neutrality. No government wishes to speculate about that.

Lastly, at the Foreign Policy Institute Olof Palme maintained that two billion kronor will be spent in strengthening antisubmarine defense by the early 1990's. According to Bildt, it will be a matter of 950 million by 1990, 450 of which redistributed in the navy and 300 transferred from other defense sectors, which will be accordingly weakened. For the debate that perhaps will come some other time it would be good if both parties could at least agree on how the appropriation will be calculated!

13129/12276

CSO: 3650/89

BRIEFS

VOLVO TRUCKS TO AIR FORCE--Volvo has received orders from government agencies for 222 trucks worth nearly 70 million kronor. The Defense Materiel Administration has ordered 80 tank trucks and 10 trailers that will be used by the air force. That order calls for delivery to be made from 1986 through 1988. The Post Office has ordered an additional 54 Volvos for delivery at the start of 1986. [Excerpts] [Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 24 Dec 85 Sect III p 1] 11798

CSO: 3650/103

HOME RULE GOVERNMENT IN EFFORT TO REVIVE SEAL HUNTING

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 26 Dec 85 p 12

[Article by Thorkild Dahl]

[Text] In Greenland, Greenpeace is considered to be cultural imperialism of the worst sort. The economic foundation of the hunting culture will be rebuilt during the coming years, through a massive Greenlandic effort.

Julianehab--The home rule government of Greenland will now invest 30 million kroner to reestablish seal hunting as a reliable economic foundation for hunting communities. This is occurring after the environmental organization Greenpeace, in its worldwide campaign against seal hunting, has destroyed the economic foundation of many Greenlandic hunting families.

Prime Minister Jonathan Motzfeldt strongly opposes the "so-called environmental organization" Greenpeace. He is upset because the organization has conducted an aggressive campaign against seal hunting, while giving no consideration to the actual facts and having no knowledge of the living conditions of Greenlandic hunting families.

"There are far too many seals and they eat too many fish, especially cod and salmon," Jonathan Motzfeldt said. He pointed out that in recent years it has been virtually impossible for Greenlanders to sell seal skins outside of Greenland. This causes a two-fold problem for Greenland. Sealers now receive 40 kroner for a good skin, while the price 5 years ago was 300 kroner. In addition, the rapidly growing seal population consumes large quantities of the fish that are in short supply and that Greenland needs to provide jobs and revenues. A large seal can eat up to 60 kg fish per day.

Greenpeace has changed its policy, but a large body of material against the hunting of young seals is still being used throughout the world. Two representatives from the organization have visited Greenland and admitted the incorrect and disastrous effects the campaign has had on the hunting culture of Greenland. They have also promised that their organization would no longer participate in the campaign.

Imperialists

The repercussions of the Greenpeace visit are still being felt in Greenland. In Godthab, the president of the Inuit Office, Hans Pavia Rosing, said that the "so-called environmental organization Greenpeace is comprised of cultural imperialists of the worst sort." He also pointed out that Greenland had never participated in the hunting of young seals.

Now the Greenlandic sealing industry will be rebuilt from its foundation. The president of the school of commerce in Godthab, Ole Ramlau-Hansen, as acting chairman of the board of the Greenland Tannery in Julianehab, has been given the job.

"The campaign against seal hunting has been absolutely devastating. But perhaps it also has been used as an excuse for doing nothing. The home rule government has stepped in to save what remains of the old Greenlandic hunting culture and, consequently, has taken over the Greenland Tannery in Julianehab. We have received 30 million kroner to make a company out of it and, according to our plans, we will provide seal skins for 4,000 shoulders throughout the world by 1989," Ole Ramlau-Hansen said. He added that the investment was not designed to produce a profit, but to guarantee the existence of facilities for treating seal skins and lamb skins in Greenland.

Prices have plummeted from 300 kroner several years ago to 40 kroner for a skin today. "Hunters cannot live on this amount. Prices must climb again so that hunters can make a reasonable profit from the sale of seal skins."

Catastrophe

The Greenland Tannery is near the harbor in Julianehab. The effort to reestablish seal skin production includes both new construction and product development.

Construction at the Greenland Tannery is to be completed no later than November 1989. The new facilities will include a sewing department and a new tannery. This will provide 40 new jobs in Julianehab.

The products will include both the traditional seal skin coat, which many people have not dared take out of their closet in recent years because of the Greenpeace campaign, and new types of coats and skin products.

Ole Ramlau-Hansen expects a totally new product, a soft skin, to be produced that will be similar to goat skin in many respects. The seal skin is depilated, after which a series of treatments gives it many of the desirable characteristics of goat skin.

In order to secure jobs at the Greenland Tannery, the board also wants the plant to repair work clothes, including anoraks.

"The Greenpeace campaign has been a catastrophe for the Greenlandic people. There are far too many seals. It is a harmful animal that eats our fish. It is clear for everyone to see that there are more and more seals in Godthabsfjord. They are eating up our entire cod quota," Ole Ramlau-Hansen said. He also pointed out that the price of seal skins was now so low that hunters have good reason to consider simply throwing the skins away.

Seal Skins For Furniture

"Now that the price is 40 kroner per skin, the skins are poorly treated by the hunters. We must improve the quality of our skins. We can use only 25 percent of the skins for coats," the board chairman said.

Before Greenpeace began its campaign against the killing of young seals in Canada, 800,000 seal skins were sold annually throughout the world. The effect of the campaign on possible buyers of seal skins is clearly seen in the sales figures. Now only 60,000 seal skins are sold throughout the world.

"We will receive 100,000 seal skins, 30,000 of which will be of top quality and can be used for the approximately 4,000 coats we hope to produce. We estimate that about 50,000 can be depilated and tanned, so that the skin can be used for furniture and shoes," Ole Ramlau-Hansen said.

Tanneries in Greenland now produce about 600 coats and they are sold in Greenland. As part of the program to build up seal skin production, skin sorting will be transferred from Alborg to Greenland and skin coloring, which now is done in Sweden, will be moved to Greenland in 1987.

The private seal skin firm Eskimo Pels is located in Narssaq. Here, too, production has been disrupted by the Greenpeace campaign. The company's management points to the great ignorance on which the EC and others have based their seal policy, including age regulations that were set in some office, without consideration for the course of nature. Skins must not be used from seals under 11 months, but the color change in the fur of many seal species occurs at 4 months, after which the seal has the same fur for several years. Thus, it is impossible for the producer of a seal skin coat to document the age of the seals that were used.

9336

CSO: 36'3/54

RISKS, CHALLENGES, FUTURE OF EASTERN TRADE

Challenges of Licenses, Information Technology

Helsinki KANSAN UUTISSET in Finnish 7 Nov 85 pp 14,15

[Article by Teppo Tiilikainen]

[Text] Information technology and licensed trade have advanced to become challenges for Finland's Eastern trade in the future. While the Soviet Union is technologically independent, the international division of labor offers Finns limitless possibilities on Soviet markets.

According to Heikki Auvinen, the author of the TINKA report on information technology which looks into the Soviet trade, in addition to U.S. export bans, it is chiefly the attitudes of Finnish officials that serve as an obstacle to a change in our export structure.

Up to now, information technology has accounted for a very small portion of the Finnish-Soviet trade; the value of computer and programming sales concluded in the present decade has come to about 100 million markkas.

The export bans imposed on U.S. high tech by the Reagan administration have constituted the most important obstacle to the development of this trade. The United States and its allies have jointly agreed on which sort of technology may be freely or subject to license exported to the Soviet Union and on what may not be exported to it at all.

Restrictions are, however, being relaxed and the exporting of several mini-computers is, for example, now permitted, although regular main-frame computers are still under export ban.

"At the present time, for example, conventional minicomputers and small super-mini models may be exported subject to license. Licenses have also been obtained for the exporting of some Department of Commerce general computers."

In Auvinen's opinion, the Finnish Government could increase its foreign policy role and propose that an international information technology agreement be concluded within the framework of the United Nations, one that would operate on the same principle as the agreement regulating the peaceful use of nuclear technology.

"If information technology and other technologies with military application were included in an international agreement, all parties would be regulating them, not just the one that currently possesses any of these technologies."

Soviet Union's Own Production

According to Auvinen, the Soviet Union's own computer industry also offers Finns considerably more opportunities than have so far been exploited.

"While the Soviet Union is technologically fully independent, there are certain items having to do with the division of labor which they buy from the West. It would make no sense to go ahead and reinvent every single screw."

Auvinen emphasized that primarily practical applications would constitute opportunities for Finns since the necessary basic technologies already exist in the Soviet Union.

"There are already some examples of this. For example, in Finland the SM-5 computer, which is much in demand, has been developed from the SM-4, manufactured in accordance with CEMA standards."

Small Businesses

According to Auvinen, one problem has been the fact that Finnish businesses in this field are usually small.

"There are in Finland about 600 firms in the information technology industry, over 100 of which are probably prepared for the Soviet trade. There are, however, only three firms in the official trade organs," Auvinen remarked.

"Another obstacle is the old degree of domestic participation rules, according to which the components too have to be manufactured in Finland so that the system is Finnish. Finnish foreign trade officials' attitude results in firms' leaving for the West."

In Auvinen's opinion, now would be an excellent time to start to jointly manufacture with the Soviets microcomputers to be used in school instruction, for example, since the necessary technology for them is quite freely for sale.

Table

Finland exports to the Soviet Union:

Forest industry products	22.2 %
Metal industry products	47. %
Textile industry products	8.2 %
Food	6.9 %
Other products	15.7 %

Finland imports from the Soviet Union:

Machines and equipment	4. %
Energy	85.9 %
Agricultural products	0.5 %
Wood raw materials	3.9 %
Metal products	1.7 %
Other products	4.2 %

The metal industry traditionally forms the core of Finland's exports and the biggest category of imports is energy. So far, information technology accounts for a very small portion.

Information Technology Exports Would Create Jobs in Planning Echelon

Erkki Nironen, who has headed CIMA-trade research projects at Lappeenranta's Technical College since 1975, believes that the Eastern trade will continue to be job-producing by nature regardless of changes in its future structure.

Traditionally concentrated on the metal industry, the Soviet trade provides considerably more work for Finns than the lively trade with the West that depends on the forest industry.

Considerable changes have taken place on the list of commodities to be exported to the Soviet Union and these past few years Finland has above all exported extensively processed special products.

There are no exact and unanimously agreed-on estimates of the effects of this trade on employment, but, taking the indirect effects into consideration as well, it is estimated that the Soviet trade provides work for about 250,000 Finns.

At this time Finns are above all interested in a schedule for setting in motion potential new joint projects. For example, it is believed that the project to refine the mineral reserves of the Kola Peninsula will at its peak be as big as the Kostamus project, which employed 3,700 Finns.

Brainwork Provides Employment

Even if construction exports should remain at roughly the present level, according to Nironen, a change in the structure of the trade is to be expected before long. For example, the drop in shipyard industry exports will reduce the metal industry's share of exports.

In Nironen's opinion, information technology is also a challenge for the future because the other changes in structure will not produce more jobs for Finns.

"For example, the tailoring for the Soviet Union of guidance systems, programs and complete packages in general will create a considerable number of new jobs in the planning echelon. On the other hand, for example, the exports of the growing chemical industry will not create more work because the industry is highly capital-intensive."

Helsinki SUOMEN SOSIAALIDEMOKRAATTI in Finnish 7 Nov 85 pp 12-13

[Article: "Scientific and Technical Cooperation with the Soviet Union Is Important in Itself"]

[Text] Finnish-Soviet scientific and technical cooperation has become a more and more important preliminary phase to cooperation in trade, but Trade and Industry Minister Seppo Lindblom reminds us that we should not forget the significance of this cooperation from the viewpoint of foreign policy either.

"Exchanges of opinions between leading scientists and experts produce commercial results, but in addition it is the very best means of conveying a true picture of conditions in our neighbor country. In this way relations with our neighbor will be entered into more profoundly and activities will be in good keeping with the spirit of the text of the CSCE resolutions."

Minister Lindblom said that much has been done to pass Soviet scientific and technical achievements on to Finland. However, he hoped that there would be a willingness on our part to intensify operations to particularly extensive activity: Different kinds of seminars and expositions offer opportunities to spread knowledge to broader circles than before.

"In this way a growing interest in Soviet Industry's products and advances would be created. We must do more than we have so far in this area.

"As technology evolves faster and faster, politicians and company managers have to have a clear picture of what is going on in the Soviet Union. A change of attitude is indispensable so that we can guarantee diversity of imports and thus provide channels to markets for Finnish products in the Soviet Union," Lindblom emphasized.

He reminded us that, as industry has adapted to a time of slow growth, the Soviet trade has played a decisive role.

Scientific and technical cooperation is of importance in the production of results, but it is also of considerable value in itself as a part of good neighbor relations.

Cautious Beginning

The agreement on scientific and technical cooperation between Finland and the Soviet Union is 30 years old. It was signed 7 years after the conclusion of the Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Pact, the first extensive agreement in this field between a nonsocialist and a socialist state. The Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Pact specifically created the basis for this.

Scientific and technical activities were set cautiously in motion. The chief objects in the technical sector were agriculture, the forest economy and the paper industry. In basic research anthropology, Finno-Ugric linguistics and ethnology were the focal areas.

Gradually, activities were accelerated. A network of committees was created to cover both applied research and basic research. There are at present 37 committees and at joint meetings they establish joint projects and evaluate the state of projects that are in progress.

With exchanges of experts, according to Minister Lindblom, activities are now at a level at which we have about 1,000 people participating in them and growth is approaching a limit of over the present over 7,000 man-days. This will be a consequence of the implementation of new, demanding joint projects next year.

Focal Points

After the growth period concentrated in the 1970's, the technical sector committees, which had sprung up in almost all the more important branches of industry, were matched by an effort in the Science and Technology Commission to study more and more specific topics. Focal areas were chosen, an example of which is the so-called Arctic Committee, which plans and develops projects relating to the exploitation of oil and gas reserves in the northern maritime areas of the Soviet Union.

Other key fields are hospital technology, process technology, biotechnics, space research, combustion technology and energy conservation, among others. At present the Science and Technology Commission is planning joint projects in information technology.

Commercial Results

From the standpoint of Finland's Eastern trade, the importance of cooperation in science and technology is growing. The commission serves as a channel for ideas in developing new products and projects, and in developing commercial activities that demand technical and scientific preparedness.

As an example, Minister Lindblom mentioned among others the Norilsk smeltery project, the planning of and preliminary work for which was done by the Science and Technology Commission. Another example that comes to mind is the light-draught icebreakers built by Wartsila for the big rivers of Siberia. The project got its start in the commission's Communications and Transport Committee and the icebreaker planning and development phase was worked out with the assistance of the committee. The conspicuous examples in the energy technology sector are the Loviisa nuclear power plants.

"Therefore, the Science and Technology Commission is a sort of coordinator of the preliminary phase of more extensive product development projects. It serves as a communications channel and a channel for the exchange of initiatives and ideas.

"In this way many a project got its start with the committees and sometimes very soon after the implementation phase switched to management by the firm in question itself.

"It is also the role of the Science and Technology Commission to act as a general contact channel when people desirous of buying or selling want to get information and contacts," Minister Lindblom described the situation.

"In cooperation with our Soviet partner we can develop a product that will suit the buyer's purposes after a jointly agreed-on development effort."

Cooperation in production can also receive impetus from scientific and technical cooperation. A heart-care ambulance developed as a result of the Hospital Technology and Pharmacology Committee has already moved into the commercial phase.

Science Giant in Our Neighbor Country

Minister Lindblom said that a country like Finland, which offers small research and economic resources, cannot alone maintain a high level of scientific and technical know-how without international collaboration.

"We must concentrate on a few narrow, key fields and strive for the top position in the world in them. Thus little attention is devoted to the other fields. Extensive international scientific and technical cooperation can in part compensate for the deficiencies stemming from this situation.

With its mighty resources the Soviet Union conducts research in almost all of today's key fields.

"It goes without saying that the Soviet Union is a valuable partner in cooperation for Finland. Through scientific and technical activities our own skills and technical preparedness are enriched and diversified."

The SFINKS project, which is part of the basic research in neutron physics, for example, stems from a project in which Soviet resources and first-line know-how produced by Finnish specialization are combined.

Minister Lindblom believes that this sort of cooperation will increase in the next few years. Finland gets to participate in projects which it would not be capable of implementing alone, but for which it can offer the specialized knowledge of a narrowly-defined field.

"The line between basic and applied research is blurred in the sense that in the fields of information technology, space technology and biotechnics, for example, basic research and industrial application of the results produced by it are very closely dependent on one another right from the initial phase.

New Areas

For years now we have been conducting space research together with Soviet scientists within the framework of the Science and Technology Commission. Radioastronomy and space geodesy are involved in this.

These activities have been taking place as exchanges of experts and information between research institutes and are limited to research conducted from the earth's surface.

In 1985 Finland for the first time also joined the ranks of manufacturers of satellite equipment. What is involved are two Soviet basic research projects that have already received international attention too.

The Phobos Project consists of the sending of space probes to study Mars' moon, Phobos. The probe's orbit will pass very close to the surface of Phobos; the moon will be bombarded by the low-power laser gun in the probe and its composition will be analyzed. A number of countries, among them some from Western Europe, will in addition participate in this project. The Swedes are building a plasma spectrometer for satellites and the Finns a data-processing unit for this spectrometer that will process measurement data before sending it to earth. The Meteorological Institute, the VTT [State Technical Research Center] and Oulu University will participate in the development effort.

The Interball Project is a series of two Soviet artificial moons that will be fired into orbits circling the earth. A number of measurements in the earth's magnetosphere will be taken with the equipment of the artificial moons and the solar wind, among other things, will be measured. For this project too, Finns are building a data-processing unit to be combined with the Swedes' plasma spectrometer.

The Science and Technology Commission is at present also surveying the possibility of obtaining Soviet remote charting equipment, among other things, for the use of the Department of Earth Measurement and the Meteorological Institute. At the end of the year director of the Department of Earth Measurement Raitanen and a number of other experts will go to Moscow to discuss a possible commercial agreement. Involved is equipment for remote charting from Finnish territory that can, among other things, be used for charting, environmental observation and meteorology.

Quantum Research and Weak Magnetism

In the fall, in connection with the Science and Technology Commission's 30th anniversary celebrations, an agreement was signed on cooperation; certain topics relating to nuclear energy magnetism and quantum research, institutes under the jurisdiction of the Soviet Union State Committee for Nuclear Energy and other items of a basic research nature will not be a part of the joint program by the Trade and Industry Ministry and the state committee in question. Behind this are also the jobs of building big particle accelerators for both Serpukhov and the ECNR and the possibility that Finns may participate in them as equipment suppliers.

Information Technology

It has also often been asserted that computer technology is a field of the future in our trade with the Soviet Union. The Science and Technology Commission is at the present time conducting a survey of the possibilities of

cooperation in both the hardware and software sectors of this field. What is involved are both the projects of different business firms and subjects for research. Obviously, we will be investing in the research sector; computer systems for home and school use as well as for banks are possible subjects for the equipment sector.

Trade and Industry Ministry More Closely Associated with Scientific and Technical Cooperation

Minister Lindblom hopes that the Trade and Industry Ministry can be more closely associated with scientific and technical cooperation than it is now. He proposes that the directors of the VTT and the TEKES [Technological Development Center] be members of the Science and Technology Commission in their official capacity. Both centers are under the jurisdiction of the Trade and Industry Ministry, which would commit both the ministry and the minister to close participation in [commission] actions.

"If I myself were not on the commission, appointed by the Bank of Finland, I couldn't follow the commission proceedings as closely as I can now."

VTT director Pekka Jauho, with whose efforts Lindblom is very satisfied, serves as chairman of the Science and Technology Commission.

Western Trade Most Important

Helsinki TIEDONANTAJA in Finnish 14 Nov 85 p 10

[Article by Pertti Honkanen: "Jermu Laine Limits Eastern Trade's Share of Trade"]

[Text] In the opinion of Foreign Trade Minister Jermu Laine (Social Democrat), "we dare not place too much faith in the attractive prospects of the Soviet trade in the energetically expanding new fields either."

"If a company regards other exports as marginal and trade with the Soviet Union as its chief source of revenue, it is on an uncertain footing," the foreign trade minister declared and criticized such companies for being rash and for relying on good luck.

An interview arranged by the Information Department of Neste Oy [state oil company] contains a fair number of statements which have scarcely ever before been publicly heard coming from the lips of a foreign trade minister since the post of minister of foreign trade was created in the government.

In the interview he gave us to understand that the Soviet trade's share of any company's exports ought not to be more than half [of its total exports] and that that share should preferably be much less than half. He set the Eastern trade's share of Finland's exports at under a fifth, that is, under 20 percent: "Firms have learned to regard the Eastern trade realistically. They quite rightly view it as part of our total foreign trade — quantitatively less than

a fifth of the country's exports." He described as questionable a situation in which half of a firm's production goes to the Soviet Union.

"Western Markets Are More Important"

The foreign trade minister in very strong terms emphasized the primary position of Western markets: "A skillful business manager regards the always keenly competed-for Western markets as a primary market area. If you succeed there, you can also trade with the East with your mind at ease. The ability of a company's products to compete must be measured on Western markets. You have to look for signals there that tell you when, for example, you are lagging behind in prices, growth or production methods."

In the interview he suggested that the shipyards too should turn their gaze more toward the West than before and that exports to the Soviet Union have accounted for too dominant a share of shipyard operations: "For the shipyard industry, for example, half of whose products go to the Soviet Union, the creation of a dynamic development strategy is an indispensable condition for survival in the future."

In the interview he labeled "making a big fuss about selling to the Soviet Union thinking in a rut."

The minister claimed that the Soviet trade system also contains "constraints and confinements" that interfere with success and improvement.

In this interview the foreign trade minister did not say a word about prospects for cultivating and developing trade with the Soviet Union, for example, diversifying imports from the Soviet Union, which would lessen dependence on fluctuations in the price of oil. However, he stated as an almost positive factor the fact that the Soviet Union's share of Finland's foreign trade is dropping to less than 20 percent — at least he did not complain about it in the interview.

USSR a Doubtful Partner?

Instead of the foreign trade minister's bringing up the favorable effects of long-term agreements, he created the impression that the Soviet Union is a doubtful partner whose word cannot be trusted: "The structure of the Soviet trade, the 5-year general agreements and the planning for long intervals may create the illusion that sales are already safely in the bag. You can't rely on quotas; they aren't orders."

Later, he warned us of the possibility that "one day" the Soviet Union may itself develop production in some field or "open its doors to, for example, the mighty avalanche of the United States and Japan."

Jermu Laine also regarded as a threat the Nordic countries' "being trampled underfoot by the superpowers and the giant concerns," obviously also by the Soviet Union. He offered Nordic cooperation as a remedy.

"Losses of Jobs Must Be Swallowed"

Shoring up our "ability to compete" was one of the penetrating ideas in the interview. The minister demanded "sacrifices" of workers and "a positive attitude toward retraining, relocating, changing production lines and cut-backs. The increase in unemployment seems to be an obvious consequence of the new trade policy line that is being pursued and now, to top it all, workers are being asked to respond to it positively.

Such an interview gives rise to many questions. Is the government's trade policy line changing in the intoxication with the Eureka project? After all, exploitation up to the required amount of the long-term cooperation program between Finland and the Soviet Union has up to now been emphasized in, for example, the government's budget proposals — in the latest budget proposal too. However, there is now no talk of that at all. And the foreign trade minister, who is the Finnish partner's vice chairman of the Finnish-Soviet Economic Commission, has also indeed on many occasions discussed cooperation with the Soviet Union and the projects that come up in connection with it in a much more positive vein.

The great importance of the Finnish-Soviet trade to employment or the equalization of economic trends does not seem to weigh very heavily at all on the foreign trade minister's thinking. Nor does he seem to care any more that it is a question of trailblazing cooperation between countries with different kinds of social systems, cooperation that has shown the way to even more extensive peaceful coexistence.

Eastern Trade and Ability to Compete

The relationship between our ability to compete and the Eastern trade was actually turned topsy turvy in the interview. It is indeed a recognized fact that trade with the Soviet Union, which is based on extensive, long-term agreements, has helped particularly the metal industry to diversify its production, raise its technological level and shift to new, very demanding fields. With the help of this experience and the resources it has generated, many firms have since expanded their operations on Western markets.

To be sure, even the foreign trade minister at least in part admitted this: "For a long time the Soviet trade has been a safe and guaranteed bread provider for some Finnish firms. The stable situation that has continued to exist in it has under the best of circumstances also provided incentives for making efforts on other markets."

In our current exports to the Soviet Union too, the degree of processing has been higher than with our exports to the West. The effect on employment with respect to export value is greater than with our exports to the West. This is demonstrated by, among other things, a study published in 1982 by the Labor Ministry. Preserving and utilizing this advantage, of course, presupposes efforts to, among other things, increase imports from the Soviet Union. Accelerating economic development and speeding up scientific and technical development will provide new opportunities for this in the Soviet Union.

Now, however, we declare Western markets to be our foremost arena of competition and that only the success achieved in it can constitute a basis for exports to the Soviet Union. It is contradictory to in the same breath appeal to the fact that there is competition on Soviet markets too and that "the Soviet trade is not a goods pipeline insulated from the rest of the world," as Jerro Laine says.

It is true that, to protect our positions on Soviet markets, we need to work hard and that the volume of trade does not automatically remain the same or grow. It is, however, odd to maintain that directing our efforts toward Western markets would be the best way of securing these positions.

We should not forget either those economic, technical and political dependencies to which more and more unilaterally relying on Western markets can lead and which will more certainly interfere with trade with the Soviet Union than promote it. At a time of anti-Soviet boycott, blockade and export-ban policy conducted by the United States, bearing this in mind is scarcely unwarranted.

11,466

CSO: 3617/41

SPACE TECHNOLOGY COOPERATION: USSR, FINLAND, SWEDEN

Helsinki TIEDONANTAJA in Finnish 14 Nov 85 p 3

[Article: "Finnish Device for Soviet Mars Probe"]

[Text] Finnish scientists have for the first time gotten a chance to build a device that will travel into space. In cooperation with the Swedes, the Finns are building so-called plasma spectrometers to be installed in the two Soviet Mars probes.

The Soviet Union will be sending two of their so-called Phobos Project probes to Mars in succession in July 1988. A probe weighs 3 tons.

The role of the Swedes and Finns is to make a spectrometer weighing 7.5 kg for each probe. Among other things, the device will measure the quantum properties of the solar wind, the gas and magnetic fields that appear in the vicinity of Mars and Mars' possible dry microatmospheres.

"We Finns will have invested a total of over 5 million markkas in the project in 3 years time by the end of 1987," lecturer Risto Pellinen of the Geophysics Department of the Meteorological Institute told us.

Participation in the project will offer Finns a unique opportunity to join them in familiarizing themselves with space technology and space research in space itself.

In Finland the project will be funded by the Technological Development Center, the Academy of Finland, the State Technical Research Center (VTT), the Trade and Industry Ministry, the Meteorological Institute and the Foreign Ministry's Science and Technology Commission.

To be made in cooperation with the Swedes, the device will be called Aspera. The Finns will build into it a data-processing unit and perform jobs relating to the random memory of the microprocessor. The microprocessor will be built at the VTT computer laboratory in Oulu and the jobs relating to the memory unit at the Meteorological Institute. The assembly will take place at the Kiiruna Geophysics Institute in Sweden.

11,466

CSO: 3617/41

AGRICULTURAL PROJECT TO CONTINUE IN USSR

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 16 Nov 85 p 33

[Article by Ilkka Lampi: "Druzhba Project Extended in Soviet Union; Kemira Raises Crop Yield Figures"]

[Text] Moscow—lasting 3 years, Kemira's agricultural experiments on the Lenin State Farm have demonstrated that with the right fertilizers and pesticides as well as the right farming techniques they can attain grain and potato per-hectare yields at the latitude of Moscow that are almost as big as those obtained in the southern parts of the country.

"Through the diversified use of mineral fertilizers and the right pesticides, it is possible to increase per-hectare yields by from 1.3 to 2.3 times and at the same time clearly raise the quality of the products. We feel that it is expedient to go on cooperating with Kemira."

This is what representatives of the Soviet partner, chairman Artyushin and chief agronomist Zakotin of the Druzhba project stated on Thursday at the celebration of the conclusion of the experimental agriculture program.

In agricultural experiments lasting 3 years, Kemira's Finnish team obtained per-hectare yields bigger than those of the state farm with all grains and with mangel-wurzel.

Only in the potato and garden plant yields did the state farm very slightly surpass the results obtained on Kemira's patches.

Big Yields

In Kemira's agricultural experiments performed by Soviets and by Finns, the average per-hectare yields were particularly high: fall rye, 3,957 kg/hectare; fall wheat, 5,258 kg/hectare; spring wheat, 4,850 kg/hectare; barley, 4,720 kg/hectare; mangel-wurzel, fully 108,980 kg/hectare (yield from tops included); and potatoes, 30,900 kg/hectare.

Proper Use

According to the impressions of both state farm and Kemira farmers, hectare yields increased specifically because, aside from the proper use of

fertilizers and pesticides, they always diagnosed the whole cultivation process starting with the preparation of the soil.

"It's not all the same how fertilizers and pesticides are used; you can get poor results with a good product," chairman and prominent businessman Jaari Iisakkila asserted.

The Soviet partner stated that Kemira had, for example, mastered the soil preparation better than the state farm did and that the depth at which Kemira sowed its seed was more even.

Every year the Finnish team, which used Finnish machines, worked Kemira's 50-to-70-hectare experimental area. They also aroused great interest and Finnish manufacturers have already been contacted.

Kemira's fertilizers, nutrients and pesticides as well as Finnish cultivation techniques aroused such great interest among the Soviet Ministry of Agriculture and the state farms that Kemira is at present entering into negotiations for a similar 5-year project.

"What is involved in the negotiations is a state farm near Moscow on which they would continue agricultural experiments with grains, grasses and mangel-wurzel. Garden plants will be omitted," Iisakkila said.

Own Work Team

Kemira was the first western firm that was permitted to bring its own work team in on agricultural experiments. Many foreign companies have participated in agricultural experiments in the Soviet Union only with their products.

"In practice the success of the project means that the importing of our products into the Soviet Union is assured and that there is a good likelihood that our activities will be continued."

Last January Kemira signed a trade agreement with the Soviet Union involving 8 billion markkas worth of fertilizer raw materials and plant protection raw materials. Extending until the year 2000, the agreement is based on full compensation.

11,466

CSO: 3617/41

BRIEFS

PIZZINATO HEADS CGIL POLL--A preliminary conference was initiated recently among approximately 70 members of the communist component of the CGIL (Italian Labor Union) as a kind of early polling to prepare for the successor to Luciano Lama, present general secretary. Antonio Pizzinato's nomination got the approval of the overwhelming majority. However, a well-defined political platform will be compiled by the secretariat of the CGIL and then submitted to a real conference among the roughly 150 members of the CGIL's steering committee (communists, socialists, supporters of other political affiliations, or persons with no party associations). Of course, this proposal will have to express the wishes of the entire union and not only a part of it. It will then be taken to the National Convention of the CGIL, which will take place between February and March 1986 at the Palasport in Rome. A committee made up of three federation secretaries: Gianfranco Rastrelli, Donatella Turtura, and Fausto Berlinotti, were responsible for this first polling. The candidate who received the general consensus was, as already mentioned, Antonio Pizzinato. Pizzinato is 53 years old and was born in Caneva del Friuli (province of Pordenone). He has been a member of the Secretariat of the Federation since 1984. Before that he was secretary of the FIOM [Federation of Those Employed in Metallurgical Industries] in Milan and then regional secretary of the CGIL in Lombardy. Luciano Lama has held the job of secretary general for 15 years. [Text] [Milan L'UNITA in Italian 6 Dec 85 p 2] 12521/6662

CSO: 3528/40

EMPLOYERS, UNIONS GIVE VIEWS ON SHORTER WORK WEEK

Amsterdam DE VOLKSKRANT in Dutch 30 Nov 85 p 9

[Report on interview with various employers and union representatives, by Pieter Broertjes and Jose Smits: "Employers and Unions See Support for Own Views in Shorter Work Week Studies"; date and place not given]

[Text] On Friday, the administration held talks with employers organizations and unions about unemployment. Has the idea of a shorter work week had its day? The decision will be made over the next few weeks. Two important studies (metal industry and Philips) on the possibilities of a further shortening of the work week are on the way and soon the members will express their opinion. The signs are unfavorable. Pieter Broertjes and Jose Smits made a tour of the negotiators and turned their spotlight on current practice. "If the union movement takes a flexible position it may be possible to get the 36 hour week, but that is all."

Amsterdam -- Even before the decisive battle concerning the 36 hour work week has begun, the president of the largest federation of trade unions is protecting himself from criticism of his dishevelled labor conditions policy. Only if the voters are willing in May 1986, will the FNV [Netherlands Trade Unions Federation] be able to close ranks and to keep the 36 hour work week above water.

FNV President Hans Pont said at a press conference that "the key to our success lies with the election results." "And," he clarified, "if that turns out wrong for the FNV, then we will have to learn to live with several results in our labor conditions policy."

A risky position because the union policy is put in the hands of voters instead of in the hands of members. Pont is apparently gambling that next year, thanks to favorable election results, he will be able to carry off the 36 hour week before the gates of hell, prior to the last CAO round. But is politics really a reliable partner?

Dr Will Albeda, the new president of the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR, the government's "think tank"), recently hit the nail on the head at an international conference on "the role of unions in the nineties."

Albeda, former minister of social affairs (1977-1981), noted that "no government derives any benefit from an agreement with a union movement which has no influence on the labor market." The recovery of employment is vital to a strong union movement, was his motto.

Therefore Johan Stekelenburg, vice president of the FNV, does not agree with his president. He feels that the FNV leadership should not be "tied up" to the elections of May of next year. "That is not a guarantee of success. We will also have to strengthen our own organization. Recruitment of members and binding of members will have to be given a great deal of attention over the next few months. Our election program is directed toward that also."

Conditional Sale

For the time being the FNV will have to win the battle for the 36 hour week in 1986 by itself. The fight against the onrush of unemployment began in the late seventies and led in November 1981 to the Agreement of Wassenaar. Former employers leader Chris van Veen and former FNV President Wim Kok agreed on a conditional sale: the productivity of the enterprises will be restored (by way of wage moderation) and labor will be redistributed (via the introduction of various forms of reduction of working hours). On the basis of this narrow compromise a decision was made in 1983, following tough negotiations and some sniping, to shorten the work week to an average of 38 hours. The first step on the road to the workers' goal (32 hour work week by 1990) had been taken.

This spring, the employers were able to stave off the demand for an average of 36 hours per week by proposing a joint study of the consequences of a further redistribution of labor. The first bottlenecks became visible and the employers wanted to stop for a moment. Independent research should produce results. The unions grudgingly agreed, as long as delay did not turn into abandonment.

In making up the balance sheet, it seems that by the end of 1985, 10 percent (190,000 workers) of the 2.2 million workers in the market sector had the 36 hour work week included in their CAO's. Stekelenburg remains optimistic about the outcome: "By the end of 1986, implementation of the 36 hour work week will be a fact for 1.5 million workers in the market sector."

His most important opponent, the president of the metal industry employers, engineer W. ter Hart (will retire next year for health reasons), has completely different thoughts about that. He has never been a proponent of a collective reduction of working hours.

Shortly before the results of the study in the metal sector (225,000 workers) are to be published, he has appeared more confident than ever. The study will not play a decisive role in the negotiations with the unions about a new CAO.

Ter Hart: "We have heard from a few hundred entrepreneurs at our regional meetings of members. They all said -- let's say 99 percent of them -- about the introduction of a 36 hour work week: that never. Or no, I shouldn't say it that way; they say: not that." Given this general position, Ter Hart cannot imagine that the outcome of the study will be 36 hours for everyone in 1986.

Pretention

The FME [Metalworkers Union Federation] leader added that the study does not pretend to determine once and for all what is and what is not possible. "Twenty-four enterprises were examined. It is true that they were spread all over the country, but when you know that 1,100 enterprises are members of the FME and that they represent 60 branches, then you also know that 24 examined companies is not many."

He expects that the study will back up the employers. "The unions have always accused us of using scare tactics when we argued that this would create scarcity on the labor market. The study will show that in some regions there is indeed a large supply of unskilled workers, but barely any supply of highly skilled technical personnel."

FNV leader Stekelenburg also presented the conclusions of the Berenschot study as supporting his views. He already had read some draft reports. "We will be vindicated."

"After 7 months, the negotiations which ended in April will be resumed. The employers used the studies as diversionary measures to prevent actions. The studies are producing long lists of bottlenecks. The employers are saying: see, it cannot be done. And we are saying: those bottlenecks do exist, but they can be solved."

Stekelenburg: "Our input in the near future will not change. Shorter working hours have to be implemented, but this cannot have a freezing effect on economic growth. Hence it is of the utmost importance that operating hours not be shortened, because then profits will automatically be put under pressure. The FNV has never said that operating hours should be shortened. Another form of roster free days is also negotiable for us."

Printers and Allied Workers

As has often been the case, the printing sector is already a few steps ahead. In the beginning of the year, the CAO partners agreed to introduce the 36 hour work week as of 1 October 1986. And if the smaller companies have not gotten that far yet, all right, but then there should be a temporary wage increase. Beautifully thought out, but this week it turned out that not all the employers of printers and allied trades simply agreed with that. The printers and allied workers did not want to run out on the agreement, but for the time being a 32 hour work week is taboo.

W. Laman, head of the labor conditions division of the Association of Printing and Allied Trades Enterprises, KVGGO, was somber. He was as sorry as could be that the printing and allied trades industry has become a testing ground. "We see daily that it is hard to get skilled people. It will lead to a situation where companies try to buy away each other's craftsmen. Wages will go up and that will get even worse when the 36 hour week is implemented in the near future."

Hence, doubt.

There is no doubt at the Utrecht electro-technical corporation Holec. In April of this year, the management came up with its own plan to shorten the work week to 36 hours and partly to 32 hours, with maintenance of wages. In exchange, the 3,500 personnel members were asked henceforth to work in double shifts and on Saturdays.

The FME, Ter Hart's club, was furious. But Holec's initiative was followed spontaneously by employers who for pragmatic reasons shifted to implementation of the 36 hour work week.

The instigator of the evil, Holec manager J. Leyten, is still willing to implement the 36 hour work week as long as the unions agree with his conditions: no 36 hours for technical craftsmen and upper level personnel, but 36 hours for administrative functions.

Curiously enough, the unions have never jumped at Holec's plans. He suspects that the leaders do not dare to propose to the members that they work on Saturdays. "I expect that in the next few months the unions will have problems primarily with their rank and file."

The first fall skirmishes (Akzo members demanded sharp wage increases) indicated that the mood at the CAO front is extremely tense. The unions, battered by loss of members, are stuck between the policy started years ago (shorter work week is a must) and the members' call for more money now that the economic tide has become somewhat more favorable again. To issue strong wage demands now instead of continuing with shortening the work week puts the credibility of the leaders at risk.

Stekelenburg admits that FNV members are less willing to accept income cuts for shorter work weeks, but was not yet ready to budge. "Solidarity -- you cannot buy bread with that. I know that. But it is our task to convince the members that the fight against mass unemployment is a question of well understood self-interest. 'For you, 10 others,' weakens the power position of the unions tremendously. That must be ended."

Tactic

Ter Hart is not afraid of wage demands if the unions do not get any promises for further reductions in working hours. "That is a form of pressure used by the unions. The question is whether such wage demands spontaneously come from the workers or are prompted. It could be a tactic. I am convinced that the unions won't let it get that far."

He sees nice things for working individuals in the future. "I sometimes compare the future CAO with a counter or a fruit basket. You take a plate and you choose exactly what looks attractive to you. The items on the counter would then include parttime work, wage increase, a VUT regulation. In such a system a choice could then be made, depending on the needs of the entrepreneurs. One of them would give preference to this, another to that."

"But I don't want to be misunderstood," he said hastily. "I am not opposed to a redistribution of labor. But it cannot be such that a uniform work week applicable to everyone should be implemented." Holec manager Leyten, soberly: "Ter Hart will say goodbye next year. These are the last negotiations he will conduct in the name of the FME. He would not want to go into history as the man who gave in to the 36 hour work week."

DAF Trucks top manager F. Sweens in Eindhoven did not leave any misunderstanding about the outcome of the upcoming CAO negotiations. He is very enthusiastic about the flexible manner in which his corporation introduced the 36 hour work week in 1983 (forced by economic necessity): production has increased and costs have decreased. His example deserves to be followed.

He is afraid that many companies will succumb to the process of shortening of working hours if they do not change their tack in time. He dictated the conditions: "Point one. If the unions don't allow a differentiation in working hours among branches of industry, companies and departments, the process will irrevocably stagnate. That is already going on. Point two. If the unions take a flexible position and accept flexible arrangements, then the 36 hour work week will probably be a fact for the majority of the people by next year. But then it will also be over for a long time to come."

8463

CSO: 3614/39

ALL FORECASTS SEEN IN AGREEMENT REGARDING WEAKER ECONOMY

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 22 Dec 85 p 14

[Article by Anders Nordstrom]

[Text] Sweden's economy is weakening. Economic growth in 1986 will not even be half as fast as it has been in 1985. What is the reason for that, and what will the consequences be?

The year 1986 will not be a good new year. At least not from the economic standpoint. The curves are no longer pointing in the right direction.

DAGENS NYHETER's compilation of economic forecasts is unambiguous: growth will slacken, and the Swedish economy will perform considerably worse than that in the rest of the world.

A country's economy is measured by its GNP, which includes the value of all goods and services produced in that country. Despite all its shortcomings, the GNP is the best measure economists have of a country's material well-being.

Sweden's GNP will grow very slowly in 1986. All of the fall's economic forecasts agree on that point. A compilation of eight forecasts by DAGENS NYHETER results in a growth figure of only 0.9 percent in 1986.

That is less than half the growth rate in 1985. There have only been 4 years since the war when growth in Sweden was at such a low level. That figure can also be compared to the average growth for the Western industrialized countries, which is expected to total 2.8 percent in 1986.

Unemployment

Rationalization of the country's production will continue in 1986, although not at the same rate as in 1985.

At the same time, the number of people looking for work is going to increase. The number of people retiring will be considerably less than the number of

young people leaving school. And if all production combined does not increase fast enough, those two trends will lead inexorably to higher unemployment.

And that is exactly what the forecasters are predicting for 1986. Unemployment is going to increase from 2.9 percent in 1985 to just over 3.2 percent in 1986.

Rudolf Jalakas, an economist at the Trade Bank, says: "But unfortunately, that is only the beginning. The recession will not really make itself felt until 1987 and 1988. There has been talk that we will see unemployment figures of close to 5 percent, something that I consider fully possible."

But why is growth going to slow down in 1986? There are several reasons, of course, but all observers agree that one important explanation is the decline in investments.

Investments Down

Gross investment--that is, the combined investment in schools, housing, machine tools, and so on--is going to decline in 1986, according to all the forecasts compiled by DAGENS NYHETER. Naturally, different observers see it declining by different amounts, but the average for all forecasts comes to a minus 2.1 percent.

When investment drops, the number of people working in the construction industry or in machine manufacturing also declines. Demand and employment in firms producing the goods needed for investment--everything from steel to wallpaper--also decline.

The people who lose their jobs cannot buy consumer goods--meaning everything from hot dogs to private automobiles--to the same extent as before. And the firms producing those goods therefore experience a drop in demand.

That is how a decline in investment spreads like rings in water to other parts of the economy, with the result being a slowdown in growth.

Cutbacks

It is easy to see how investment, employment, and growth could slow down in that way when the world's economy is weak. But why is Sweden being hit harder than other countries?

Rudolf Jalakas says: "The explanation is that the Swedish Government is pursuing an economic austerity policy that is making the slump worse.

"Governments used to stimulate demand to counteract an economic slump. Now the opposite is being done: cutbacks are making the economic slump worse.

"That is just the opposite of traditional Social Democratic policy, but necessity knows no law. Sweden must tighten up in order to straighten out the imbalances in our economy. This has reference to the deficit in trade with

other countries, the budget deficit, which is still too high, and inflation, which must be brought down to the level in other countries.

"If we succeed this time, perhaps we will be able in the next recession--in the early 1990's--to go back to a fine old Keynesian policy and stimulate demand instead of reducing it."

Item	What the Economists Predict								
	LO	TCO	PK Bank	Savings Bank	SHB Bank	S-E Bank	Econ. Inst.	Gota Bank	Average
GNP growth	1.2	1.5	1.0	1.0	-0.5	0.5	1.1	0.5	0.9
Gross investment	-4.0	-1.7	-1.5	-1.5	-0.5	-2.0	-3.1	-3.0	-2.1
Industrial investment	0.0	0.0	2.0	5.0	5.0	-2.0	0.0	-5.0	+0.6
Exports	4.8	5.0	4.0	3.0	0.0	0.0	2.2	3.5	2.8
Inflation (average for the year)	4.0	5.0	5.0	5.5	6.5	6.5	5.0	5.0	5.3
Current account balance (billions of kronor)	-0.7	0/-3.0	-7.0	-5.0	-12.0	-9.0	-2.7	-8.0	-5.9
Unemployment (percent of labor force)	3.2	2.9	3.2	-	3.2	3.3	3.1	3.2	3.2

Sven Hegelund, who is an economist for the Negotiation Cartel for Local Government Officers, is not entirely sure that a perceptible austerity policy will be necessary.

"It is quite clear that there is no room for any big expansion efforts, especially since the result would be increased imports and a deteriorating balance on current account. But some cautious stimulation of investment primarily in the municipal sector ought to be possible," he says.

"It is well known, of course, that government investments in schools, roads, water supplies, and such things do not increase imports anywhere near as much as stimulation of private consumption does."

Klas Eklund is an economist for the Cabinet Office. He does not want to anticipate the government's budget bill, which will be presented in January, by discussing its possible effects in tightening up the economy, but he provides another explanation as to why growth in Sweden will be slower than in the rest of the world.

"Slow growth in 1986 can be described as the price we must pay for the large cost increases occurring in recent years. The government's 6-percent ceiling on wage increases was cracked in 1984, of course, and it appears that this year's 5-percent ceiling is going to do the same," he says.

"That will lead to a decline in net exports, since our competitive position will be weakened. The result will be a drop in the stimulus we have been getting so far as a result of industry's success with exports."

Slow growth in 1986 will also intensify conflicts with respect to the redistribution policy. A growth rate of 1 percent is practically all signed away in advance, partly because of decisions already made to increase pensions and partly because of growth in public consumption, mainly in the form of care for the elderly and medical treatment.

This means that any improvement for one group in 1986 must be paid for with a worsening of conditions for some other group.

Sven Hegelund says: "That is an almost inescapable effect of slow growth. Tensions in society increase, not only between labor and capital but also between various groups of wage earners such as those employed in the private sector and government employees and between pensioners and the employed."

One area where the economic forecasts diverge is the balance on current account--that is, Sweden's trade with foreign countries. Here the guesses range from zero to a deficit of 12 billion kronor.

There are two aspects to this. One is that in all circumstances, the balance on current account has improved dramatically since the start of the 1980's. This is true especially if one relates the deficit to the entire economy--the GNP--which has grown substantially at current prices.

Deficit

In 1982, Sweden's deficit on current account amounted to 37 percent of GNP. In 1986, that deficit will amount to 0.6 percent of GNP if we assume that the average of all the forecasts is correct.

But a deficit on current account must always be covered by foreign borrowings that are as large as the deficit. This means that even if the deficit shrinks substantially, Sweden's foreign debt will continue to increase for every year in which foreign trade is not in balance.

That will also increase the interest that Sweden must pay continuously on its foreign debt, making it harder and harder to bring the current account into balance in the future.

11798

CSO: 3650/92

STATE, OIL FIRMS SHAKEN BY FAILURE TO FIND OIL IN BLOCK

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 30 Dec 85 p 9

[Article by Flemming Dahl: "Oil Shock Produces New Problem"]

[Text] It is not often that one would consider it very likely to think that one has several hundred billion kroner in the bank--only to discover suddenly that the money probably is not there after all. But Oil-Norway was forced to a realization of this type the other day when Norsk Hydro's expected discovery of oil in block 34/8 in the North Sea did not materialize.

If further mapping confirms the feared suspicions that the block does not contain drillable oil reservoirs, Oil-Norway will be confronted with a new set of problems. A number of interests--which had projected a future on the basis of a gigantic oil discovery in 34/8--will be required to concentrate on alternative possibilities.

The Norwegian government and the affected oil companies--with Norsk Hydro in the lead--will be required to search for other sources of income and work projects. The same will apply to the shipbuilding industry and other categories of suppliers which were looking forward to contracts in connection with the construction and operation of a giant field in block 34/8.

Gas Problem

It seems more difficult than expected to achieve a desirable price for Norwegian gas, not the least, for the extremely large gas reservoirs in the Troll field. The current Troll customers on the continent will know that Norway, lacking imminent income from newly-discovered oil, will have an increased need to sell the gas, and thereby, they will be able to see a new opportunity for pushing the price down.

In a desperate attempt to develop an alternative oil field, the Norwegian authorities may be forced to reduce oil taxes. A reduced tax rate would make it profitable for the oil companies to develop a lesser field which the companies find uninteresting given the current taxation.

Towns in the Vestland district--which were situated to be able to fight over the consequences of development and operation of an oil field in 34/8--will be required to fight over other projects. There will be one less project from which to choose, and the allocation job of the authorities will be even more difficult than it already is.

Pressure on Authorities

As operator of 34/8, Norsk Hydro was anticipating hiring hundreds of employees for a particularly challenging 34/8-project, but now can put the authorities under pressure to allocate opportunities in other interesting blocks. Not a desirable situation for the authorities who already have had problems for a long time in allocating the few interesting blocks among the many companies which are applying. (Just look back at the problems in allocating operator responsibility and ownership shares for the drilling in 34/8...)

Norsk Hydro rightly can be expected to put increasing emphasis on its insistence on a yet-more crucial role than the company previously had been given in the anticipated construction of the Troll project. This would mean an increase of the already existing disagreement between Norsk Hydro on the one hand, and the other Troll participants--such as Statoil, Shell and Saga--on the other hand.

For central and northern Norwegian interests, the failure to discover oil in 34/8, however, can provide a certain joy--should it lead to increased efforts toward exploration for oil and development of fields farther north on the continental shelf. Central and northern Norwegian interests have felt for a long time that projects on the southern part of the shelf have been given too high a priority.

Gas-Norway

With the oil disappointment in connection with 34/8, it is more likely than ever that Oil-Norway will be re-christened Gas-Norway. The proven gas resources on the Norwegian shelf are becoming ever-more predominant relative to the proven oil resources.

Gas represents potential income--just as does oil--but paradoxically enough, gas produces headache, and certainly anything but just happiness. The reason is that in the foreseeable future, it appears difficult to be able to sell anything approaching all of the available gas--and with that which can be sold being at the price which the customers offer simply in order to ensure some income, given the lack of oil income.

For the American company Conoco--which battled for an ownership interest in 34/8, among other ways, by participating in the construction of a rig by the Trosvik Group in Brevik--the disappointment from 34/8 must be unusually unwelcome. It now appears that Conoco again is sitting with a very expensive rig--even taking note of how various problems with the construction of the rig were solved--but will not be receiving any oil income from 34/8.

12578

CSO: 3639/54

UNANTICIPATED ECONOMIC GROWTH SEEN RESULTING IN POWER DEFICIT

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 30 Dec 85 p 9

[Article by Kjell Aaserud: "Hydroelectric System Manager"]

[Text] "Economic growth has been stronger than the government's allowances in its figures for the supply of electricity. As it now looks, there will be a deficit of 2 billion kilowatt-hours in 1990," says Gunnar Vatten.

A long time ago, Gunnar Vatten took his place as the successor to Sigurd Aalefjaer as the director of the State's Power Stations. Starting on 1 January, these same State's Power Stations will become an independently managed firm under the direct aegis of the Oil and Energy Department--from whence Vatten came as deputy secretary. This does not mean that he is unknown in the "inner sanctum" of Norwegian hydroelectric power expansion in Middelthun Street. He was hand-picked from there for the department but now is returning once again.

[Question] "What is so different between 'the old' State's Power Stations and the operating firm with the same name?"

[Answer] "The operating firm, State's Power Stations, will be more operationally oriented and function according to operational-economic criteria set by Parliament," states Gunnar Vatten. "It is divided into five divisions--three on the technical side and two on the staff side. One of the technical divisions will manage the facilities. As respects expansion, the firm will have to compete directly with private contractors--who additionally long ago overtook more and more of the facilities. While private contractors had only about 20 percent of the new facilities around 1970, they now have about half. On the other hand, the total numbers have decreased."

[Question] "Industry and the common woman and man are more interested in there not being power rationing."

Power For Sale, But ...

[Answer] "We seemingly have not been polite enough in providing information. There has been talk about up-coming rationing. There is power available. The only issue is the price. When we buy expensive power from our neighbor countries, can this not be used as a means of competition by our own industries? Other countries, for example Canada, use their power as an industrial-political tool. We are seeing, among other things, that Norwegian firms are evaluating locating in Canada precisely because of the availability and price of power."

[Question] "According to very many, we soon will have a shortage of power."

[Answer] "Because of the increased economic activity, I will not contradict the assertions. By way of large facilities, Jostedal is under way, but Parliament likely will not make a decision on Stryn and Saltfjellet before 1987. Our job is to move the publicly-owned facilities forward as quickly as possible. We have much to do concerning Stryn and Saltfjellet in the coming years. But that will not be enough. Therefore, I hope that Parliament will 'cut through' when a new energy report and plan come up for consideration in the spring. My hope is that the hydroelectric system will be moved ahead from category two and three to category one and on to dealing with granting concessions because the outlook at the moment is not good."

Gunnar Vatten does not want to name any water systems, but unless we are terribly mistaken, Gaular and Rauma must be on his mind.

Financial Problems

"One problem is that usable streams are in districts with good power supplies. If these districts themselves were to develop power plants, they would have liquidity problems and face financial difficulties. In my speech I have asserted that more streams can be developed into power sources through longterm guarantees of the state buying the power and attempting to solve the financial problems in that manner.

"It is clear that we are confronting great challenges concerning energy supplies for today and tomorrow," states Gunnar Vatten.

"If one views the situation in a broader perspective, the job which we have--concerning research and development in order to maintain and preferably increase our competency in the energy field--is a continuation of our previous endeavors. It is of particular interest that the work which will be done in this area will be made available to Norwegian industry with a view to locating in foreign countries. Under no circumstances will the operational firm of the State's Power Stations lack challenges in the future."

12578

CSO: 3639/54

END

**END OF
FICHE
DATE FILMED**

4 March 1986

